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The German-Russian exchange – particularly in demographic matters – is an integral part of the work of Robert Bosch Stiftung. The 
present study, which has been co-financed by Robert Bosch Stiftung, shows that Russia and its neighbours are facing several challen-
ges: these include low birth rates, ineffective health care systems, low life expectancies as well as migration flows, which lead 
to ethnic conflicts in many places. Some of these issues are also familiar to Germany. In the context of the German-Russian exchange, 
it is therefore important to learn from one another, to support scientific dialogue and to cooperate in tackling the problems caused by 
demographic change. 
4  The Waning World Power
Russia and the other Soviet successor states 
have a long, painful history of demographic 
crisis: hunger, war, persecution and genocide 
have repeatedly decimated their populations 
and driven the people to places no human 
being would actually want to live in. But the 
demographic changes now facing the region 
differ from previous experiences.
On the one hand, the large post-war gene-
ration is reaching pension age, although in 
Russia – as in Ukraine and Belarus – about 
half of all men die before they are 65, 
anyway. Nowhere in Europe do people die 
as early as they do in Russia. On the other 
hand, a generation of young people, born 
in the immediate post-Soviet period with 
very few children, is approaching working 
age. When they reach childbearing age and 
have as few children as people currently do, 
the demographic downturn will accelerate 
further. Russia’s far north and far east, in 
particular, are already undergoing a veritable 
upon the world economy; that it promotes 
monopolies and corruption and forces state 
intervention in the economy; that it divides 
society into rich oligarchs and an underclass 
of have-nots. But the former empire of Czars 
and five-year planners is having a hard 
time dispensing with old ideologies and 
establishing a future based on its citizens’ 
own capabilities, meaning a modern society 
with a creative, self-confident middle class 
which thinks and acts freely. Despite all 
efforts to promote innovation from above, 
with technology parks and special economic 
zones, there is little evidence of a new, open 
and economically liberal Russia. 
Necessary efforts towards quality, demo-
cracy, health and education should not only 
focus on human talent; they should also 
openly address immigration. Russia needs 
immigrants, like all strongly shrinking and 
ageing nations such as Japan and Germany, 
population implosion since, in addition to 
low fertility, people are emigrating in droves. 
By the middle of the century, the number of 
Russia’s inhabitants could sink by 25 million. 
The working-age population will suffer 
especially heavy losses, shrinking by 15 
million or about 20 percent by 2030. 
The country, however, will have to master 
what may be one of the greatest trans-
formations: turning an economy based on 
natural resources, which president Dmitry 
Medvedev once called “primitive”, to a 
service and knowledge-based economy with 
a broad foundation. Moscow’s leadership 
knows very well that selling oil, gas and 
metals will not pave the way to sustainable 
development; that it is highly dependent 
CLAIMS TO GLOBAL INFLUENCE 
AND FEAR OF DOMESTIC COLLAPSE
Where are the world’s biggest country and its neighbours heading?
1960 2010 2050
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in order to survive in a globalized world. 
Enough can be found in the Caucasus, Central 
Asia and all the predominantly Muslim Soviet 
successor states. But Russia’s population is 
by no means prepared to productively exploit 
these Soviet-era bonds. Fear of the foreign 
goes hand in hand with a return to nationalist 
countries. The demographic crisis is also a 
great opportunity for renewal.
Berlin, March 2011
Reiner Klingholz
Director
Berlin Institute for Population 
and Development
sympathies. In Moscow, especially, where 
about one-fifth of the population is Muslim, 
suspicion is increasingly turning violent.
If Russia wants to maintain its role as a world 
power, it has to be willing to modernize the 
state. Demographic changes are creating 
enormous pressure to implement reforms. 
Young people, few though they are, need 
sound educations, jobs, functioning health 
care systems and, above all, individual 
freedom so that they can contribute to their 
China 646 China 1.354 India 1.614
India 448 India 1.214 China 1.417
Soviet Union 214 USA 318 USA 404
USA 186 Indonesia 233 Pakistan 335
(Russian SSR) 120 Brazil 195 Nigeria 289
Japan 93 Pakistan 185 Indonesia 288
Indonesia 93 Bangladesh 164 Bangladesh 223
Brazil 73 Nigeria 158 Brazil 219
Germany 73 Russia 140 Ethiopia 174
Bangladesh 54 Japan 127 Congo 148
United Kingdom 52 Mexico 111 Philippines 146
Italy 50 Philippines 94 Egypt 130
Pakistan 49 Vietnam 89 Mexico 129
France 46 Ethiopia 85 Russia 116
Nigeria 45 Egypt 84 Vietnam 112
Demographic descent
In 1960, the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic would have been the world’s fourth most populous state. Despite the fact that 
today’s Russia continued to grow for most of the 20th century, by 2010, it only ranked 9th. The demographic shrinkage, which 
will cost Russia about 25 million people until 2050 – the combined size of the country’s ten largest cities –, the country will 
no longer appear among the top ten by the middle of the century.
Russia and the world’s most populous countries, inhabitants in millions, 1960, 2010 and 2050
(Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database, New York)
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OVERVIEW
20 years of transformation and no end in sight
It has been about 20 years since the failed 
putsch of August 1991 sealed the Soviet 
Union’s fate. At that time, a group of 
conservative functionaries tried in vain to 
disempower president Mikhail Gorbachev and 
turn back the clock. It was no longer possible, 
however, to stop a superpower from falling 
apart into 15 countries of the most various 
sizes and levels of development. 
Economic allies became competitors 
practically overnight when the Soviet system 
of regional division of labour collapsed: 
while the Central Asian countries had been 
responsible for the production of hydropower 
and cotton, Ukraine for the supply of 
numerous finished products and Moldova 
for food, the countries now had to stand on 
their own feet and seek markets for their 
products. The competition for capital, people 
and technology flared up even within the new 
countries. Where economic and settlement 
structures were once subordinated to security 
policy issues, they now primarily responded 
to market incentives. In many places, these 
made nonsense of established structures: 
numerous industrial settlements collapsed 
under the high costs of production, centres 
of the defence industry became obsolete and 
rural areas emptied due to emigration. 
Between the new freedoms and the unfamiliar 
supply of consumer goods on the one hand 
and the reality of million-fold poverty and 
unemployment on the other, an enormous 
gap emerged. This did not only have a dire 
effect on psychological health: drug and 
This study shows a world region which is 
slowly leaving behind the chaos of the 1990s 
and, in part, achieving high rates of economic 
growth. This often reinforces existing 
regional inequality, however. It also shows a 
region still marked by mutual dependencies 
even 20 years after its fragmentation and, at 
the same time, slowly opening up to the rest 
of the world. It shows a region characterized 
by a demographic process of shrinking in 
the north and strong population growth in 
the south; facing a dwindling labour force 
on the one hand and migration pressure 
on the other. Balancing these is often more 
complicated than it may appear in theory.
A cluster analysis – a classification of regions 
in the post-Soviet space into groups – based 
on demographic characteristics, makes 
it possible to trace the most important 
trends and to get a glimpse of the future. A 
second cluster analysis based on economic 
features provides orientation when 
trying to understand the regions’ levels of 
development. The results of this cluster 
analysis are described separately on page 11. 
Comprehensive information about methods 
and data can be found in the chapter 
“Indicators and Methods” on page 138. 
alcohol abuse destroyed many people 
physically. Aids became a problem and 
tuberculosis enjoyed a renaissance. In 
Russia, life expectancy for men was lower at 
57 years than it had been since World War II. 
Moreover, empty public coffers and extreme 
inflation rates following price deregulation 
tore holes in the social safety net. 
Those who barely had enough to ensure 
their own survival could not afford to have 
children. Within a decade, the average 
number of children per woman in Russia 
sank from over two to 1.2. There were 
similar developments in many other Soviet 
successor states as well as in the entire 
ex-Soviet sphere of influence, in East 
Germany and in most of the Central and 
Eastern European countries. Starting in the 
mid-1990s, women increasingly postponed 
childbearing in order to pursue their career 
goals first and thus reinforced the downward 
trend in fertility rates. 
In regions where more people die than 
are born, demographic stability depends 
upon immigration. The population shrinks 
and ages especially fast in those places to 
which no one moves. Ageing in turn makes 
the social safety net expensive, while 
the infrastructure in rural areas becomes 
more and more costly for the remaining 
and shrinking population. The population 
number is not, however, the only decisive 
factor in regional sustainability; the socio-
economic characteristics of inhabitants 
are also important: in order to secure long-
term prosperity and well-being, citizens’ 
education levels play an ever-greater role in 
post-industrial societies. Attaining peaceful 
relations in the face of ethnic and religious 
differences is another major challenge facing 
modern societies. 
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Cluster 1 – Where immigrants go
Thanks to immigration, a small group of 
regions managed in the past to maintain 
or even increase their populations despite 
low numbers of children. These include 
the capital cities of Moscow, Kiev and 
Minsk as well as the Baltic Sea metropolis 
of St. Petersburg and the Ukrainian Black 
Sea harbour of Sevastopol. Cities such 
as Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod 
and Novosibirsk are undergoing similar 
standards, this group’s population losses by 
2030 will be minimal. A few regions may 
even experience slight growth. 
Natural resource production, often quoted 
as Russia’s only engine of growth, only plays 
a larger role in Tatarstan and Belgorod. The 
capital cities have instead become centres 
of modern services such as banking and 
insurance, while Krasnodar Krai owes its 
popularity to agriculture, trade and tourism. 
With the ever-slower expansion of natural 
resource production, which accounts for the 
bulk of Russian GDP but only provides 1.5 
percent of all jobs, these regions are well-
equipped for the future. 
developments, but not the regions to which 
they belong, where the rural areas, villages 
and small towns provide fewer and fewer 
job prospects for the young and educated. 
In addition to these administratively 
independent cities, group 1 contains 
exclusively Russian regions: Moscow and 
Leningrad Oblasts, the popular Black 
Sea region of Krasnodar, the Republic of 
Tatarstan on the Volga and the small region 
of Belgorod on the Ukrainian border. They 
have become immigrant destinations due 
to their economic strength and regional 
features such as an attractive geographical 
location (Krasnodar) or active migration 
policies (Belgorod). With the exception of 
greater St. Petersburg, where women have 
extremely few children even by Russian 
Demography
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4
Cluster 5
(Source: see chapter „Indicators 
and Methods“)
Yakutsk
Vladivostok
Magadan
Novosibirsk
Almaty
Murmansk
Saratov
MOSCOW
RIGA TALLINN
ASTANA
VILNIUS
MINSK
KIEV
Kaliningrad
St. Petersburg
BISHKEK
DUSHANBE
ASHGABAT
BAKU
YEREVAN
TBILISI
TASHKENT
 CHISINAU
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Nonetheless, these alleged “winner regions” 
are facing enormous challenges: young 
and old, natives and immigrants, rich and 
poor are but a few of the opposing forces 
which need to be reconciled. 18.7 percent 
of inhabitants are 60 or older. While it is 
true that immigrants lower the average age 
and make sure that the labour force shrinks 
more slowly here than elsewhere, migrants 
increasingly face opposition – sometimes 
violent – from the native population. 
Restrictive migration policies introduced at 
the beginning of the century contributed to 
this, forcing many immigrants into illegality. 
Most recently, fear of terrorism has also been 
feeding resentment towards immigrants, who 
often hail from Muslim countries or the crisis-
ridden Russian North Caucasus. Allaying 
these fears is one of politics’ and society’s 
most difficult tasks in the near future. Other 
problems include economic inequality, which 
has become extreme in Moscow in particular, 
and limited housing in the major cities. 
Many of the regions in group 2 are direct 
neighbours of the EU. The three Baltic states 
have even been EU members since 2004. 
From an economic perspective, they stand 
out from the rest of group since they are 
among the wealthiest regions of the former 
Soviet Union. Yet membership in the EU has 
led to westward migration losses. 
Despite demographic stability, the regions 
in group 2 do not count among the post-
Soviet hopefuls – with the exception of the 
Baltic states. In the North Caucasus, political 
instability, corruption and a lack of legal 
security block sustainable development 
as much as the population’s low level of 
education. Only when this changes will 
foreign investors find their way back here, 
since the region will hardly manage on its 
own to catch up to the rest of the country. 
There is no money to invest – up to 80 
percent of many of these regions’ budgets 
come from federal subsidies – and innovation 
is extremely weak. This is also true for 
western Ukraine and large parts of Belarus. 
Cluster 2 – Where people live long
The regions in group 2 are also facing 
generally low population losses in the next 
two decades, if for entirely other reasons 
than the economically strong areas in group 
1. In contrast to the latter, almost all of the 
members of this group are losing inhabitants 
due to emigration. Women, however, have 
an average of 1.64 children in the course of 
their lives, which is about 0.3 more than in 
group 1. One reason for this is that group 2 
includes more rural areas in which traditional 
lifestyles are still the norm. This is true 
for both regions in the North and South 
Caucasus as well as for the western regions 
of Ukraine and Belarus. 
The really distinguishing feature of this 
group is, however, the high life expectancy 
of 72.2 years. This can be attributed to 
climatic conditions as well as the significance 
of religion and the ethnic make-up of the 
population. Both in the North Caucasus as 
well as in the western regions of Ukraine, 
there are fewer Russians than the nationwide 
average. Avoidable alcohol-related deaths 
occur less often. Low industrial density, 
meaning less environmental pollution, 
contributes to longer lives as does the 
low degree of urbanization, which limits 
problems like drug abuse and HIV.*
* Some researchers doubt the credibility of life 
expectancy data from the North Caucasus. In 
particular the republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia 
seem too positively assessed. These economically 
underdeveloped regions would have been assigned 
to group 5, if life expectancy had been somewhat 
lower.
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Cluster 3 – Where the population 
is ageing and shrinking due to low 
fertility
There is a low fertility belt, in which the 
ageing of society has reached an advanced 
stage, extending from Kaliningrad through 
vast parts of Belarus and Ukraine, Central 
and Northwest Russia and past the Urals 
to the Siberian region of Krasnoyarsk. As a 
result, in group 3 a fifth of the population is 
60 or older; in the north Ukrainian region 
of Chernihiv, the figure is as much as 25 
percent. On average, these regions will 
probably shrink by double-digit percentages 
until 2030. Containing 66 regions, group 3 is 
clearly the largest of all. 
Industrial regions of average economic 
strength constitute a large portion of the 
group. The GDP spectrum reaches from an 
annual 14,700 international dollars per 
capita in Central Russian Lipetsk Oblast to 
3,800 international dollars in the Zakarpattia 
Oblast in Ukraine’s outermost southwest. In 
many places, immigration and emigration 
balance each other out. Only a few areas have 
notable migration surpluses. These include 
the Central Russian oblasts of Kaluga and 
Yaroslavl, Samara and Astrakhan Oblasts 
on the Volga, Russia’s western outpost of 
Kaliningrad, the Ukrainian Black Sea harbour 
of Odessa as well as the scientific centres of 
Novosibirsk and Tomsk. 
the private sector in Russia is much more 
successful than the state when it comes to 
patent applications and license agreements. 
The construction of innovation centres 
cannot solve all problems at once anyway. 
Regional differences are too big for the 
Russian government to bridge the gap in 
wealth within a short period. Taking the 
advice of many experts, the Kremlin decided 
in the mid-2000s to direct investments 
primarily to regions worth subsidizing; 
for example, to places where a city can 
become an engine of growth or where tourist 
potential can be exploited, and to use tax 
revenues to support other regions. 
Cluster 4 – Where people leave 
the peripheries
Relatively few potential engines of growth 
can be found in Russia’s far north and east. 
These regions belong to group 4, which is 
primarily characterized by massive out-
migration. In addition to peripheral Russian 
regions, the northern parts of Kazakhstan 
and Moldova belong to this group. Next to 
emigration, these regions are marked by low 
life expectancies, slightly above-average 
numbers of children and, consequently, 
young population structures. 
The group of emigration regions clearly 
shows that uniform settlement of the Russian 
territory cannot be realized under market 
conditions. During the Soviet era, people 
could be attracted to far-off regions by wage 
top-ups and generous holiday provisions. 
Since the demise of the planned economy, 
however, there are few reasons to move 
from major centres to distant areas, where 
When Russia’s leadership talks about 
modernizing the economy through 
innovation, it has many of this group’s 
regions in mind. To a certain extent, they 
constitute the country’s old industrial core. 
The crisis in the mechanical engineering 
sector had, in some areas, disastrous 
consequences. Numerous regions are 
trying to counter economic stagnation 
with increased investment in research and 
development. In only very few, however, 
has this effort resulted in an increasing 
number of patent applications, a common 
indicator of innovation strength. Among the 
happy exceptions are the Siberian oblasts of 
Novosibirsk and Tomsk, Kursk and Voronezh 
Oblasts, and Ulyanovsk Oblast in the Volga 
Federal District. By Ukrainian standards, 
Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts have 
high innovation rates, but compared to 
Russia, they are modest. 
A fundamental problem in the Russian 
research landscape is industry’s low demand 
for innovation. During the Soviet era, the 
state did, indeed, invest extensively in 
science; but a majority of the expenditures 
were made in the “military-industrial 
complex”. These expenditures were 
significantly curtailed when the Cold War 
ended but a market for civil innovation 
did not emerge in its place. Many firms do 
not have money left for research because 
they have to invest large sums into the 
modernization of outdated production plants. 
This is why Russia’s public coffers fund about 
70 percent of research and development and 
only about 30 percent is funded privately. 
In Germany, the USA and Japan, the ratio is 
reversed. 
In recent years, the Russian state has 
generously invested in the construction 
of technology parks and special economic 
zones. Their success will depend on the 
number of enterprises which ultimately 
settle there, for despite lower expenditures, 
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temperatures remain below zero most of 
the year. Many factories are defunct due 
to enormous production costs. Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug has lost more than 
two-thirds of its inhabitants since the last 
Soviet census in 1989 and Magadan Oblast 
has lost over half. On the island of Sakhalin 
as well as in the regions of Kamchatka and 
Murmansk, losses constitute about a third 
of all inhabitants. This trend will continue 
with losses which will most likely compare 
to those in group 3. In contrast to the past, 
these will be based primarily on mortality 
surpluses since many young people eager to 
leave have already done so. 
As almost everywhere else in Russia, marked 
migration flows from rural to urban areas 
can be observed. The elderly and the socially 
disadvantaged remain behind in the villages, 
where jobs are scarce and medical care is 
generally inadequate. 
A future beyond the exploitation of valuable 
resources like gold, diamonds, crude oil and 
natural gas seems unrealistic in many places, 
particularly in the far north. This is not the 
case in the south, on the border to China. 
Yet in the regions of Amur, Khabarovsk and 
Primorye, high transportation costs also 
impede the economy. Instead, economic 
exchange with China, Japan and Korea is 
growing more significant, something of 
which many Russians are sceptical. They are 
afraid that the emerging world power in the 
south will take over the extremely sparsely 
populated eastern parts of the country. 
or the Caucasus remains doubtful due to 
political tension in many places. The blessing 
could thus fast become a curse: if economic 
prospects for young people do not improve, 
the latter will continue to emigrate or seek 
their fortunes in informal sectors. The drug 
trade, for example, is already flourishing in 
Central Asia. 
The oblasts of Aktobe and Atyrau in the 
western part of Kazakhstan, which also 
belong to group 5, do not fit into the picture. 
Labour migrants are attracted by crude oil 
production as they are in Tyumen Oblast in 
Western Siberia, which belongs to this group 
as well. Kazakhstan’s economic upswing 
has also led to massive immigration in the 
independent cities of Astana and Almaty. Like 
the oil-producing oblast of Mangystau, they 
are excluded from the analysis (see chapter 
“Indicators and Methods”). They do, however, 
combine young population structures and 
high numbers of children, as in group 5, with 
extremely high rates of immigration and 
economic strength, which even exceed most 
of group 1 regions. 
Cluster 5 – Where lots of children 
ensure population growth
The majority of regions in group 5 also have 
to fight emigration. These regions will by no 
means empty, however, since women have 
an average of 2.78 children – as many as in 
North Africa. This is significantly more than 
required for stable population development. 
The high numbers of children lead to an 
extremely young population structure and, 
in some places, high rates of growth, clearly 
distinguishing these regions from all other 
clusters. 
The main reason for the high numbers of 
children is the low level of development in 
these regions. In much of Central Asia and in 
the Russian republics of Chechnya, Tuva and 
Altai, people generate but 1,000 to 5,000 
international dollars a year. The average 
in the post-Soviet space is about 9.500. 
Social safety nets have barely been created, 
which is why families continue to assume 
the responsibility for care. Yet the children 
have few local job prospects, which is why 
young people are leaving in droves. The most 
popular destination is Moscow, whence they 
send a major portion of their wages back 
to the homeland in order to support their 
families. 
Strong population development creates both 
opportunities and risks. In many places, the 
numbers of children per woman has fallen 
markedly in recent years, a trend which 
will probably continue. In proportion to 
the working-age population, the number 
of children will thus decrease while, at the 
same time, there are still comparatively few 
pensioners. The “demographic dividend” 
constituted by a growing working-age 
population once helped other countries, 
like the “Asian tigers”, to develop quickly. In 
order to make use of this dividend, however, 
enormous investments in jobs are required. 
Whether this will be possible in Central Asia 
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Economy
(Source: see chapter „Indicators 
and Methods“)
The growth engines
The regions of cluster 1 of the economic 
analysis unite extraordinary economic 
strength and above-average employment 
rates. The cluster includes cities such as 
Moscow and Astana as well as resource-
producing regions such as Tyumen and 
Sakhalin Oblasts in Russia and Atyrau and 
Mangystau Oblasts in Kazakhstan. The EU 
member states of Estonia and Latvia also 
belong to this group.
The reformers
Cluster 2 contains regions which, measured 
by GDP and employment, are slightly above-
average but are characterized primarily 
by extensive investment in research and 
development. These are, above all, European 
The laggards
Cluster 4 clearly comes in last, both in terms 
of GDP and employment. It includes much of 
the Caucasus, a few underdeveloped regions 
of Siberia, two regions of western Ukraine as 
well as Tajikistan. The shadow economy plays 
a large role in this cluster since legal labour 
markets are barely developed in many places. 
The risk of social unrest is increasing in those 
places where many children are born, as can 
already be observed in the North Caucasus. 
regions in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus; 
frequently, ones with large cities such as 
Yekaterinburg in Sverdlovsk Oblast. The 
cluster also includes some Siberian regions 
such as Novosibirsk and Tomsk. Investment 
in research and development is not a 
sufficient condition of future prosperity but 
it is an important prerequisite – especially 
in regions without large deposits of natural 
resources. 
The large mass
Cluster 3 is by far the largest group and, to 
a certain extent, it constitutes the “average 
scenario”. The regions in this cluster have 
neither high GDPs nor massive investments 
in promising sectors of the economy. They 
also have average employment rates. 
Many regions lack the conditions to attract 
immigrants in the future. 
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12  The Waning World Power
The Soviet population has experienced more 
than its share of hardship and extensive 
demographic losses in its 70-year history. 
The massive starvation of the 1930s and the 
Second World War at the beginning of the 
following decade claimed up to 40 million 
victims.8 Stalin’s forced resettlement of 
farmers, the deportation of entire peoples 
and forced labour in Siberia’s prison camps 
and the Far East claimed many millions more 
and extensively altered regional settlement. 
Reconstruction after the war
At the end of the Second World War, the 
western part of the Soviet Union lay in ruins. 
Hardest hit were today’s Northwestern, 
Central and Southern Federal Districts as 
well as Ukraine and Belarus. In addition to 
those who had died, millions had lost their 
homes and livelihoods. 
Already during the war, the economic and 
demographic centre of the country had 
shifted to the east. Important industries, 
such as the defence industry, had been 
evacuated in the early stages to Chelyabinsk 
and Sverdlovsk (today’s Yekaterinburg) 
behind the Urals. Today’s Siberian Federal 
District as well as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
also received development aid in this way. 
After the war, the Asian part of the country’s 
significance continued to grow. Siberia and 
the Far East were the most quickly-growing 
regions in the Soviet Union, even if the 
settlement of these inhospitable stretches of 
land was by no means voluntary. 
In order to exploit Siberia’s rich natural 
resources, the Gulag – or the Chief 
Administration of Corrective Labour Camps 
and Colonies – had already been sending 
prisoners eastwards as forced labourers 
at the end of the 1920s. Rich farmers, 
who resisted collectivization, so-called 
kulaks, were resettled by the millions in 
barely-inhabited areas. At the beginning 
of the Second World War, the government 
extensively deported Germans to Kazakhstan 
in order to prevent them from joining the 
approaching Wehrmacht, the German armed 
forces. In the final years of the war, diverse 
peoples from the Caucasus and the Crimea 
were sent to Central Asia and Siberia: 
members of the Karachay people, the Kalmyk 
people, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean 
Tatars, Greeks and others were accused 
of deserting or even collaborating with 
the occupation. After the war had ended, 
prisoners constituted a major portion of the 
labour gangs.
In the 1950s, the Soviet authorities invested 
enormous sums into the reconstruction of 
industry in all areas of the country. Heavy 
industry, the backbone of Soviet production, 
grew rapidly and required a growing number 
of workers. Stable birth surpluses ensured 
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that the demand could be met. The belief 
that economic and population growth are 
mutually stimulating took firm root during 
the first quarter century following the war’s 
end. 
Throughout the reconstruction of industry, 
which had long broken the dominance of 
agriculture in the Czarist era, an ever-larger 
portion of the Soviet population resettled in 
the cities, where, in the 1960s, more than 
half of the population lived for the first time. 
Moscow had over six million inhabitants, 
making it one of the world’s largest cities; St. 
Petersburg had about half that many. That 
the level of urbanization in the Soviet Union 
was still significantly lower than that in the 
West was due to the fact that the authorities 
limited legal access to almost all major 
centres. On the one hand, they wanted to 
be able to better plan the economy and to 
prevent social problems such as poverty and 
crime. On the other hand, particularly cities, 
which were home to the defence industry, 
were virtually barricaded during the Cold 
War. 
From 1950 to 1970, the population of the 
Soviet Union grew from 178 million to over 
240 million people; only China and India 
had more inhabitants. Over half of the Soviet 
population lived in today’s Russia, another 
one-fifth in Ukraine. Still, it was the Central 
Asian Soviet republics as well as Armenia and 
Azerbaijan that experienced the most rapid 
growth in the 1960s. In contrast to Russia’s 
urban centres, these areas maintained their 
traditionally large families – and, to a certain 
extent, still do. Between 1959 and 1970, the 
populations of the southern Soviet republics 
grew an average of 40 percent while the rest 
of the country had growth rates of between 
five and 20 percent.9 Compared to Western 
Europe, however, even these numbers were 
extremely high.10
Decline in birth rates and sinking life 
expectancy
In the 1960s, however, there were signs 
of something which would characterize 
the following decade: the number of births 
declined and population growth slowed 
down. In almost all of the urbanized 
European Soviet republics, the total fertility 
rate dropped to fewer than two children per 
woman by the end of the 1970s.11 It was only 
the constant influx of young immigrants – 
which should actually not have taken place 
under the propiska system* – which ensured 
population growth in the European part of 
* During the Soviet era, every citizen had a stamp in 
his or her passport noting a permanent residence and, 
consequently, a permanent workplace – the so-called 
propiska. Moving was extremely difficult. The only 
people who gained access to large cities such as Mos-
cow were those who exchanged places of residence with 
other citizens, had relatives in the city or were desper-
ately needed by local companies. Many people evaded 
the regulations, however, by entering sham marriages, 
using bribery or risking illegality.
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the country. Planners continued to direct 
their attention to the eastern parts of the 
country, to which they conducted people 
on a massive scale following the oil and gas 
discoveries in Western Siberia. 
The first doubts about the country’s 
demographic future appeared in the early 
1970s. Granted, only few spoke about 
population decline at the time; but it was 
clear that decreasing numbers of children 
in an economic system which relied on a 
growing number of labourers would lead to 
crisis. 
Another difficulty was that life expectancy 
in the 1960s suddenly began to sink. 
Both infant mortality and deaths among 
people of working-age contributed to this 
development.12 It was only in the 1980s that 
Mikhail Gorbachev addressed the problem 
of high mortality and disability rates, which 
were due primarily to excessive tobacco and 
alcohol consumption. Among other things, 
Gorbachev imposed restrictions on vodka 
production and sales and managed to add 
two years to average life expectancy, which 
had been lost during the 1970s. Yet the 
success of the anti-alcohol campaign did not 
last long. After the restrictions were lifted, 
people began to drink more – and to die 
earlier. 
Uncertainty and fewer children
The last Soviet census in 1989 counted 285.7 
million people nationwide.13 A decade after 
the demise of the Soviet Union, there were a 
million more people living on former Soviet 
territory, but in nine of the 15 successor 
states, the population had decreased; in 
Ukraine, in fact, by several million. 
As a consequence of economic uncertainty 
engendered by the transition to a market 
economy, the average number of children per 
woman in Russia fell within one decade from 
over 2.0 to under 1.2. The Soviet Union’s fall 
equally drastically affected life expectancy, 
which fell from 68.9 to 63.9 years between 
1991 and 1994 alone. A disproportionate 
number of men were affected by this, as they 
sought to solve the problems of transition 
with vodka. By the middle of the 1990s, they 
had a life expectancy of a mere 57.4 years.14
In 1992, more people died in Russia than 
were born for the first time since World 
War II. Annually, the country began to lose 
an average of 800,000 inhabitants due 
to rapidly increasing mortality surpluses. 
Countering this development, however, was 
the yearly return of hundreds of thousands 
of ethnic Russians who wanted to come back 
to the country of their ancestors following 
the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. 
The returnees were inspired by a lack of 
prospects, violent conflicts and germinating 
xenophobia in the Soviet Union’s successor 
states. It was only thanks to them that Russia 
was able to avoid a population decline of 
several million people in the 1990s. 
Meanwhile, within Russia regional disparities 
widened. Especially the Asian parts of 
the country struggled with extreme out-
migration and low fertility. Following the 
discontinuation of state wage and holiday 
subsidies in cold Siberia, only a paltry few 
Russians could be found who wanted to 
work in the factories and mines east of the 
Urals. Gradually, the country’s north-eastern 
regions emptied and have by now lost over 
half of their populations. It is particularly the 
rural areas which have experienced a true 
exodus: whoever had no opportunity to go 
west settled, at the very least, in the local 
region’s capital. 
For many regions, the ability to attract 
migrants is going to be a matter of existence 
in the future, since only a few areas in Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic states will 
be able to achieve demographic stability 
on their own. Even if women in these 
countries were to have more children in the 
foreseeable future – and the most recent 
figures suggest they will – they will hardly 
exceed the 2.1 children necessary for stable 
population numbers. Furthermore, the next 
generation of parents has already thinned out 
significantly due to the dearth of births in the 
last 20 years. 
Ageing and growing regional 
differences
Due to low numbers of children, as well 
as possibly increasing life expectancies in 
the future, the share of older people in the 
population will grow significantly. Currently, 
this figure is relatively low compared to 
Western Europe, even in the “oldest” of the 
Soviet successor states, since the two-child 
family only became the norm later and life 
expectancy remains low. 
Of Russia’s 142 million inhabitants, about 
one-fifth was of pension age in 2009. By 
2030, this share could increase to about 
30 percent. Since the large cohorts of the 
1950s and 1960s will reach pension age in 
the upcoming years, while comparatively few 
adolescents reach employment age, Russia’s 
working-age population will most likely 
shrink by about a million people annually 
in the next ten years.15 The available labour 
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ressources will thus have to be used as well 
as possible. In particular, the country has to 
fight the high rates of disability, which are 
due to unhealthy lifestyles. 
Both the economy and state coffers will 
suffer due to the losses of potential tax-
payers. More elderly people does not only 
mean greater burden on a pension system 
which is already chronically in debt; it also 
means that the need for geriatric care will 
explode. Paradoxically, the greater the 
recovery in numbers of children per woman, 
the graver the cost increase in the next ten 
to 15 years, since the younger generations 
will create medical care and education costs 
before they can contribute to the country’s 
wealth. The Russian government has already 
introduced initial reforms for the largest 
social sector, the pension system, by adding 
a fully-funded component to the traditional 
pay-as-you-go system. And the government 
could soon increase the comparatively low 
retirement age of 55 years for women and 
60 years for men to prevent a decrease in 
pension levels and related old-age poverty. 
The consequences of demographic ageing 
will affect all Soviet successor states sooner 
or later, from the relatively old societies in 
the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine to the 
very young nations of Central Asia. For even 
in the republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, which have a wealth of 
children, fertility rates have sunk in the 
last few years, a trend which will continue 
in the future. In these countries, a public 
infrastructure of geriatric care needs to be 
developed since such care has so far been in 
the hands of the family. This tradition could 
change, however, in the wake of economic 
development and the modernization of 
society so that the demand for public institu-
tions will increase. 
In the next 20 years, demographic weights 
in the territory of the former Soviet Union 
will shift. This will burden primarily the 
Slavic republics in the north. In contrast, the 
societies of the Central Asian states as well 
as of Armenia and Azerbaijan will continue 
to grow due to younger populations and 
high rates of children, although there are 
also regional differences here. For example, 
Armenia will grow only minimally from 
today’s 3.1 million to 3.2 million inhabitants 
by 2030 – and will even shrink subsequently 
– while Tajikistan will grow by more than 
35 percent to ten million inhabitants by 
2030.16 Taken together, the growth countries 
already mentioned will constitute just about 
half of the population in the territory of the 
former Soviet Union by 2030; they currently 
constitute but one-fourth. 
In the past 50 years, Russia has lost its status 
as a demographic superpower. While the 
Soviet Union, in terms of inhabitants, was the 
world’s third-largest country in 1960, Russia, 
the largest Soviet successor state, now ranks 
ninth, behind countries such as Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Nigeria. By 2050, Russia 
Growth in the south
All Central Asian states as well as Azerbaijan will grow by 2050 due to high fertility rates and young 
populations; Tajikistan will even grow by 60 percent. The wealthier, Slavic republics of the north, on the 
other hand, will not be able to stop the shrinkage which can already be observed. In Russia, even the 
significant migration surpluses and a slightly rising fertility rate will not be able to counter the trend, since 
potential parents are missing due to the low number of children of the first two decades of independence. 
Population projections from 2010 to 2050 (2010 = 100 percent)
(Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population 
Database, New York)
may well have fallen to 14th place. Among the 
five countries which can expect the largest 
population losses in absolute numbers until 
2050, there will be two Soviet successor 
states: Russia and Ukraine. Japan will top the 
list.17
These countries thus fit the picture of a 
demographically divided world: while 
populations in a low fertility belt stretching 
around the globe from Portugal in the West, 
through Russia and to Japan, are hardly 
growing, stagnate or shrink, the rest of the 
world can expect large growth. Between 
2010 and 2050, Asia can expect to gain 
20 percent of its current population or 1.27 
billion inhabitants; both Americas should 
gain 29 percent or 271 million inhabitants. 
Africa is even facing the doubling of its 
inhabitants, from today’s one to two billion 
people. Even the small African countries of 
Uganda and Malawi will then have – taken 
together – more citizens than Russia.18 
15Population Development
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On 12 June 2008, 87 babies were born 
in the Russian oblast of Ulyanovsk in the 
Volga Federal District, about three times 
as many as on a normal day.19  But this was 
no normal day; it was a Russian national 
holiday and simultaneously the deadline for 
the finale of the annual competition “Give 
Birth to a Patriot on Russia’s Independence 
Day”. Every couple which had a child on 
this date received a cash or material prize, 
such as a refrigerator or a washing machine, 
and, in addition, took part in a lottery for a 
Jeep named Patriot. The region’s governor, 
Sergey Morozov, announced the event in 
order to contribute to an increase in the low 
number of Russian children. He decreed 12 
September, exactly nine months before the 
national holiday, a special holiday for “family 
communication”. 
In 2006, Vladimir Putin had already pointed 
out in his state-of-the-nation address that the 
demographic crisis was one of the country’s 
most pressing problems.20 A few figures give 
an idea as to why: while two million babies 
were born in Russia in 1990, ten years later 
only 1.2 million were born. In the same 
year, 2.2 million people died. The average 
number of children per woman sank in the 
first eight years following the fall of the Iron 
Curtain from 1.89 to 1.16. Since then, the 
annual number of children has risen again to 
1.8 million and the number of children per 
woman has also recovered, as the 1.54 figure 
demonstrates.21* In the future, however, 
the number of births will continue to sink 
despite slightly rising fertility, since the small 
cohorts of the 1990s will produce ever-fewer 
potential mothers in the future. The 20 to 
29-year-old age group of women, who will 
contribute to most of the births, was still 
Few children in the wealthy north, 
lots of  children in the poor south
In contrast to Europe, relatively large regional 
differences in fertility rates can be observed in the 
former Soviet Union. While the average number of 
children per woman in the north is usually between 
1.3 and 1.7, the Central Asian states have rates of 
more than two and in some cases even three. Many 
of the differences can be explained by the level of 
development in the respective regions, their reigning 
views of gender and the populations’ religious and 
ethnic make-up. Nonetheless, the average numbers 
of children per woman have long been approaching 
one another. 
Average number of 
children per woman 
on the territory of the 
former Soviet Union, 
2009
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Plummeting birth rate during transition
* The total fertility rate has been simplified and given 
as the average number of children per woman. It is 
ultimately a hypothetical measurement which draws 
conclusions about fertility patterns among women of 
certain age groups based on developments in a calendar 
year. A better measurement is the cohort fertility rate, 
which provides the actual average number of children 
per woman. This, however, is only available when 
women have ended their family planning at about 45 
years old. Other figures, such as adjusted fertility rates 
(to mothers’ age or spacing of births) are not taken into 
consideration here since they are not available for all 
regions in question.
(Source: see page 140)
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comprised of 11.6 million people in 2008.  
The five to 14-year-olds were comprised of 
but 6.5 million.22
Other Soviet successor states have similar 
problems: In Moldova, the average number 
of children per woman halved between 1990 
and 2002, from 2.39 to 1.21.23 Central Asian 
societies, which have many children, as well 
as the Russian South, also experienced a 
significant decrease in fertility rates. In most 
of these countries, however, the transition 
from the large family to the two-child family 
is still in full swing.  
Older mothers, fewer children
Throughout  contemporary Russia, the 
number of children per woman already sank 
for the first time to just below two at the 
end of the 1960s, especially because more 
and more former rural dwellers moved to 
the cities and found work in industry. The 
fertility rate then remained steady, with 
minor fluctuations, until 1991.24 Since 1992, 
the annual number of deaths has exceeded 
the number of births and young families in 
Russia, as in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and 
the Baltic states, are more often having but 
one child. This is not what most Russians 
want, however: in surveys, the majority say 
they would like two children.25
There have been many attempts to explain 
the drastic decline in births as the system 
underwent change. Material hardship and 
uncertain prospects immediately following 
the demise of the Soviet Union particularly 
prevented people from starting families. 
People had to live with decreasing wages or 
they lost their work entirely. The state had 
to drastically reduce social benefits because 
it also had to deal with empty coffers as a 
result of the economic crisis. The financial 
support remaining for young families was 
usually quickly devoured by up to four-digit 
inflation rates. Even ten years following the 
Soviet Union’s fall, the risk of poverty for a 
Russian family upon the birth of a second 
child increased by over 50 percent.26 
Since they have now overcome the worst 
hardship following the fall of the Soviet 
Union, citizens’ newly-won personal 
freedoms are becoming apparent in 
individual lifestyles, at least in the wealthier 
northern states. More and more women 
are going to university and putting off 
childbearing until they are much older. This 
has been made possible by – among other 
things – modern contraceptives, which are 
now easily accessible compared to the Soviet 
era, when they were hard to come by or sub-
standard. Nonetheless, the Soviet successor 
states still lag behind western industrialized 
countries when it comes to family-planning 
methods. 
In the Soviet Union, the short supply of 
modern methods of contraception led to a 
veritable “abortion culture”: it was common 
for women to bear the number of children 
they wanted when they were young and then 
to prematurely end all further, unwanted 
pregnancies. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
there were still more than two abortions per 
birth in Russia. It was only in 2006 that the 
survival chances for unborn foetuses rose 
to over 50 percent. Despite this progress, 
Russia still has Europe’s highest abortion 
rate.27 It is also because of this that many 
expect the Kremlin to prohibit abortion 
in the wake of future policies promoting 
births. Where this could lead to, however, 
was already demonstrated between 1936 
and 1954, when Josef Stalin pushed through 
a prohibition on abortion: instead of the 
hoped-for baby boom, statisticians noted 
an increase in maternal mortality, since 
abortions did not decrease but were, rather, 
performed illegally under medically and 
hygienically insufficient conditions.28 
In particular, fertility rates of women under 
25 have decreased dramatically: whereas in 
1990 almost every sixth woman between 
20 and 24 still bore a child, in 2009 it was 
only every 11th woman.29 Many women, 
however, make up later for having put off 
children when young: Russian women over 
25 now have more children than they did 
in 1990.30 The average age at childbearing 
rose from 25.3 to 27.2, reaching the level 
of the late 1960s, before the sexual 
revolution encouraged Russian women to 
have children younger and younger.31 Other 
changes confirm that Russia, like many of its 
neighbouring states, is slowly approaching 
Western European family patterns: more 
and more unmarried couples live together, 
more and more children are born out of 
wedlock and more and more children are not 
the result of the first solid relationship. This 
change is happening especially fast in the 
three Baltic states. 
But the past cannot be shed overnight. The 
divorce rates among Russians, Ukrainians 
and Belarusians remain the highest in all 
of Europe.32 In the 1970s, the relative ease 
of dissolving a marriage already served as 
a security valve for premature marriages.* 
Now the average marriage age has shifted 
upwards, but, like the average age at 
childbearing, it has still not reached western 
levels. 
These are all remnants of the Soviet atti-
tude according to which a woman enters 
adulthood only when she bears her first child. 
Whoever did not have a child when young 
risked being stamped as an “old spinster” 
and, for health reasons, may not have been 
able to have children later. This in spite of 
the fact that women faced – and still face 
– a double-burden: the majority works, but 
can seldom rely on support from a partner 
when it comes to taking care of and raising 
children. 
* A special „bachelor’s tax“ made early marriage 
financially appealing to men.
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Money does not make children
In light of high employment rates for 
women, the Soviet Union, like all socialist 
countries, created an extensive network of 
kindergartens. After the Wall fell, however, 
many of these institutions closed due to 
a lack of funds. Of the former 87,900 pre-
school institutions, only 45,600 remain.33 
That the number of places per child has 
essentially remained steady is due only to 
the serious decline in births. Single mothers 
especially, of which there are many in Russia 
due to high divorce rates, have problems 
reconciling careers and families due to 
insufficient public child-care. 
Furthermore, single mothers often run into 
financial difficulty: many men successfully 
evade their child-support obligations. 
For women, this is even worse since child 
benefits by no means ensure survival: even 
in the more generous regions in the Urals, 
the subsidies are just about 300 roubles, or 
seven euros, a month. Maternal leave laws 
do, on the other hand, provide security at 
first glance, guaranteeing 100 percent of 
wages for 70 days prior to and after the birth 
of a child. Yet many employers who receive 
the money from public coffers and who 
should be transferring it to employees do not 
meet their obligation.34
Vladimir Putin’s family policy reforms in 
2007 significantly expanded financial 
support for young families. Putin introduced 
subsidies for kindergarten fees and raised the 
birth benefit as well as child-care benefits 
which are paid for a child’s first one-and-
half years. The latter is 40 percent of the 
parental salary but not more than 14,000 
roubles monthly. Unemployed women also 
receive 2,000 roubles a month for the first 
child and 4,100 for all succeeding children. 
Additionally, Putin created the so-called 
maternity capital, a one-time payment 
equivalent to 10,000 US dollars for the birth 
or adoption of a second child. It is adjusted 
annually according to inflation rates.* The 
money is paid out on a child’s third birthday 
and can be used for educational purposes, 
the mother’s private retirement arrangement 
or to buy a flat. The last option is the only 
way of profiting in the short-term from the 
money, and it is a very important one: a 
dearth of housing is considered one of the 
main reasons for the lack of offspring. An 
equivalent of 8,000 Euros, however, is hardly 
likely to enable a family to buy a flat. 
Nonetheless, the maternity capital is one 
of the reasons for the most recent increase 
in births. Whether it can truly influence the 
average number of children per woman can 
only be determined, however, when today’s 
mothers have passed childbearing age in 
20 years, meaning when it is finally clear 
how many children they will ultimately have 
had. So it is highly possible that women 
have simply shifted the time at which they 
are bearing children in order not to miss out 
on the financial incentive.  This short-term 
effect has been observed in other countries 
in which the state paid bonuses for offspring. 
Something similar was already seen in Russia 
in the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev used 
financial incentives, among other things, to 
inspire people to start families. 
Annual number of 
births per 1,000 women 
of various age-groups 
in Russia (1990, 
2000, 2009) and 
Germany, 2008
(Source: Rosstat 
(2010). Tsentralnaya 
Baza Statisticheskikh 
Dannykh. Moscow; 
Eurostat)
Mothers in Russia are getting older
Women in Russia are not only bearing fewer children in comparison to 1990, they are also bearing children 
later. The slight rise in numbers of children since the beginning of this century can be explained by the fact that 
women over 24 years old are having more children than they used to. That the trend towards later childbearing 
could continue is demonstrated by comparison with Germany, where most children are born to women between 
30 and 34 years old. 
15 to 19 20 to 24 25 to 29 35 to 39 40 to 4430 to 34
* If the maternity capital has not previously been 
claimed, it is paid for the birth of a third and every 
 successive child.
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Contraception is replacing abortion
Since the mid-1990s, the number of abortions has declined in all Soviet successor states. There has been a 
significant decrease especially in the mainly Slavic states of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, where the rates 
were highest in the period following the fall of the Iron Curtain. In these countries, modern methods of 
contraception have increasingly become the preferred method of family planning. Nonetheless, there are 
still more abortions annually in Russia than in the entire EU, which has more than four times the people. 
Abortions per 
100 live births 
in 15 Soviet 
successor states, 
1991 to 2008
(Source: Unicef, 
TransMONEE Database)
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Financial means alone cannot solve the 
dilemma facing the many women who 
have to choose work over children. Yet 
instead of promoting the modernization 
of society, Russia’s and Ukraine’s family 
policies constantly uphold tradition. In the 
current Russian Demographic Concept, an 
average of 1.95 children is the explicit goal 
for 2025. Furthermore, “traditional family 
values should be revived”.35 The experiences 
of other industrial nations show, however, 
that the rates of children are highest where 
gender equality is greatest and careers and 
families can be easily reconciled due to 
extensive child-care institutions. Steps in this 
direction have been taken in particular in 
the Baltic states. These have looked towards 
the Scandinavian countries, which have the 
necessary conditions and where the number 
the number of children per woman has fallen 
an average of 22 percent in the 39 regions of 
Russia in which the median was over 1.91 in 
1990. In the 39 regions which lay below the 
median, it was only about 20 percent.* That 
means that the various regions are becoming 
more similar with regard to family size. 
In the meantime, there are only three 
regions in Russia in which enough children 
are being born to maintain the population. 
These include the poor mountain republics 
of Chechnya, Altai and Tuva, where the 
populations still lead traditional lifestyles.  
Also outside Russia, high numbers of children 
can practically only be found in economically 
underdeveloped areas with traditional 
family and social structures, such as in 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan or Turkmenistan. On 
the other hand, there are very low numbers 
of children in the post-Soviet space primarily 
in cities such as Moscow, St. Petersburg or 
Kiev. But even the city-country divide has 
grown murkier. While women in rural areas 
of Russia still bore 60 to 70 percent more 
children than urban women in the 1960s, the 
surplus in the 1980s was only 50 percent and 
has since fallen to 34 percent.36
of children per woman is about 1.9. But 
in addition to the government, employers 
also have an obligation: flexible working 
hours and part-time work could promote the 
reconciliation of work and family. Neither of 
these is prevalent in Russia.
Regional alignment in numbers of 
children
Regional differences in the average number 
of children per woman continue to decline, 
unaffected by the enormous upheavals of 
the 1990s – a phenomenon which has been 
noticeable for about half a century. In the 20 
years since the demise of the Soviet Union, 
* Since Ingushetia was not yet an independent region 
in 1990, it is not considered here. The total number of 
Russian regions sinks accordingly to 79.
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Russia was probably the first country in the 
world to establish an agency for migration 
management in 1763.37 Catherine the Great 
wanted to attract specialists from a wide 
range of fields to come and populate, defend 
and cultivate the empire’s vast expanses of 
land. The majority of those who answered 
her call were Germans. In fact, in the first 
nationwide census of 1897, 1.8 million 
people claimed that “German” was their 
native language.38
Now almost 250 years later, Russia has 
become the scene of a gigantic migratory 
movement once again. With regard to 
the total number of arrivals, Russia is the 
second most popular immigration country 
worldwide and strongly depends on further 
immigration.39 After having strictly regulated 
migration for decades during the Cold War, 
Russia is now struggling to integrate its 
immigrants into society, who frequently live 
in the shadow of the law and regularly face 
discrimination. 
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, Russia has gained some five million 
new inhabitants through immigration – 
almost as many as it had lost during the 
previous 70 years of Soviet rule.40 Ethnic 
Russians, returning to their home country, 
account for the largest percentage of these 
new immigrants. When the former Soviet 
republics declared independence, Russians 
became expats practically overnight. In 
the first few years of independence, some 
three million Russians were forced to flee 
as a result of economic hardship, hostility 
toward foreigners and regional conflicts.41 
Compared to the masses of immigrants 
flowing into Russia, relatively few people 
chose to emigrate. Only those who have 
historic homelands outside the former Soviet 
Union – like Germans, Greeks or Jews – left 
the country in large numbers. In contrast, 
the number of Russians who chose to move 
to the newly formed neighbouring states 
decreased dramatically, as Russian workers 
were no longer needed.42
Since the mid-1990s, economic factors 
have played an ever-increasing role for 
immigrants. According to recent estimates, 
up to seven million labour migrants reside 
in Russia during the summer months, most 
of whom come from the South Caucasus, 
Central Asia, Moldova and Ukraine. Many 
of them, however, do not have a valid 
residence or work permit.43 They come to 
Russia, because at home, above all in the 
Central Asian countries with their young and 
rapidly growing populations, they cannot 
earn enough to provide for their families. 
On the other hand, Russia is experiencing a 
growing labour shortage as a result of recent 
economic growth and demographic change, 
and the wages are many times higher than 
what the immigrants could earn in their home 
countries.
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s 
population has decreased by six and a half 
million, but without immigration, it would 
have declined by eleven and a half million.44 
The other Soviet successor states have to 
pay the price for Russia’s migration surplus. 
With the exception of Belarus, all the new 
 Migration
Russia’s demographic reserves
republics have reported more emigration 
than immigration since the beginning of 
the 1990s.* Kazakhstan used to be home 
to 16 million people. Although the flow of 
immigrants to this Central Asian country 
has increased in recent years because of 
its strong raw materials industry, it has lost 
around two million inhabitants just in the 
first 15 years of independence. Many of the 
emigrants were of German descent and chose 
to resettle in their historic country of origin.45 
Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan have 
suffered even heavier losses in population 
as a result of migration – the same is true 
for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. And like in the 
countries of the South Caucasus, the actual 
emigration figures may well be much higher 
than the official statistics.46
Political zig-zagging
During the Soviet era, government policies 
actively promoted population transfer 
between the various Soviet republics. 
In the beginning, such transfer occurred 
through resettlement programmes and 
even deportation, and later, mainly through 
financial incentives such as wage top-ups. 
In the 1930s, the government resettled 
millions of Russian workers to propel the 
industrialization and urbanization of the 
country. The prisoners of the Gulag were 
forced to work under the harshest conditions 
in the Asian part of the country. When World 
War II began and in the years that followed, 
* Belarus officially reports slightly positive net 
 migration, but there is debate among experts  concerning 
the credibility of the data.
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they were joined in increasing numbers by 
members of various ethnic groups which 
Stalin mistrusted and had deported en masse 
to Siberia and Central Asia.* A large number 
of soldiers were also continually sent to the 
farthest corners of the country. 
In order to maintain better control over the 
flow of migration, the Kremlin introduced the 
propiska in the 1930s – a passport stamp, 
designating the place of residence and 
work of every citizen. In this way, officials 
were able to strictly regulate the number of 
immigrants allowed into large cities.
Thanks to such policies, the constituent 
republics of the Soviet Union became 
ethnically quite diverse. In 1970, Russians 
comprised 43 percent of Kazakhstan’s total 
population, making them the largest ethnic 
group in number.47 However, in the final two 
decades of the Soviet Union, an increasing 
number of Russians and other ethnic groups 
who mainly settle in Russia, like the Tatars, 
began returning to their home countries. This 
trend quickened dramatically as the political 
system fell apart and ethnic conflicts flared. 
All roads lead to Russia
Russia remains the destination of 
choice for labour migrants throughout 
most of the post-Soviet territory. 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
and Armenia supply the largest 
numbers of immigrants to Russia. 
However, the flow of immigrants 
from the Baltic states has practically 
come to a standstill. Since joining 
the EU in 2004, Estonians, Latvians 
and Lithuanians have been looking 
for employment more intensively in 
Western Europe. Along with Russia, 
Kazakhstan has become a popular 
destination for migrant workers from 
neighbouring Central Asian countries. 
In proportion to its population, the 
Kazakh capital city Astana has seen 
the highest influx of immigrants in the 
entire territory of the former Soviet 
Union. 
Selected migration flows in the post-Soviet space, 
2009
(Source: Rosstat, Demograficheski Yezhegodnik 
Rossii – 2010 g., Moscow)
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* The ethnic groups deported by Stalin included the 
Chechens, Ingush, Volga Germans, Finns, Latvians, 
Lithuanians, Estonians, as well as Balkars, Greeks, Turks, 
Armenians, Romanians, Crimean Tatars, Karachay and 
Kalmyks.
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into illegality. Human and drug trafficking, 
corruption and forced labour flourished 
in this environment. Moreover, Afghans, 
Chinese, Indians and citizens of various 
African countries have been using Russia as a 
transit country to enter the EU ever since. 
The government introduced restrictive 
measures to counteract the massive flow of 
immigrants. One such measure mandated 
that, starting in 2002, each immigrant 
would have to register at the place of arrival 
within three days, at which time he would 
have to provide proof of an official place 
of residence. In light of Russia’s notorious 
housing shortage, finding accommodation 
that quickly was impossible in many 
places. Instead of improving the migrants’ 
situation, the new laws merely pushed more 
immigrants into illegality and barred them 
from taking up regular employment.
The Russian government amended its 
immigration policies once again in 2007. The 
biggest beneficiaries of the new, more liberal 
laws are citizens of the CIS states, who, at 
95 percent, represent the overwhelming 
majority of all immigrants in Russia.49 They 
themselves (and not the employers, as 
was previously the case) are issued a work 
permit. With this in hand, they can now apply 
for jobs in the region in which the permit 
was issued. The economic situation is used 
as the basis for determining how many work 
permits will be available each year and 
what regions will receive which percentage 
of potential migrant workers. In 2011, the 
government plans to issue approximately 
1.7 million work permits – 200,000 fewer 
than in 2010 and significantly fewer than 
before the economic crisis of 2009.50 The 
restrictions do not apply, however, to various 
specialists. Attracting highly-skilled workers 
to Russia, continues to be a major challenge 
though. Conversely, increasing numbers of 
highly qualified Russians are heading west – 
to Europe or the United States. 
Change in working-age 
population and net 
migration in Russia, 
1993 to 2009
(Source: Rosstat, 
Zentralanaya Basa 
Statisticheskikh 
Dannykh, Moscow)
Immigration eases the labour shortage – but cannot prevent it
Russia recorded a migration surplus of 845,000 people when ethnically-motivated immigration reached its 
peak in 1994. The flow of immigration slowed considerably in the following years. But after Russia passed a 
more liberal immigration law in 2007, the official surplus doubled to almost 250,000 people. This massive 
increase is solely due to immigration from the CIS countries, Georgia and the Baltic states. There is very little 
migratory exchange between Russia and other countries. For many years, immigration helped replenish the 
supply of workers on the labour market. However, the low birth rate in the 1990s has led to a smaller pool of 
workers who are just now coming of age. As a result, the workforce is dramatically shrinking – a decrease of 
900,000 workers was reported in 2009 alone. Even if all (regular) immigrants were of working-age – and, in 
fact, about 80 percent of them are – the deficit, which is expect to climb higher in the coming years, would only 
be offset by one-third.
Among the hundreds of ethnic groups in the 
former Soviet Union, there seemed to be 
no sense of a shared Soviet identity which 
government planners had hoped to achieve 
through population relocation. 
Russian policymakers began supporting 
immigration in the early 1990s by largely 
opening the borders to immigrants. But the 
country was unprepared for the ensuing 
wave of newcomers and could only react 
to the developments instead of shaping 
them. This had enormous repercussions for 
many migrants, as the Russian authorities 
were often unable to recognize retirement 
entitlements and academic certificates from 
other republics.
The ethnically-motivated migration that 
followed the collapse of the Soviet Union 
reached its climax in 1994 with an official 
influx of 1.2 million immigrants to Russia.48 
From this time onward, labour migration 
became more significant and confronted 
Russia with new challenges. The lack of 
explicit regulations in the labour market 
forced many immigrants from the South 
Caucasus or Central Asia, in particular, 
Net migration with the CIS countries, Georgia and the Baltic states
Net migration with other countries
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The new regulations and simplified proce-
dures for issuing work permits to seasonal 
workers have significantly improved the 
immigrants’ situation. As a result, the 
percentage of unregistered immigrants has 
dropped from 50 percent to between 15 
and 25 percent.51 Yet the reform measures 
have proven less successful in reducing the 
number of informally employed migrants 
and integrating them into the regular labour 
market. Even though three-quarters of all 
migrant workers received work permits in 
2007, this did not guarantee them a job. If an 
irregular work relationship already exists, it 
is rarely formalized at a later time. Therefore, 
despite legal provisions offering visa-free 
entry into the country and residence permits, 
the majority of immigrants continue to work 
in the underground economy.52*
The Herculean task of integration
Many Russians believe that the increasing 
number of immigrants lessens their own 
chances of employment. When surveyed, 
the majority of the population regularly 
respond that they view immigration with 
concern rather than optimism.53 There is 
more to this than economic fears. Politicians 
and the media have long sown resentment 
against non-Russian immigrants from 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as 
Chinese immigrants in the Far East. On 
repeated occasions, nationalistic Russian 
organizations have lashed out at foreigners. 
For years, racially-motivated attacks have 
claimed dozens of lives and injured hundreds 
– particularly in Moscow.
In order to reverse this worrying develop-
ment, Russia will have to do better at 
integrating immigrants into the regular 
labour market. The more often immigrants 
are forced to live in the shadow of legality, 
the more likely Russians will believe that 
every Chechen is a potential terrorist and 
every migrant worker is out to steal a job 
from them. But the fact is that these often 
low-skilled immigrants earn such meagre 
wages no Russian would be willing to 
work for. An especially high percentage 
of immigrants earn their living in the 
construction and retail industries. And 
recently, more women have been coming to 
Russia in search of work. They usually look 
for employment in the service sector, for 
example, in geriatric care. Many of them, 
however, end up in prostitution.
In 2008, labour migrants in Russia sent 
approximately 26 billion US dollars back 
home to their families.54 In other words, 
each migrant worker transfers about 
100 US dollars out of the country each 
month.55 Labour migration is thus not only a 
demographic safety valve for countries like 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, but also 
an important factor in combating poverty 
– far more significant than international 
development aid. There is some debate, 
however, as to what extent these funds are 
capable of influencing the economic strength 
of the sender countries in the long-term. Most 
of the remittances are channelled into private 
consumption – not investment. Furthermore, 
these countries find themselves more 
dependent on Russia’s economic fortune (and 
misfortune). For example, when the economic 
crisis in 2009 caused unemployment to 
rise in Russia, remittances fell by almost 30 
percent.56 Nonetheless, labour migration 
will surely continue in the foreseeable future 
due to the enormous welfare gap between 
these countries. Therefore, the question 
“Immigration – yes or no?” is not entirely up 
to Russia to decide. 
From a demographic point of view, immi-
gration is actually becoming more important 
every year. The number of working-age 
people in Russia has steadily decreased since 
2007 and the trend is expected to accelerate 
in the coming years. Even if Russia gained a 
net influx of 300,000 immigrants annually, 
its working population will continue to 
shrink by one million people each year until 
2020.57 There seems to be little chance of 
closing this gap completely – in 2009, the 
migration surplus amounted to just under 
250,000 people.58 Already in 2006, the 
Russian government launched a programme 
to encourage compatriots in neighbouring 
CIS countries to return home to Russia 
voluntarily. So far the programme has had 
little success – largely because most of the 
Russian expatriates, who were willing to 
return home, had already done so in the 
1990s.
Internal migration – few destinations 
for few migrants
While international immigrants are spread 
relatively equally across the country thanks 
to regionally issued work permits, there are 
only a handful of destinations available for 
inner-Russian migrants. In 2009, 45 out of 
80 Russian regions recorded a migration 
surplus, although 29 of them owed this to 
international immigration alone. Out of 
the 16 regions which gained from internal 
migration in 2009, most were located in 
economically strong areas around major 
conurbations like Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
Novosibirsk and Yekaterinburg. The Southern 
Russian regions of Krasnodar and Stavropol 
continue to be popular destinations for 
migrants. Samara and Nizhny Novgorod 
Oblasts in the Volga Federal District also 
figure among the regions which have gained 
from internal migration since 1991. As a 
consequence of the economic crisis, they lost 
population to other Russia regions in 2009 
for the first time in several years.59
* Citizens from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and 
Ukraine do not require an entry visa to Russia.
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Still, Moscow remains the only significant, 
inner-Russian destination for migrants. Out 
of the 162,000 people who moved from 
one Russian region into another in 2009, 
about 91,000 or 57 percent moved to the 
capital and its environs. St. Petersburg and 
surrounding Leningrad Oblast ranked a 
distant second at just under 20 percent as 
the destination of choice. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union hit the Far East and the 
northern European section of the country 
especially hard. Prior to the political 
upheaval, many Soviet citizens were lured 
to the farthest reaches of the country with 
state-funded wage bonuses and additional 
welfare benefits. Certain inhospitable regions 
also received new inhabitants through the 
Soviet programme of “raspredeleniye”, which 
sent university graduates to work there for 
three or four years. After completing their 
Xenophobia in the middle of society
Even though Russia strongly depends on immigrants from other countries, a large 
number of Russians exhibit a rather xenophobic attitude. Immigration is not 
regarded as socially enriching or as a necessity, but rather a threat.
How strongly do you agree with the statement that we should show 
foreigners in Russia that we do not want too many of them to come here?
What do you think of the statement „Russia for the Russians!“?
(Source: Levada Center, nationwide survey, 
20 to 23 June 2008, 1,601 respondents)
(Source: Levada Center, nationwide survey, 
20 to 23 November 2009, 1,600 respondents)
Completely agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Completely disagree
Don’t know
Haven’t really 
thought about it.
I’m against it. 
That’s fascism.
Doesn’t 
interest me.
It wouldn’t be bad to 
implement it within 
appropriate limits.
I support it. It should 
have been implemented 
long ago.
service, many returned home and were 
replaced by new graduates. In the 1990s, 
this steady exchange became a one-way 
street. Masses of people left the northeastern 
regions of the country to head west or south, 
and there was no one to replace them. As a 
result, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, which 
had once been home to 150,000 people, 
has lost approximately 100,000 residents 
since 1991. The situation is similarly dismal 
in Magadan Oblast, where 170,000 people 
have left the region that once boasted a 
population of 370,000.60 This development 
has hit rural areas especially hard, where 
entire villages are disappearing. 
Compared to the Soviet era, the mobility 
of the Russian people has fallen by more 
than 50 percent. In 2009, only 1.7 million 
people changed their place of residence 
inside Russia – three million fewer than in 
1989.61 Internal migration could help ease 
regional imbalances, e.g. with people leaving 
regions with high structural unemployment 
for places with a labour shortage. But before 
this can happen, various obstacles will have 
to be overcome. For example, many large 
cities that need skilled workers suffer from 
an acute shortage of affordable housing. As 
a result, many people commute on a weekly 
or monthly basis from their home to their 
place of employment. Also complicated 
registration procedures represent a hurdle to 
spurring higher internal migration, as well as 
the shortage of work agencies which could 
network employers and job-seekers on a 
national level.
4
Western Europeans still admire Mikhail 
Gorbachev for opening the Soviet Union to 
the rest of the world. Russians, however, 
do not have such a high opinion of him. 
They remember him as the leader who 
spearheaded the campaign against alcohol. 
In 1985 the price of alcoholic beverages 
began increasing dramatically and 
restrictions were implemented on conditions 
of sale.* With these measures in place, the 
government succeeded in decreasing the sale 
of alcohol by more than 60 percent within 
two and a half years.62 Most importantly, 
the average life expectancy in Russia began 
increasing again, which, in contrast to other 
western industrial nations, had steadily fallen 
since the beginning of the 1970s. In 1988, 
Soviet leaders discontinued the unpopular 
anti-alcohol campaign, because the imposed 
restrictions had resulted, among other things, 
in a boom of self-distilled vodka, so-called 
“samogon”. In hindsight, many Russians 
regard this experiment as the beginning 
of the end of the Soviet Union and as the 
cause of the gaping budget deficit which 
significantly hampered the first free-market 
reforms.
Following the campaign’s conclusion, the 
gains in life expectancy were lost again 
quickly. In 1994, Russians could expect to 
reach the age of 63.9 years – six years less 
than in 1987. The average life expectancy 
for males was only 57.4 years – on average, 
they were not even able to officially retire at 
60. Between 1994 and 1998, life expectancy 
briefly resumed its uphill climb until falling 
again in the aftermath of the Rouble crisis. 
Since then, the country’s most important 
health indicator has risen to 67.9 years – 
about the same level as that of 1960.63 In 
effect, the average Russian life span is about 
six years shorter than in China and almost 13 
years shorter than in Germany.64
The mortality rate of working-age men 
is largely responsible for this enormous 
disparity. In 2008, an average of 10.7 out 
of 1,000 men between the ages of 16 and 
59 died – three to five times higher than in 
countries at a comparable stage of economic 
development.65 According to estimates by 
the World Health Organization, premature 
death in Russia accounts for 16 fewer years 
of life for males and seven fewer years of life 
for females.66 Russian women live some 13 
years longer than men – the largest disparity 
in life expectancy between the sexes in the 
world. The only other countries where a 
similar imbalance exists are in neighbouring 
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the three 
Baltic states.67 
But what exactly are so many relatively 
young Russian men dying of? The leading 
cause of death is cardiovascular diseases, 
followed by what is called “external causes”. 
These include an especially large number of 
homicides, suicides and accidents, which, in 
terms of the total population of Russia, occur 
four times more frequently than in the EU.68 
72 percent of all homicides and 42 percent 
of all suicides can be attributed to alcohol 
abuse.69 For a long time, cardiovascular 
diseases were not attributed to excessive 
alcohol consumption. But in the meantime, 
studies show that certain drinking habits can 
significantly increase one’s risk of developing 
fatal heart disease. This applies particularly 
to Russia, where alcohol is not so much drunk 
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for enjoyment with food – like in France or 
Italy – but consumed in high-proof form for 
the purpose of getting intoxicated.70 In each 
of these countries, life expectancy fell in 
proportion with rising alcohol consumption. 
Mostly unemployed and less educated people 
tend to abuse alcohol in order to escape the 
reality of poverty and lack of opportunity. 
Today, Russians age 14 and older consume 
between 15 and 18 litres of pure alcohol each 
year, equivalent to approximately 75 to 90 
half-litre bottles of vodka.71
According to extensive studies, between 
31 and 52 percent of all fatalities among 
male adults in typical Russian industrial 
cities are alcohol-related. In more rural 
areas, anti-freeze, perfumes and similar 
substances containing alcohol are especially 
dangerous as these are often consumed as an 
inexpensive vodka ersatz.72
One must look back far in the past to 
understand the central role of alcohol in 
Russian society. In the Middle Ages, the 
combination of grain farming and long, cold 
winters contributed greatly to forming a 
pronounced drinking culture. Later the Czars 
actively endorsed alcohol consumption, as 
the alcohol monopoly financed one-third 
of their national budget. Although Lenin 
attempted to reduce alcohol consumption 
through his “New Economic Policy” at 
the start of the 1920s, Stalin lifted all the 
restrictions in 1926 in order to raise money 
for his push to industrialize the country. Yet 
the discrepancy between the life expectancy 
of citizens in modern-day Russia and that 
in western nations only first appeared in 
the late 1960s. Up until that time, the large 
increases in life expectancy in both East and 
* One of the more drastic measures, which Russians 
continue to criticize to this day, include the decision to 
destroy vineyards in Southern Russia, Moldova and the 
Crimea.
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West were the result of progress made in the 
fight against infectious diseases. After that, 
the West continued to see improvements in 
general health thanks to new advances for 
treating such chronic diseases as diabetes, 
stomach ulcers, cardiovascular diseases and 
cancer. In addition, preventative medicine, 
regular medical check-ups, environmental 
protection, less physically wearing labour 
and healthier lifestyles all had a positive 
effect on life expectancy. In the paternalistic 
system of the former Soviet Union, citizens 
were not inclined nor encouraged to take 
such responsibility for their own health. 
Aside from alcohol, the risky lifestyle of 
Russian citizens is exacerbated by increasing 
tobacco consumption, which has been on the 
decline in Western Europe for years. More 
than one-third of all Russians over 14 years 
of age and almost two-thirds of men in this 
age group smoke cigarettes on a daily basis – 
more than in any other European country.73
However, alcohol and tobacco are not 
equally popular everywhere in the former 
Soviet Union. In the southern, more Muslim-
oriented regions of Russia, e.g. Central Asia 
and the South Caucasus, people drink less 
alcohol in comparison. This might explain 
why men in Kyrgyzstan live four years and 
in Tajikistan three years longer than the 
average Russian, although these countries 
are far poorer in terms of GDP.74 Even within 
Russia, one can identify a generally higher 
life expectancy in poorer regions than in 
more affluent areas. This may be partly 
due to higher consumption of hard drugs, 
predominantly heroin, which has now 
become a serious problem in the industrial 
cities.  
Old and new scourges of humanity on 
the rise
One of the direct effects of drug consumption 
on general health is its role in the spread 
of Aids, as HIV is frequently transmitted 
through contaminated hypodermic needles. 
According to recent estimates, one percent of 
all 15 to 49-year-olds in Russia and Ukraine 
are infected with HIV, the majority of whom 
are men.75 They, in turn, are increasingly 
spreading the disease to women through 
sexual contact, whereby a third mechanism, 
mother-to-child transmission, may play an 
even larger role in the future. In contrast 
to alcohol, HIV infection and Aids are also 
Where life ends too early
Compared to neighbouring countries, life expectancy 
in Russia is relatively low. In some crisis-ridden 
regions of Siberia and Northwest Russia, life 
expectancy has barely risen over the age of 60. 
Across the country, men die much earlier than 
women. The inhabitants of the Baltic states, 
however, live comparably longer. According to 
official statistics, life expectancy is extremely high 
in the Caucasus, yet some researches question the 
credibility of the region’s official data.
Life expectancy at birth 
in the former Soviet Union 
in 2009
less than 65
65 to under 67
67 to under 69
69 to under 71
71 to under 73
73 and more
(Source: United 
Nations, National 
Statistical Offices, 
World Population 
Prospects: The 2008 
Revision Database, 
New York)
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affecting Central Asian countries. Although 
fewer of their citizens are infected, the 
number of new infections is increasing at a 
disturbing rate.
What all the former Soviet countries have 
in common is how each society often 
stigmatises and marginalises those with Aids. 
Frequently they belong to groups that already 
exist on the fringe of society – drug addicts, 
prison inmates, halfway-house children, 
homosexuals and prostitutes. This lack of 
tolerance is a serious hurdle for disease 
prevention measures, e.g. through sexual 
education and improvement in hygiene. And 
treatment of the disease is not much better; 
only about 20 percent of those with Aids in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia have access 
to effective therapy.76
Tuberculosis is also making a comeback 
in Russia as a result of poverty and 
deterioration in medical care. The number 
of new, documented cases of tuberculosis 
increased to 80,000 between 1990 and 
2000. When adjusted to the size of the 
population, that is ten times more than in 
Great Britain or the Netherlands.77 Since 
then, the number of tuberculosis cases has 
stagnated at a high level.78 The potential of 
new multi-resistant pathogens is a growing 
cause of concern. The risk groups are largely 
identical to those who have Aids, as their 
weakened immune system significantly 
increases the danger of infection. However, 
cases of tuberculosis are concentrated 
geographically in Siberia, specifically the 
rural areas of Tuva Republic and Amur Oblast, 
where there is generally no possibility to 
quarantine the sick. Even so, Russia invests 
almost 1.3 billion US dollars in fighting TBC 
each year. Among the 22 countries most 
severely affected by tuberculosis, no other 
country invests as much in combating the 
disease – although no other enjoys such a 
high a standard of living either.79
Problems abound despite a slight 
recovery
What can politicians from Kaliningrad to 
Vladivostok do to prevent their country from 
losing tens of thousands of people each year 
to avoidable deaths? Based on the experience 
of Western European countries, it seems that 
high-risk groups require more information 
about the dangers of excessive alcohol and 
tobacco consumption, as well as unhealthy 
eating habits and lack of regular exercise. 
This can, however, only be achieved through 
social and economic policies which combat 
the actual roots of the problems. As long as 
poverty, lack of opportunity and inequality 
continue to afflict large segments of the 
population, it is unlikely that people will 
engage in more health-conscious behaviour. 
In early 2010, the Russian government 
once again initiated a wide-ranging anti-
alcohol campaign. With a mandate to sell 
half-litre bottles of vodka for no less than 
89 roubles (approximately two euros) and 
more restrictive regulations on sales and 
advertising, the government hopes to cut 
alcohol consumption in half by 2020. The 
current minimum price for vodka is relatively 
low, but is set to significantly increase in 
coming years. The long-term success of the 
campaign will depend on how well it cuts 
down on illegal distilling.  
As for promoting a healthier lifestyle, there 
are signs of progress. Life expectancy in 
Russia has been on the rise since 2003 – 
largely because of fewer deaths caused by 
external causes.80 Although this trend slowed 
down during the economic crisis in 2008 
and 2009, there is no evidence that it has 
reversed.81 In the future, demographics may 
also contribute to alleviating the country’s 
struggle with alcohol. For example, beverages 
with low alcohol content, such as beer and 
wine, are more popular among young people 
than high-proof spirits. Approximately 80 
percent of 18 to 24-year-old Russians drink 
beer, while only 25 percent drink vodka. In 
contrast, almost 60 percent of those over 
39 years of age drink vodka and another ten 
percent drink samogon.82
Lagging behind Europe
Life expectancy in Russia kept pace with that of 
western industrial nations up until the mid-1960s. 
But while life expectancy continued rising in the 
West thanks to improved living conditions, it 
stagnated in Russia and then began falling at the 
beginning of the 1970s. Mikhail Gorbachev’s anti-
alcohol campaign resulted in only a short-lived rise 
in the mid-1980s. Only in recent years has Russia 
seen a noticeable improvement in national health.
Life expectancy 
at birth in four 
European countries 
and the USA, 
1950 to 2010
(Source: United Nations, 
World Population 
Prospects: The 2008 
Revision Database, 
New York)
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The health care system is also in desperate 
need of reform. The system was completely 
subsidized by the government during the 
Soviet era, but with the establishment of 
a public health insurance industry at the 
beginning of the 1990s, there has been a 
growing disparity in the quality of health 
care. The insurance premiums are generally 
administered by region, and in many places, 
they do not sufficiently cover the cost of 
treatment guaranteed by the constitution. 
Often those who can pay out-of-pocket are 
the ones who receive treatment. And those 
who cannot have to pay for it – in the worst 
case – with their lives. In 2006, the number 
of diagnosed cardiovascular diseases in the 
crisis-ravaged region of Pskov, south of St. 
Petersburg, exceeded the number of deaths 
by just 20 percent. In other words, almost 
every other patient succumbs to the disease. 
In the affluent, oil-rich regions of the Ural 
and the Volga Federal Districts, e.g. the 
Republic of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, 
five out of six patients are cured. This can be 
attributed, on the one hand, to better quality 
of treatment, and on the other, to the fact 
that a broader segment of the population has 
access to the health care system.83
In order to counter this disparity in medical 
care, the government announced in 2006 
that health care would be one of four major 
national projects, for which it pledged to 
appropriate a large increase in funding. 
The most recent data show that access 
to the health care system has indeed 
improved since the beginning of the new 
millennium.84 Vladimir Putin has pledged 
to invest an additional 300 billion roubles 
– approximately seven billion euros – into 
the health care sector beginning in 2011.85 
The plan also calls for an increase in the 
employer health insurance contribution from 
currently 3.1 to 5.1 percent. This increase 
comes at a crucial time, as the demographic 
development of an ageing society is 
expected to dramatically inflate health 
care expenditure. The percentage of the 
population age 64 and older is predicted to 
increase from the current level of 14 percent 
to just under 20 percent by 2030.86
In addition to modernising the technical 
apparatus at clinics and doctor’s practices, 
the structure of health care must be modified 
to meet the challenges of today and of 
the future. The problem is that the system 
continues to focus on combating infectious 
diseases and pays little attention to curing 
chronic illnesses. Many patients are treated 
by highly-paid specialists in hospitals, yet 
there are far too few general practitioners 
who could potentially treat one-third of all 
out-patient cases at a fraction of the cost.87 
But because general practitioners were often 
insufficiently qualified in the Soviet era, 
people have little confidence in them today. 
The health care concept put forth by the 
Russian government pledges to change this 
by 2020.88 Of course, training thousands of 
general practitioners will require significant 
time and money. To make matters worse, 
a powerful lobby of medical specialists is 
fighting to prevent a general overhaul of the 
system.
Lethal hazards
The disparity in life expectancy between Russia and members of the EU is largely due to the fact that Russians 
die of  heart disease more often than Western and Central Europeans. They are also more likely to fall victim to 
violent crime and traffic accidents. The probability of being murdered is 20 times higher in Russia than in the 
EU. Generally speaking, alcohol plays a decisive role in the mortality rate. Infectious diseases are responsible 
for far fewer deaths in comparison. Even so, the mortality rate is significantly higher in Russia than in the EU as 
tuberculosis and HIV/Aids are comparably more widespread. 
Number of deaths for every 
100,000 inhabitants aged 
0 to 64 in Russia and the EU 
according to cause of death*, 
2006 
(Source: World Health 
Organization, European Health 
for All Database, Geneva)
Circulatory diseases
Neoplasms
Infectious 
diseases
External causes 
and poisonings
* The mortality rates are age-standardized. This means 
that they signify the hypothetical rates if Russia’s age 
structure were the same as the EU’s. Because Russians 
are somewhat younger on average than citizens of the 
EU, the actual disparity between Russia and the EU is 
negligibly smaller than indicated here. 
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The airplane manufacturer Sukhoi in 
Siberian Komsomolsk-on-Amur is a model 
enterprise of the Russian weapons industry. 
The state corporation produces fighting jets. 
In August 2010, Sukhoi made headlines: 
seventy employees had phoney engineering 
degrees. The corporate management did not, 
however, view this as sufficient reason to 
let the employees go: degrees were simply a 
formality and the employees had been with 
the company for years.
The dishonest acquisition of academic 
degrees has taken on threatening proportions 
in large parts of the former Soviet Union. 
There are no exact figures, but experts 
estimate that, depending upon the field, 
between 30 and 50 percent of doctorates 
in Russia have been purchased. Degrees in 
medicine and law are in particular demand.89 
In the long-term, this will undoubtedly 
cause extensive economic damage. The 
Department of Economic Security in the 
Russian Ministry of the Interior estimated 
that there were 5.5 billion US dollars in bribe-
money in the educational sector in 2009. 1.5 
billion dollars alone were paid by beginning 
students in order to fraudulently gain access 
to universities.90 This means that there is a 
growing number of pseudo-experts making 
the successful pursuit of the modernization 
of either society or the economy doubtful.
Corruption in the educational system 
intensified when the sector was liberalized in 
the 1990s. During the Soviet era, university 
education was free and a degree promised 
nothing more than a badly-paid job in a state 
company determined by the government. 
When, following the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the government significantly cut educational 
subsidies, colleges and universities began 
to fight for survival. Despite the introduction 
of tuition fees, the quality of education, 
which once enjoyed a good reputation even 
in the West, could not be maintained. Many 
teachers and university professors are 
still convinced of the superiority of the old 
system, however, and stand in the way of 
post-industrial progress in education.
Crowded lecture halls
Initially, statistics justified the viewpoints 
of conservative Russian pedagogues. In 
comparison to other industrialized countries, 
Russia provides a high degree of education. 
88 percent of citizens between 25 and 64 
have a school leaving degree comparable to 
the German Abitur. Only four percent leave 
school without any kind of secondary leaving 
degree. More than half of the adults have 
completed a degree at a university of applied 
sciences or comprehensive university.91 In 
some fields, the number of academics among 
the employed population is higher than in 
any other state in the OECD. What is also 
astounding is that the revolutionary leader 
Vladimir Lenin’s motto, “learn, learn and once 
again learn,” which could not go unheeded 
in any Soviet classroom, did not merely 
survive communism. The annual number of 
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college graduates even multiplied more than 
three-fold between 1989 and 2009. And 
this was true not only among the urban but 
also among the rural population and for both 
sexes.92
Russia should, therefore, be ideally equipped 
to compete in the race of modern information 
societies. In absolute numbers, it has the 
world’s fifth-largest pool of academics, 
following the USA, China, India and Japan. 
Of the world’s 350 million people with a 
university degree, 20 million live in Russia, 
which, with two percent of the world’s 
population, can boast six percent of all 
academics. 
Yet the academic sector’s achievements 
fail by far to meet expectations. Between 
1995 and 2008, the United States Patent 
Office (USPTO) registered 2.3 million 
patents worldwide. Only 0.1 percent came 
from Russia. A scale which compares 
USPTO patents with the percentage of the 
population with a university degree ranks 
Russia 48th. This means it falls far behind 
all industrialized western countries as well 
as countries such as Costa Rica, Jordan 
and Mauritius.93 Essentially, the following 
rule of thumb applies: the richer the 
country, the more patents per person with 
university degree. According to per capita 
GDP and education levels, Russia should be 
registering three times as many inventions.*
29Education
* Investigations carried out  by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization come to similar results.
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In citation indexes, which count among the 
criteria for scientific efficiency, Russia also 
ranks poorly. Between 1990 and 2008, the 
number of publications by Russian scientists 
in international journals stagnated, despite 
the joint facts that the number of academics 
in the country doubled, former political 
barriers ceased to exist and the number of 
publications increased worldwide.94
 
Modern structures gain foothold slowly 
Mono-causal explanations for the fact that 
the number of students is growing more 
intensively than the country’s innovation 
strength fall short. Only the interplay of 
various factors gives an idea as to why 
Russian developments differ from those in 
other countries. For example, young men 
at universities often seek a refuge from the 
military, as students are temporarily released 
from military service. Nor does the Kremlin’s 
patriotism halt at universities, which rely 
more on native researchers and less on 
exchange programmes or cooperation with 
international research institutions. This 
deprives young Russian researchers of the 
opportunity for important exchange with 
recognised international colleagues. Whoever 
does manage to find such opportunities 
often seeks employment abroad after 
completing studies, where young academics 
are generally paid better and the universities 
are better equipped technically. A perfect 
example is the case of the Russian 
researchers Andre Geim and Konstantin 
Novoselov, who won the Nobel Prize for 
physics in 2010: educated in Moscow, they 
now work in Manchester, England. 
It has also been difficult to implement 
the Bologna Process, to which Russia 
officially committed in 2005. University 
administrations and many professors who 
fear the loss of Russia’s educational identity 
are the main opponents of the reform. Higher 
Few centres of innovation
The distribution of patent applications in the post-
Soviet territory reflects the regions’ economic 
strengths. Innovation is strongest in Moscow and 
St. Petersburg as well as in Siberian Tomsk and 
weakest in the Central Asian countries and in large 
parts of Ukraine. Compared to the inhabitants 
of many Western European countries as well as 
Japan, South Korea and the United States, Russians 
register extremely few patents.
Patent applications per one million 
inhabitants, 2008
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competitiveness also feeds their rejection. 
This reveals one of the cardinal problems of 
the Russian higher education: insufficient 
mobility. Many instructors teach at the same 
alma mater where they once studied. Hardly 
anyone has visited another Russian or foreign 
university in the course of his or her career. 
Another hurdle on the way to reform is that 
the bachelor’s degree, particularly if acquired 
abroad, is not highly valued in the Russian 
labour market.95
Innovation centres and technology parks 
like those in the Moscow suburb of Skolkovo, 
where a Russia Silicon Valley is planned to be 
erected by 2015, are supposed to promote 
greater cooperation between academic 
teaching and the labour market. The Kremlin 
is not only relying on financiers from the 
economic sector; it is also attempting to 
attract researchers and top-level scientific 
managers from the West. Accordingly, 
Moscow declared education a “national 
project” in 2006. Universities are to be 
evaluated according to international criteria 
and flag-ship institutions will enjoy special 
funding as “national research universities” 
and “federal universities.” So far, however, 
the results have been discouraging. Of about 
3,000 accredited university institutions, 
no more than 100 to 150 are competitive, 
according to Education Minister Andrei 
Fursenko.96 The “Times Higher Education 
Index” ranking, which takes a look at 200 
of the world’s leading universities, did not 
include a single Russian institution in 2010.97
Vocational training is also deficient. 
Employers often complain that graduates 
are not up to the requirements of the work. 
Handicraft trades and manual labour are 
not socially prestigious. This must change 
in order to counter the dearth of skilled 
labour in production. The average age of an 
employee in industry is currently 54 years. 
Moscow has developed a promising plan: 
its “labour force” programme is trying to 
attract large local companies as sponsors for 
students in technical fields and to get them to 
guarantee subsequent employment.
Since vocational training is so unpopular, 
less-talented students try to enter university, 
lowering the general level of education. Due 
to a demographically determined decrease 
in the number of students, universities will 
soon need to compete for students, however, 
accepting sinking levels of quality into the 
bargain. In the 2011/2012 school year, only 
15 million children will attend school, which 
is eleven million fewer than in 1996/1997.98 
In order to guarantee higher standards and to 
fight corruption, the government introduced 
a system of nationally uniform admission 
exams at the beginning of this century. 
These are intended to promote competition 
among the institutions and the quality of 
education. Those who pass the tests can 
apply nationwide using their points.
Yet many universities have been waging 
a bitter war against the reform, which 
impinges long-term upon their autonomy 
in selecting students. A few universities 
have managed to reclaim a certain degree 
of freedom with regard to the selection of 
applicants. But this is not the only reason 
that it remains a question as to whether the 
tests can effectively fight corruption: the 
first regional trials revealed irregularities 
in test evaluation. Those who can afford it 
also frequently and successfully contest test 
results. Corruption has also been observed to 
have been shifting to high-schools.99
Reforms similar to those in Russia have 
also been introduced by many other CIS 
countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan. In comparison to shrinking Slavic 
societies, however, Central Asia is facing 
entirely different challenges. The wealth of 
children is leading to a constantly growing 
number of students of whom only a few, due 
to comparatively low levels of education in 
the region, will be able to study. Educational 
quality also lags significantly behind Russia’s 
and the Baltic states’. 
Recently, international Pisa studies have 
shown that Russian schools have catching 
up to do. Russian pupils had below-average 
results in all three testing fields.* This is 
explained not only by poorly-qualified, over-
aged teachers but by outdated curricula 
and methods. A Russian grammar school 
pupil has to master more material than his 
or her counterparts in the West, but the 
aim of instruction focuses primarily on 
memorization and regurgitation. Instead 
of promoting critical thinking and study, 
instruction tends to punish independence 
and autonomy. 
Education and teaching thus reflect social 
and political norms. Modernization, when 
and if it takes place, continues to be driven 
top-down. The educational system is not 
laying the groundwork for grass-roots 
creativity and innovation by a large portion 
of the general population.
* Reading, natural sciences and mathematical 
problem solving.
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The economic upheaval of the 1990s was 
a traumatic experience for the Soviet 
successor states. Sinking production 
rates, unemployment and inflation led to 
the impoverishment of large parts of the 
population. The trend towards rising real 
income, which lasted until the economic 
crisis of 2009, only took off following total 
collapse at the end of the last century. Where 
a Russian had an average of 1,700 roubles 
per month in 1999, ten years later he already 
had 16,900, or about 400 euros. Even 
excluding inflation, this was a significant 
increase: while income rose by about 900 
percent, consumer prices only rose by 300 
percent.100
Yet social inequality has grown alongside 
the Russian economy. A few oligarchs have 
earned a fortune by selling natural resources 
such as oil, gas, aluminium and other metals 
as well as coal and wood while a broad 
middle class has still failed to form. This is 
demonstrated by the Gini coefficient, an 
internationally recognized measurement 
for the distribution of income or wealth.* 
In Russia, the coefficient rose from 0.39 to 
0.44 between 1999 and 2009. In Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Armenia, however, the 
coefficient recently fell to values of about 
0.3, which are typical for developed 
countries.101
That there is still no real middle class with 
purchasing power in large parts of the 
post-Soviet space has been documented 
by a household survey conducted by the 
GfK Association in Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
Only 0.7 percent of the participants said they 
had enough savings for all consumer goods, 
while a further 4.7 percent could afford 
everything except own housing. Another 
20.5 percent said that they could buy all 
household appliances but not a car. The large 
majority (55 percent) had enough money for 
food, clothes and smaller household items 
but could not afford larger goods such as 
TVs, refrigerators or washing machines. At 
the lower end of the scale, 16.9 percent had 
enough for food but not for clothes, and 2.3 
percent even had problems with daily food 
expenses.102
In accordance with these figures, about 
40 percent of household income in Russia 
and Ukraine is still spent on food; in 
highly developed countries, this figure is 
significantly lower. Even in the former Eastern 
Bloc countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland the share hardly exceeds 20 
percent. The development gap can also be 
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seen in modern services such as Internet 
access. Only 32 percent of the adult Russian 
population has Internet and significantly 
fewer have access in Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova. Only the Baltic states can compete 
with Central and Western Europe in terms of 
Internet access. In these countries, between 
59 and 69 percent of the adult population are 
online.103
New consumer groups and incipient 
modernization
Alongside the economy, demographics also 
impact consumer structures. In the upcoming 
years and decades, Russia’s enormous 
domestic market will grow smaller and be 
characterized by ever-older consumers. 
By 2030, the number of pensioners will 
have grown from today’s 30 million to 40 
million. Almost every third Russian will have 
surpassed working age, according to today’s 
definition.104 This could permanently alter 
consumer behaviour since older consumers 
TVs and refrigerators remain unaffordable for many
Household survey in Russia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, 2010
(Source: GfK Association)
We do not have any financial difficulties; we can afford a flat or a house
We can afford many things except expenses such as a flat or a house
We can afford household items but it would be difficult to buy a car
We have enough money for food, clothes and smaller household objects but it would be difficult 
to buy a TV or refrigerator
We have enough money for food but not enough money for clothes
We do not always have enough money for food
* The Gini coefficient is a scale from 0 to 1. A value of 
0 means that everyone in a given country has the same 
income. A value of 1 means the entire national income is 
in the hands of a single person.
demand different products than younger 
ones. In developed countries, pensioners 
spend a larger part of their income on health 
care and medicine as well as housing and 
energy.
Yet at the moment, pensioners hardly play 
a role as consumers in Russia. While their 
pensions were often paid with considerable 
delay in the 1990s so that their real value 
had largely been destroyed by rapid inflation, 
they now receive monthly payments which 
are more or less regularly adjusted to price 
level increases but are still barely sufficient 
to cover basic expenses. In the short-term, 
the low purchasing power of the elderly 
will not change since the next generation 
of pensioners has little to fall back on due 
to the chaos following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union; nor will they really profit from 
the newly introduced funded pillar in the 
pension system. It is only in the mid- and the 
long-term that pensioners, via continuous 
economic growth, can become a strong 
consumer group similar to those in Western 
Europe. 
Among the countries surveyed, there are 
some interesting similarities in the relation-
ship between educational attainment and 
purchasing power. A completed secondary 
education generally protects people from 
poverty, defined as not having enough 
money for food and clothes, but a university 
degree does not guarantee a significantly 
higher income.105 This has to do with the fact 
that, on the one hand, university graduates 
often find jobs in public service which are 
traditionally paid poorly. On the other hand, 
good money can be earned in the shadow 
economy without higher education. 
Underdeveloped consumption and pro-
duction patterns can best be observed in 
retail trade. Whereas in Western Europe, 
large supermarket chains dominate 
commerce, in Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine, it is primarily small mom-and-pop 
stores and street markets. It is unlikely that 
these will be around for long, however: 
change is already underway. The cumulative 
market share of discounters, supermarkets 
and so-called hyper-markets in Russia 
such as Sedmoy Kontinent, Auchan, O’Key, 
Spar and Billa was but 14 percent in 2005; 
by 2009, it had grown to 34 percent. Yet 
compared to Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, for example, with shares of 60 to 75 
percent, there remains an enormous gap.106 
The housing market is also lagging behind. 
Russians spend very little for accommodation 
and utilities – a mere nine percent of their 
income in contrast to the roughly 20 percent 
in Central European countries.107 This is 
partly related to the fact that, following the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, people 
could become owners of their previously 
state-owned flats for free and still have to 
pay relatively little property tax. Households 
also continue to benefit from an artificially 
low gas price, which the government is 
nonetheless increasing step-by-step to meet 
market levels. Select groups such as veterans 
or low-income earners also have access to 
further subsidies for utilities. Whoever still 
lives in state-owned property also pays 
rents well below market prices. The further 
the liberalization of the housing market 
proceeds, however, the more money citizens 
will have to pay for their housing. 
The most pressing problems are the shortage 
of available housing and the miserable state 
of a great deal of property. Since market rents 
are unaffordable for most people, several 
generations often live together under one 
roof. Families which once had fewer than 
five to ten square metres of space per person 
could, until recently, apply for subsidized 
housing, although they had to face a years-
long wait. Since the construction of social 
housing is proceeding very slowly, however, 
the waiting list still contains about 2.9 million 
families.108 There are other hurdles on the 
way to ownership. Since free or cheap living 
was essentially a basic right during the Soviet 
era, many people remain sceptical when it 
comes to taking up a loan. The thought of 
having to pay instalments and interest rates 
still frightens many. This is also why only 0.8 
percent of Russia’s population maintain that 
they are in a position to buy a flat.109 
In the long-term, both consumer behaviour 
and market structures in the former Soviet 
Union should approach Central and Western 
European patterns. This is demonstrated, for 
example, by bank accounts: the share of the 
Russian population which has a bank account 
rose between 2005 and 2009 from 43 to 73 
percent, which is higher than in Poland.110 
The speed with which the remaining gap will 
be closed depends upon whether or not the 
economy can continue its upward trend of 
the last decade following the crisis of 2009. 
The upswing following the turn of the century 
started, however, from an extremely low level 
and depended in great part on the export 
of raw materials. In order to create a broad 
group of consumers in the future and to 
attain greater prosperity, the country needs 
an educated workforce which generates new 
jobs through innovation and simultaneously 
drives back the shadow economy and 
corruption. 
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 The demise of Communism also ended 
state-decreed atheism in the post-Soviet 
space. Yet although it had been prohibited for 
decades to practice one’s beliefs, the various 
confessions had been able to maintain their 
ideological and regional differences. When 
the Soviet Union disintegrated, religion 
experienced a renaissance in Russia and the 
other Soviet successor states. In addition 
to the search for meaning, religion fostered 
identity in the process of national rebirth. In 
post-Soviet countries, religious belief proved 
the cornerstone of a return to traditional 
national values. 
Russia’s major religions include Orthodox 
Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. 
The Russian Orthodox Church is by far the 
largest religious community. In the last 
20 years, it has been able to significantly 
expand its social presence. The number of 
parishes rose from 6,893 in 1988 to 29,141 
in 2008. At the end of the 1980s, there 
were five clerical colleges. By now, the 
Orthodox educational sector encompasses 
87 institutions, and these still cannot 
accommodate the rush of applicants. The 
number of operated monasteries rose from 
21 to 769.111
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Orthodox 
Church was not prepared to meet the 
challenges of its newly-won freedom. Many 
church representatives toyed with the idea 
of returning to a pre-revolutionary tradition, 
when Orthodoxy enjoyed the status of a state 
religion. The clergy did not trust emerging 
democracy. It was especially afraid of 
Western freedoms, such as the individual 
choice of religious belief as guaranteed 
in the liberal 1990 law on religion. But in 
1997, the law was replaced by a new one, 
thanks to pressure by the Orthodox Church, 
explicitly favouring the four “traditional” 
confessions.112 
More than a religious community
The Orthodox Church has by now come to 
play a fundamental role in society, which it 
does not, however, use to criticize the state 
or government. It sees itself, rather, as a 
spiritual mentor to the political elite. The 
role model for this symbiotic relationship 
is that between the Church and the state 
in the Byzantine Empire, from which 
Russia adopted Christianity.113 There are 
still conflicts, however, when the Church 
tries to use the state for its own purposes. 
For example, it did not manage to legally 
establish two matters close to its heart: 
installing military clergy in the army and 
introducing mandatory Orthodox instruction 
in the schools.114
Religion and Ethnicity
Renaissance after 70 years of suppression
Nonetheless, state institutions and 
politicians try to rub elbows with Church 
dignitaries, which lends additional 
legitimacy. Furthermore, the Church’s 
self-styled orthodoxy, presented as a 
specifically Russian form of Christianity, suits 
Vladimir Putin’s nationalistic course: the 
state and the Church both reject pluralistic 
democracy. The only difference is that the 
Church rejects it more openly since it does 
not have to take into account foreign policy 
considerations. It rejects western democracy 
and universal human rights as irreconcilable 
with the Russian tradition of consensus 
and community as principles of social 
organization.
Sociological research confirms that the 
Russian Orthodox Church is more than simply 
a community of people with shared beliefs. 
In surveys, “Russian” and “orthodox” are 
increasingly used as synonyms. Accordingly, 
“orthodox” means “genuinely Russian” 
and protecting orthodoxy is deemed a 
national security matter. Belief is simply a 
sub-category in this system of orthodoxy. 
Whoever professes orthodoxy thereby 
emphasizes his or her place within a Russian 
tradition.115 In a 2009 survey conducted 
by the Levada Center, an opinion research 
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institute, 72 percent of the population 
deemed themselves orthodox while only 30 
percent of Russians believe in God.116 And 
only a fraction of believers, whose knowledge 
of the religious canon is generally superficial, 
participate in parish life.
The average age of church-goers has grown 
drastically younger, falling from 65 to 50. 
In the past, the most committed church-
goers were uneducated “Babushkas”. In 
the meantime, they have been replaced by 
mostly female students, young professionals, 
teachers, civil servants and businesswomen 
between 40 and 55 years old. The historical 
irony is that this generation’s sympathy 
with and nostalgia for the Soviet era has 
turned the Soviet Union’s most important 
“non-Soviet institution” into a Church for the 
Soviet people.117
In Belarus and Ukraine, an orthodox religious 
renaissance has undergone a similar 
development. In the western regions of both 
countries, which belonged to Poland and 
Czechoslovakia until 1939 and were thus 
less “Sovietized”, the degree of religiosity 
is significantly greater among the Catholic 
population, however. In Caucasian countries, 
religion plays an important role in daily 
life but the population seldom practices. 
This is also true for Muslim Azerbaijan. In 
Armenia, the Apostolic Church is the de facto 
state church. Its primary responsibility is to 
legitimate military conflicts with its Muslim 
neighbour, Azerbaijan, over the Nagorno-
Karabakh region.118
Growing number of Muslims
Islam is Russia’s second-largest religion. It 
is not clear, however, how many Muslims live 
in the country. The 2002 census conjectured 
14.5 million based on the ethnic make-up 
of the population. By now, the 15-million 
mark has most likely been surpassed. 
Representatives of the Islamic community 
think there are even more than 20 million 
Muslims in Russia because, since the demise 
of the Soviet Union, millions of people – 
especially from the Central Asian states of 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan – have 
left for Russia, which is economically better 
off. The largest contingent of immigrants, at 
1.5 million, hails from Azerbaijan. Whether 
the immigrants are devout Muslims or simply 
nationals of Islamic countries is not clear 
from the estimates.119
Little change expected
After 1990, the number of Muslims in some 
Central Asian states and Azerbaijan grew 
significantly. One reason for this is that ethnic 
Russians emigrated. In Russia itself, the number 
of Muslims is increasing only slightly nor will it 
increase erratically in the future. The existing 
growth can be attributed to higher numbers 
of children by Muslim women, a more youthful 
population structure and immigration of Muslims 
from neighbouring countries to the south. About 
80 percent of Russia’s Muslims settle in the 
North Caucasus or on the Volga, especially in the 
republics of Dagestan, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan 
and Chechnya.120
Estimated share of 
Muslims in the total 
population in selected 
Soviet successor states 
in percentages: 1990, 
2010 and 2030
(Source: Pew Forum 
on Religion & Public 
Life, World Muslim 
Population Data Tables, 
Washington DC)
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Russia’s traditional Muslim population 
is settled in Tatarstan (5.5 million), 
Bashkortostan (1.6 million) and in the 
mountain region of the North Caucasus 
(seven million).121 These peoples did not 
immigrate to the Russian Federation; Russia 
incorporated them in the wake of colonial 
expansion. Today, they can, like ethnic 
Russians, rightly see Russia as their historical 
homeland. In contrast to Tatarstan, however, 
which is closely linked to the heart of 
Russia, the North Caucasus leads a marginal 
existence. More and more Caucasians are 
fleeing from the underdeveloped region’s 
economic problems. They are not, however, 
welcomed with open arms in Russia’s large 
cities: xenophobia in Russia has reached 
dangerous proportions and it sporadically 
explodes into pogroms. Right-wing 
extremists and racists can rely on the tacit 
acceptance of the public at large. 
Purists are gaining influence
Since the first war in Chechnya broke out 
in the mid-1990s, Islam has been equated 
in the Russian mind with extremism and 
separatism. Both parties have contributed 
in their own ways. Step by step, the 
separatists have turned the war of liberation 
into a jihad, while Moscow defines the 
war as its contribution to the global fight 
against Islamic terror, not least to counter 
international criticism of crimes against 
the civilian population. A more nuanced 
encounter with the Islamic renaissance has 
not taken place. Authorities deem all kinds 
of Islamic re-birth “militant and steered 
from the outside” if they do not correspond 
to traditional Soviet-style Islam, grouping 
them under the incendiary blanket term of 
“Wahhabism”. 
Even dignitaries of the official Muslim clergy 
committed to traditional Islam and keen to 
get along with the Kremlin use this term. 
This is not surprising, since criticism by the 
purist reformers is directed primarily against 
the spiritual nomenclature of the old school. 
Before the Iron Curtain fell, the population 
had developed a specific form of religious 
practice in order to survive Soviet rule. The 
religion and customs of the mountain peoples 
were combined in ritual practices. Mullahs 
and Imams possessed only rudimentary 
religious knowledge and violated, as far as 
purists were concerned, the true teachings 
of Islamic ritual. The religious conflict 
masked, however, a generational conflict: 
young people especially joined oppositional 
religious groups in order to protest rigid 
policies, state corruption, nepotism and the 
lack of social prospects. 
Wahhabism is guided by the pure teachings 
of the prophets and can be traced back to 
Ibn al-Wahhab on the 18th century Arabian 
Peninsula. But the term “Salafism” would 
better befit the purism of Russian Islam. This 
also preaches an uncompromising purism 
without necessarily calling for militant 
struggle. The state made a tragic mistake in 
the early phase of these movements by failing 
to distinguish between the various forms 
of Islam: the religiously active Muslims, the 
politically active but peaceful Islamists and 
the militant “Jihadists”.122 Instead, security 
forces indiscriminately fought all believers 
whose faith did not conform to Soviet Islam, 
promoting rather than quelling radicalization. 
Today, there is virtually no Islamic opposition 
willing to enter a dialogue and more and 
more Muslims accept militant underground 
activities.*
Policies attempt to encounter purist pressure 
by making ever more concessions to religion 
and its dignitaries in worldly matters. This 
has in some places essentially led to the 
abolition of the separation of church and 
state, as can be increasingly observed in 
Dagestan and Chechnya. Now that faith has 
found its way into political and social life, the 
state and society are facing de-modernization 
and retreating to pre-modern patterns of 
behaviour.124 Russia’s south has become a 
foreign country-within-the-country. In the 
post-Soviet world, both the Caucasus and 
Central Asian states have been affected by 
the mobilization of Islamic forces. Measured 
by the number of terrorist acts, however, 
there is much greater potential for violence in 
the North Caucasus.125
* In 1999, Dagestan’s population still supported the 
Russian security forces’ struggle against Islamists, with 
a majority rejecting the founding of a pan-Caucasian 
emirate.123
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Russia is rich in unspoiled nature, endless 
forests and majestic rivers which meander 
northward across the Siberian tundra. The 
vast, sparsely populated regions offer a 
habitat for bears, rare snow leopards, the 
Amur tiger and the world’s only fresh-water 
seal, which lives in Lake Baikal. 22 percent of 
all the world’s forests are located in Russia; 
around 47 percent of its territory is covered 
by forests.126 The Russians’ close relationship 
to nature is the subject of countless songs 
and poems, and even the prime minister 
Vladimir Putin likes to present himself 
as a rugged man of nature. Yet in reality, 
Russians are rather rough-handed with the 
environment and environmental protection is 
a matter of low priority.
During the Soviet regime, humans and nature 
alike were regarded as mere resources for 
ensuring the victory of communism over 
capitalism. Huge production facilities, 
pre-planned industrial cities and gigantic 
combines were built in the wilderness, 
pouring millions of tonnes of nitrogen oxides, 
sulphur dioxide, carbon dioxide and heavy 
metals into the air each year.127 Under the 
government’s direction, rivers were diverted 
and contaminated and 969 atomic bombs 
were detonated for testing purposes.128
Soviet-era contaminants, produced in large 
part by the military-industrial complex, 
continue to adversely affect the environment 
today. As the nuclear weapons race drew 
to a close at the end of the Brezhnev era, 
the Soviets had tens of thousands of 
operational nuclear warheads – enough 
to annihilate life on the planet many times 
over. Hundreds of thousands of people were 
employed in secret nuclear programmes 
in places not found on any map (so-called 
SATO, the Russian abbreviation for “closed 
administrative territorial units”). These 
cities were frequently named after faraway 
places and had only one P.O. box number. 
They were given real names in the 1990s. 
The most important nuclear weapons 
laboratory, for example, was in Arzamas-16 
(today’s Sarov), 186 kilometres away from 
Nizhny Novgorod and 80 kilometres away 
from Arzamas itself. A large bomb factory 
was located in Sverdlovsk-45 (Lesnoy) in 
the Ural Mountains near Yekaterinburg, and 
one of the key sites of plutonium production 
could be found in the Siberian city of 
Krasnoyarsk-26 (Zhelesnogorsk). To this day, 
the environmental pollution in all of these 
cities remains high. 
In Tomsk-7 (Seversk), highly active waste 
material was simply buried underground 
and bulldozed over. The Soviet military 
disposed of atomic reactors in submarines by 
sinking them off the coast of Novaya Zemlya 
and in the Sea of Japan. In 1957, a tank 
containing 300,000 litres of waste exploded 
in a plutonium facility in Chelyabinsk-40 
(Ozyorsk), releasing millions of radioactive 
particles into the air – more than were 
Environment
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released by the Chernobyl accident. Later, 
engineers diverted an estimated 76 million 
cubic metres of highly radioactive waste-
water into the Techa River, which is still 
contaminated today.129 
The Soviets – and to some degree the 
Russian Federation as well – produced 
approximately 145 tonnes of weapons-grade 
plutonium. Out of this total, 17 tonnes have 
been used in nuclear testing, disposed of, 
or sunk to the ocean floor inside nuclear-
powered submarines.130 One of the most 
intensely discussed matters of international 
security involves how the remaining 128 
tonnes and the masses of radioactive waste 
from civilian and military nuclear facilities 
can be safely stored and safeguarded from 
terrorists, for example. Even small amounts 
of highly radioactive waste would suffice to 
make a so-called “dirty bomb”.131
The distrustful Soviet military preferred to 
have most of their bomb-grade material 
produced in the Russian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, but carried out their nuclear 
testing in the neighbouring republics or 
along Russia’s outlying borders. In 1961, 
the military detonated the most powerful 
nuclear device on the island of Novaya 
Zemlya – an explosion almost 4,000 times 
more powerful than the bomb that destroyed 
Hiroshima. Around 120 atmospheric nuclear 
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tests were carried out at the test site in the 
eastern Kazakh city of Semipalatinsk-21, and 
the military repeatedly failed to give ample 
warning to the farmers and shepherds who 
lived there. The effects are evident today; 
the lifespan of residents in the surrounding 
villages is almost ten years less than the 
average in Kazakhstan.132
Because of the long half-life of radioactive 
fissile materials, the toxic waste of the 
Soviet era is still very dangerous today. 
“Traditional” environmental pollution, on 
the other hand, is relatively easy to remove. 
Many of the old industrial factories have been 
closed down because they were no longer 
profitable or were modernized. Compared to 
1990, the amount of unprocessed industrial 
and municipal waste water that ends up in 
streams and rivers has fallen by almost 40 
percent and emissions of airborne pollutants 
have decreased by 30 percent.133 But as 
living standards increase, Russians are 
producing more garbage than ever before. 
Air pollution has worsened with increasing 
volumes of traffic in cities. In recent years, 
the nation’s energy consumption has 
also surged. In terms of population – and 
certainly in terms of GDP – Russia continues 
to produce far higher emissions of sulphur 
dioxide and heavy metals than comparable 
industrial countries. According to the Human 
Development Report of the United Nations, 
“despite modernization attempts, the last 
few years have seen Russia becoming 
increasingly resource export-oriented and 
environmentally unfriendly.”134
Until Gorbachev came to power, information 
about environmental pollution was rarely 
publicized in the Soviet Union. In its first 
environmental report in 1989, the state 
committee for environmental protection 
admitted that 290 areas were impacted by 
an “unfavourable environmental situation.” 
These areas comprised 3.7 million square 
kilometres or 16 percent of the entire land 
area of the Soviet Union.135 Today, 136 cities, 
home to 56 million inhabitants, continue to 
register high levels of air pollution, thirty of 
which suffer from “very high” levels of air 
pollution.136
The worst environmental conditions can be 
found in areas where traditional coal- and 
chemical-producing industries and heavy 
industries are situated, such as the Kuznetsk 
Basin, one of the 13 most polluted regions 
in Russia, over which hangs a toxic cocktail 
of heavy metals, nitrogen oxides, sulphur 
dioxide, halogen-containing compounds 
and phenols. According to data released 
by the Blacksmith Institute in New York 
in 2007, four of the top ten most heavily 
polluted regions on earth can be found in 
the territory of the former Soviet Union: the 
former chemical weapons production centre 
of Dzerzhinsk in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, the 
petrochemical city of Sumgait right outside 
the Azerbaijani capital of Baku, the North 
Siberian city of Norilsk, which is off-limits 
to foreigners and where the largest nickel 
smelting works in the world have decimated 
vast swathes of vegetation, and the region 
surrounding the destroyed Ukrainian reactor 
in Chernobyl.137
Inefficient energy consumption
Few countries in the world consume more energy 
per unit of output than the post-Soviet states. The 
enormous waste of energy is primarily caused 
by the extraction of fossil fuels and antiquated 
production methods in industry. Uzbekistan’s 
economy is the least efficient, as huge amounts 
of electricity are needed to artificially irrigate 
the cotton fields there. The economies of Latvia 
and Armenia, on the other hand, consume less 
energy in comparison.
Energy intensity in 
different countries, 
2008
(Source: International 
Energy Agency, Online 
Database, Paris)
Consumed tonnes of oil equivalent for 
a GDP of 1,000 US dollars (2000) based 
on purchasing power parity
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One sign of just how far Russia’s industry 
is lagging behind is its high energy needs 
for production; Russia requires two to three 
times more energy to achieve the same 
GDP than Germany or Sweden. Ukraine’s 
use of energy is comparably inefficient.138 
Even though Russia ranks ninth in terms 
of population, it is the third-largest carbon 
dioxide emitter after the USA and China, 
and the second largest emitter of methane, a 
major contributor to the greenhouse effect.139 
The enormous emissions of methane are 
mainly due to the production of natural gas 
and leaking pipelines. In fact, the oil and gas 
pipeline infrastructure is widely regarded 
as outdated and corroded. Devastating 
accidents occur on a regular basis, such as 
the one near the northern Russian city of 
Usinsk. The 20-year-old pipeline had been 
losing oil since February 1994 and engineers 
had tried collecting it behind an artificial 
dike. But when the dike burst in October of 
the same year, 100,000 tonnes of crude oil 
gushed across the Siberian tundra and into 
the Kolva and Pechora Rivers, where the oil 
is now degrading naturally, but extremely 
slowly due to the low temperatures. Pipeline 
leakages account for the loss of some twenty 
million tonnes of oil each year in Russia – 
about four percent of total production.140
Contested impact of climate change
Despite all this, climate protection hardly 
plays a role in the country. Russia did ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol – albeit with a seven-year 
delay – and announced that after 2020 it 
would reduce emissions of greenhouse gases 
to ten to 15 percent less than the amount 
emitted in 1990. However, because so many 
energy-wasting industrial facilities shut their 
doors during the course of the country’s 
free-market transformation in the 1990s, 
Russia’s emissions are actually lower today 
than those called for by the Kyoto Protocol. In 
the coming years, Russia could even increase 
its emissions and still claim to be a “climate 
protector”. A far more ambitious goal will 
be to reduce energy intensity by 40 percent 
until 2020.141 
Environmental policy has also taken a 
backseat in Russia for a long time because 
many Russian scientists see an advantage to 
global warming. According to climate models, 
temperatures in the northern latitudes are 
set to rise much more than in the equatorial 
latitudes. Melting sea ice and less snow 
cover will lay bare more of the planet’s dark 
surface, which in turn will absorb more of the 
sun’s heat and accelerate global warming. 
For Siberia this could mean a temperature 
increase of up to four degrees centigrade by 
2030.142
This would allow the forests and agricultu-
rally viable farmland to extend 200 to 1,000 
kilometres northward.143 Heating costs would 
plummet, the north-eastern passage would 
be free of ice for merchant ships, and it would 
be easier to tap new fossil fuel resources in 
the far north and under the Arctic Sea. On 
the other hand, the fertile chernozem regions 
and steppes in the south would suffer from 
more severe summer droughts. Furthermore, 
the permafrost, which covers 60 percent of 
the Russian territory, is beginning to thaw 
out as a result of climate change.144 A large 
portion of Russia’s 200,000 kilometres of 
gas and oil pipelines run over or through the 
permafrost which goes down 1,500 metres 
in some places. Buildings, roads, railways, 
high-tension wires, airports, nuclear power 
plants, winding towers and gigantic toxic and 
nuclear waste dumps have been built atop 
or anchored in this solid ground. This entire 
infrastructure would begin to destabilize 
if the permafrost thawed. In addition, the 
thawing moors and swamps would release 
enormous amounts of carbon dioxide and 
methane, propelling the greenhouse effect 
even further.
Russians were given a taste of the volatile 
weather they can look forward to during 
the scorching summer of 2010. Although 
forest and peat fires are relatively typical 
for that season, they spread out of control 
and developed into 700 separate large 
fires. The flames consumed 70,000 square 
kilometres of woodland – an area the size of 
Bavaria – and because the dry fields caught 
fire after the long drought, the country 
reported a 40-percent shortfall in the grain 
harvest for the first ten months of the year.145 
Moscow and other cities were engulfed in 
poisonous clouds of smog. According to 
recent estimates, the fires were responsible 
for a one percent drop in Russia’s economic 
growth – equivalent to a loss of some eleven 
billion euros.146 And the carbon dioxide 
released by the fires has contributed even 
further to global warming. 
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The global financial crisis of 2008 hit Russia 
harder than other emerging economies. Dom-
inated by natural resources, the economy 
proved to be not only especially vulnerable; 
the crisis also revealed that the boom years 
had not been sufficiently used to place the 
economy on a broader foundation. 
The mono-cities, or monogoroda, were the 
first to feel the painful effects. These are cit-
ies which are dependent upon the production 
of a single combine or several large compa-
nies within one industrial sector. Most mono-
cities are relicts of the planned economy, 
which created factories and workers’ settle-
ments all over the country as it underwent 
rapid industrialization. These centres were, 
above all, production sites which only met 
the needs and desires of their inhabitants to 
a limited extent.
According to the official definition, a place 
is a mono-city when more than one-fourth 
of the working population is employed by a 
single company or in a single industrial sector 
or when at least half of industrial production 
is rooted in a single branch of the economy. 
A company is deemed “city-forming” when 
50 percent of the inhabitants – including 
employees – are dependent upon the com-
pany’s social and communal services.147 By 
now, Russian experts define mono-cities as a 
remnant of industrialization whose days are 
counted: “Mono-cities are settlements whose 
inhabitants and organizations are incapable 
of compensating for the risks of external eco-
nomic influences and of ensuring the loca-
tion’s sustained economic development.”148 
The Russian government’s crisis programme 
of December 2010 pinpoints 335 mono-cit-
ies.149 In total, there are far more settlements 
with mono structures. Official statistics 
exclude places maintained by the military 
as well as closed settlements deemed “top 
secret”. Of the Russian Federation’s 1,090 
cities, a total of about 450 fulfil the criteria 
for a mono-city. 25 million people live in 
these, or about one-sixth of the population. 
Prior to the crisis, mono-cities generated up 
to 40 percent of GDP.150
The gas and oil producing mono-cities in 
Western Siberia survived the slump without 
any notable losses. Hit hardest were those 
places which live from mechanical engineer-
ing or the automobile industry, although the 
chemical, wood pulp and construction mate-
rial industries also suffered heavily. In 2010, 
a federal programme provided the most 
adversely affected cities with about 500 mil-
lion euros in emergency aid. Receivers, which 
initially numbered 27, rose to 35 and should 
rise to at least 50 in 2011.151 The automobile 
city of Tolyatti, where the Lada is built, was 
the first to receive a package. With more than 
700,000 inhabitants, this is Russia’s best-
known and largest mono-city. The centre of 
lorry production in Naberezhnye Chelny also 
received help. Svetlogore in the Far East, 
which only has 1,900 inhabitants but where 
the important tungsten metal is produced, 
also received a subsidy. 
 Cities
Planned life
The investment programme has high aims: 
planners assume that every state rouble 
will bring in ten roubles from private inves-
tors. But the commission bemoans a lack of 
innovation projects worth promoting. For 
example, a third of the larger cities were not 
able to make promising proposals. Further-
more, 76 percent of the mono-cities are small 
communities lacking the funds to even set up 
proposals.152
How much “city” does Russia need?
Reconstruction poses enormous difficulties 
for Russia. Since the planned economy did 
not include market-oriented calculations 
when cities were founded, transportation 
costs and climate conditions were taken into 
as little consideration as the fact that many 
places were geographically untenable. Even 
today there are many cities which cannot be 
reached by land at all, or only seasonally. 
Cities were founded, however, with other 
goals than in the West, even during the Czar-
ist era. They did not emerge as a conglom-
eration of free individuals; they served the 
political leadership as administrative centres. 
While Europeans believed that “town air 
makes you free,” Russian cities were verita-
ble strongholds of bondage. The Soviet Union 
remained true to this tradition.
World-wide, urban development follows a dy-
namic described by Zipf’s Law: according to 
this, a country’s largest city has about twice 
as many inhabitants as its second-largest 
city, three times as many as the third-largest, 
and so on. This law does not apply to Russia: 
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cities such as Novosibirsk, Novgorod, Yeka-
terinburg, Samara and Omsk all have only 
about one million inhabitants. These second-
ranking cities are frequently too small to 
become engines of innovation. There are no 
urban centres between 1.5 and four million 
inhabitants which could do so.
Previous attempts to resettle workers from 
the north and other economically weak 
regions have failed over and over due to the 
housing market and underdeveloped loan 
systems. Whoever wants to resettle from this 
kind of a region to a prospering one is seldom 
in a position to finance the move. Generally, 
selling property does not cover housing in the 
new location. And the Russian population is 
not considered mobile. In times of crisis, the 
willingness to move declines even more since 
many people grow food in their own gardens. 
If migration takes place, then it is owing 
to the young. Vorkuta, for example, a city 
beyond the Arctic Circle, has lost more than 
a third of its inhabitants since 1989. Since 
the older generation remained behind, the 
city has hardly been able to save on its social 
infrastructure.153
The large cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg 
have proven more adaptable in the midst of 
crisis than the cities in other regions, despite 
all the difficulties they have faced. On the 
basis of this knowledge, the government has 
apparently considered permanently altering 
the face of Russia. An as-yet unpublished 
proposal suggests long-term resettlement of 
the population in 20 centres.154 Promoting 
small cities (up to 100,000 inhabitants) has 
been deemed futile. Instead, resources for 
investment and modernization should be 
pooled. The foundation of the new economy 
is a three-million agglomeration: “An in-
frastructure of knowledge, a new model of 
urban administration and the concept of a 
creative city can emerge on the basis of intel-
lectual resources.” The prerequisite for this 
is an open migration policy. Without such a 
policy, planners predict population losses 
by 2030 for cities such as Omsk, Kazan, 
Ufa, Chelyabinsk, Rostov and Perm. Only 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Nizhny 
Novgorod, Yekaterinburg and Samara would 
continue to grow.155 The proposal distances 
itself from the Soviet belief in uniform set-
tlement of the territory. Whether there are 
resources and the political will to realize such 
a major project remains doubtful, however. 
Experts are already warning about excessive 
bureaucratic planning and have reminded 
planners that successful agglomerations 
emerge naturally. 
Urbanization Russian-style
In the 20th century, Soviet leaders converted 
the former peasant’s state into an industrial 
giant. More and more people moved to the cities 
throughout the period of industrialization, which 
had already begun even prior to the Second World 
War. The cities were often created for the sake of 
production only and are still dependent upon a 
single enterprise – so called mono-cities. Today, 
the share of the urban population in Russia and 
Ukraine is only marginally smaller than in Germany 
or France; but many live in small cities of little more 
than 10,000 inhabitants. And these are dispersed 
throughout the vast territory. Agglomerations 
with several million people and which could 
become engines of growth are mostly absent in the 
settlement pattern.
Percentage of population living in cities in selected countries, 1950 to 2010
(Source: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database, New York)
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How should Russia protect its 20,000 
kilometre border in the future? Which 
domestic dangers will the Soviet Union’s 
most powerful successor state have to face? 
These and other security policy questions are 
increasingly being asked from a demographic 
perspective. 
A simple arithmetical example makes the 
background clear: Starting in 2016, a million 
men are supposed to serve in the armed 
forces, most of them as conscripts. In 2008, 
about a million young men were 18 years 
old – conscription age. In 2017, however, 
this number will have decreased to about 
630,000. After compulsory military service 
was reduced to twelve months in 2008, 
the army needs about 600,000 recruits 
annually to fill its ranks. This will also lead 
to shortages if all conscripts, regardless of 
their fitness for duty, are drafted, since the 
conscription rate has so far been a mere 25 
percent. Many potential soldiers postpone 
service by pursuing higher education. Others 
are eliminated due to poor health – far 
more than are actually not fit for service. 
And whoever can afford to buys his way out 
of military service to avoid the notorious 
chicanery and abuse by older soldiers or 
superiors. 
The typical conscript hails from the lower 
class, is poorly educated and often addicted 
to drugs or alcohol.156 Of the 305,000 men 
who underwent medical examinations in 
spring of 2009, 100,000 had previously 
served jail terms or been on probation 
according to the Veterans Commission of the 
Public Chamber of the Russian Federation.157 
Even if this figure is exaggerated, it will only 
be possible in the future to find enough and 
sufficiently qualified recruits if the Russian 
population’s general health improves and the 
observance of human rights within the troops 
is effectively supervised. 
Hard power vs. soft power
The sorry state of the conventional armed 
forces has been a perennial topic in Russia 
for 20 years. Numerous reforms have been 
undertaken but most of these have failed 
in the face of military opposition and a lack 
of resources. The army never managed the 
leap from the industrial to the information 
age. The share of modern weapons was but 
ten percent in 2009, according to Defence 
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. By 2020, these 
should increase to 70 percent.158 Among other 
things, the loss of Russian soldiers’ lives in 
the ultimately victorious war with Georgia 
in 2008 inspired the Kremlin to launch a 
new reform. Experts consider this the most 
credible reform so far. Its core: today’s 
army, which can rely on a large number of 
reservists, is to be replaced by an operational 
army with small units which can be mobilized 
immediately. Russia wants to deploy these 
to respond more flexibly to local conflicts. 
This appears more urgent than ever before, 
particularly in Russia’s restive south.159
 Security
Foreign policy ambitions and domestic dangers
Moscow, influenced by the 19th century 
paradigm of the nation state, has little 
understanding for the fact that the qualities 
of a major power are no longer measured 
solely in terms of their military strength and 
territorial size. Territory and military power 
have not, of course, become superfluous; 
but in comparison to “soft power” qualities, 
they are becoming less significant: today, 
modern countries increasingly measure 
their international influence in terms of 
technological innovation, well-educated 
human capital, cultural resources and a 
modern set of values. 
Besides, the question needs to be asked: to 
what extent is Russia’s possibly endangered 
position as a superpower its most urgent 
foreign security problem? Who would 
actually attack Russia? Moscow considered 
the USA, NATO and China the main risks, at 
least until the beginning of the Medvedev era. 
The Military Doctrine through 2020 breeds 
hope for a paradigmatic shift: Washington 
and Brussels were mentioned as “military 
dangers”, but not as “military threats”; 
consequently, there is no “realistic possibility 
of an armed conflict.”160
The country’s foreign and security policy 
elite has taken a similar view: in a survey by 
the Moscow office of the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung in cooperation with the Sociological 
Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
about two-thirds of those surveyed – which 
included experts, opinion-makers and 
high-ranking civil servants – found the 
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level of national security unsatisfactory. 
Other countries and the military only play, 
however, a subordinate role: international 
tensions ranked 28 among 70 possible 
threats, China’s growing economic and 
military power ranked 30 and a military 
attack by other countries only ranked 62. 
By contrast, primarily internal threats such 
as governmental corruption, a backwards 
economy and terrorism were ranked in the 
top ten. Demographic shrinkage and the 
population’s poor health were also among 
the top concerns.161
Experts definitely see the demographic 
crisis as a security threat for Russia. It is 
questionable, however, whether the purely 
numerical decline in potential conscripts 
is the root of all evil. In the future, the 
capacities and educational levels of the 
young will be of much greater importance. 
They will determine Russia’s economic 
potential and, indirectly, the ability to moder-
nize the military and fortify the country’s 
global political influence. 
In the eyes of many Russians, the increasing 
number of non-Russian ethnicities also 
constitutes a growing danger. Confrontations 
in the Caucasus and repeated attacks in 
the country’s centre have led to growing 
xenophobia and fear of terror among the 
Russian population. Many people are 
already projecting their anxieties onto the 
armed forces and have warned that young 
non-Russian men may soon constitute the 
majority of recruits. Military operations in 
regions plagued by ethnic tensions, such 
as Chechnya, could be become harder and 
harder to conduct.162 There is no doubt that 
society’s increasing ethnic polarization is 
potentially very dangerous since deepening 
mutual mistrust can only be reversed 
gradually.  
Russian security policy still has a hard time 
negotiating the gap between its foreign 
leadership ambitions and its domestic 
challenges. This is illustrated by the “National 
Security Strategy to 2020”. It makes clear 
that Russia must aim to regain the status of 
a world power and, with regard to strategic 
weapons, to keep up with the United States. 
At the same time, it acknowledges that stable 
economic development and a high standard 
of living for its citizens constitute the basis of 
security. The strategy even contains sections 
on science, culture, health and a responsible 
relationship to the environment.163
These considerations arose against the 
backdrop of the global economic crisis, which 
is why they emphasize economic factors. 
Nonetheless, the strategy is another step 
away from Cold War security policy, which 
was based on nuclear armament. Of course, 
nuclear arms constitute an effective threat 
in international conflicts but they are of little 
practical use in ensuring the security of one’s 
own people, particularly where domestic 
threats are concerned. 
Fewer and fewer male newborns
Following a temporary high during the Gorbachov 
era in the mid-1990s, the number of male 
newborns in Russia halved within twelve years. 
The number of potential conscripts has declined 
accordingly in the last few years. Of the 626,000 
boys born in 1999, only a fraction are likely to be 
drafted in 2017. From the standpoint of today, the 
majority (of those who even survive until then) 
will either buy their way out of military service or 
will not even report for service for health reasons. 
In recent years, the number of births has again 
risen slightly, but this will decline again when the 
smaller cohorts of the 1990s reach childbearing 
age. 
Number of male newborns in Russia, 1980 to 2009
(Source: Rosstat, Demograficheski Yezhegodnik Rossii – 2010 g., Moscow)
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from this migration, although there are many 
weak industrial regions in the immediate 
vicinity of Moscow beset by a slew of 
economic and social problems. The region’s 
great challenges lie in the health sector 
because, among other things, the population 
here is ageing more quickly than elsewhere 
in Russia. Due to natural population loss, 
the area will have to rely more and more on 
immigration. Further from Moscow, in the 
south and the east, things look different since 
the number of children in these regions is 
higher. Many non-ethnic Russians live here, 
in the republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan 
and Mari El, for example, and particularly 
in the North Caucasus, which includes the 
crisis-ridden regions of Chechnya, Ingushetia 
and Dagestan. These areas first came under 
Russian control at the end of the 19th century 
and some of them have been fighting for 
independence since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Two wars in Chechnya have 
caused lasting damage to the breakaway 
republic’s infrastructure while growing 
Islamic extremism and Russia’s fight against 
terrorism continue to trouble the region. 
In the European part of Russia, the country’s 
historical core spreading to the Urals, 73 
percent of all Russians inhabit just slightly 
more than 20 percent of the entire country’s 
area. The region’s undisputed centre is 
Moscow, whose economic strength attracts 
tens of thousands of immigrants year for year. 
The capital’s surrounding regions also profit 
(Source: author’s calculations based on: Rosstat, 
Tsentralnaya Baza Statisticheskikh Dannykh; 
Demoscope Weekly. Vsesoyuznaya Perepis 
Naseleniya 1989 Goda, Moscow)
1989 (census) until the end of 2009
Beginning of 2010 to the end of 2030
Population development in percentages
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European Russia is demographically 
divided
In Northwest and Central Russia as well as in vast 
parts of the Volga region, population numbers 
have been dwindling for years. Steadily low 
numbers of children and the advanced ageing 
of the population mean that this trend will only 
become more pronounced. In contrast, in the 
south of European Russia, meaning in the North 
Caucasus, where patriarchal family structures 
ensure high numbers of children and religion still 
plays a significant role, the population is growing. 
NORTH CAUCASIAN 
Federal District
VOLGA 
Federal District
CENTRAL 
 Federal 
District
SOUTHERN 
Federal District
NORTHWESTERN 
Federal District
(Source: Rosstat, Tsentralnaya  Baza 
Statisticheskikh Dannykh, Moscow)*
Population change from 2010 to 2030 
in percentages
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Magnetic Moscow
Towards the end of the 1980s, Moscow’s 
authorities registered 300,000 private cars. 
This means that in a population of about 8.7 
million, one in 30 citizens had a car. Lucky 
automobile owners could race at high speed 
through the city’s wide boulevards. Today, 
more than four million car owners move daily 
at a snail’s pace to get to work through the 
very same roads.164
It is not only the proliferation of the private 
automobile which attests to Moscow’s 
boom. Moscow’s GDP is larger than in all 
other 17 regions of the Central Federal 
District together. This is also true of the city’s 
budget.165 Over half of the country’s banks 
had their headquarters in the city in 2007.166 
And almost half of all Moscow’s employees 
have a university degree, which is more 
than in London.167 Russia’s goal of having an 
economy based on knowledge and modern 
services seems to have taken root here.
To the same extent that Moscow has become 
a centre for multinational corporations, it 
now also attracts hundreds of thousands 
of immigrants annually. Whether they hail 
from other former Soviet republics, China, 
Vietnam or African countries, people stream 
into the city from all over the world. In the 
last 20 years, the population has grown 
by about two million people to far over ten 
million. And then there are up to three million 
unregistered immigrants.168
Natives and newcomers alike find a mix of 
Soviet relicts and the blossoms of global 
capitalism in today’s Moscow. Bright bill-
boards on gray, pre-fabricated apartment 
blocks celebrate technology’s newest 
achievements. In the tiny kiosks of train 
stations, mobile phones, digital watches and 
jewellery seduce the masses of stressed 
commuters. And high-end limousines and 
cross-country vehicles roar along the 
enormous arterial motorways. The trans-
formation from a planned to a market 
economy has generated wealth and well-
being for many, but it has also caused a lot of 
problems.
One of Moscow’s biggest headaches is its 
infrastructure. The capital’s road system is 
hopelessly congested and parking spaces 
are in short supply. Cars dominate the 
city landscape so much that you do not 
even notice the centre’s few green spaces. 
Whoever wants to escape the stream of cars 
by taking the Metro has to face chronically 
overfilled trains despite the fact that they 
run every 40 seconds. Accommodation is 
not only notoriously insufficient; it is also 
unaffordable for many. At the beginning of 
2008, flats cost an average of about 3,000 
euros per square metre.169 In Berlin during 
this period, buyers hardly paid more than 
1,000 euros.170 No wonder a torrent of 
commuters from the surrounding areas flood 
into the city every morning. Over a million 
of those employed in Moscow prefer the 
significantly cheaper housing outside the city 
and take the commute for granted.171
CENTRAL Federal District
Population in 2010 37.12 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 32.62 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 57
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.42
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 69.4
Annual net migration 2005-2010 159,763
Mean age in 2010 41.0
(Source: see page 139)
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The open closed city
In 1920, only a million people lived in 
Moscow, which had been decimated by civil 
war and the First World War. As the newly-
founded Soviet Union’s capital and industrial 
centre, Moscow nonetheless tantalized 
people from every part of the Union. The 
population had already tripled by 1930; the 
problems caused by such an explosion were 
not far behind.172 Additionally, starvation 
in the following decade encouraged the 
burgeoning crisis in housing and supplies: 
hundreds of thousands fled to the capital 
from rural areas in search of food, which the 
government rigorously delivered to urban 
centres. 
In order to curb rampant rural flight, the 
Soviet leaders introduced a domestic 
passport in 1932 intended to regulate access 
to large cities. It was only possible to enter a 
city with a propiska, a stamp permitting its 
receiver to live and work in a specific place. 
This new system ensured that every Soviet 
citizen had permanent accommodation, 
but people could only move in extenuating 
circumstances. The only way to get into a city 
like Moscow was to rely on family relations, 
job offers or voluntary exchanges with other 
citizens.
The domestic passport, however, was not 
able to stem the flow of migrants. Whoever 
really wanted to make it to Moscow did. 
Many went underground and sought informal 
employment, while others acquired illegal 
passports to gain a foothold in the regular 
labour market. Still others entered sham 
marriages with city inhabitants. Up until the 
beginning of the Second World War, rapid 
industrialization attracted another million 
people. Only about a few hundred thousand 
were needed to reach the declared ceiling of 
five million inhabitants.173
After the war, which had thinned out 
Moscow’s population to 2.5 million, there 
were more immigrants. In the early 1970s, 
the city broke the seven-million record, 
rendering the Soviet planners’ goal, which 
had been upwardly adjusted, obsolete.174 
In order to curb such rapid growth, Soviet 
planners began to relocate industries 
outside the city. The target was only realized, 
however, in 40 of 400 cases while 200 
new businesses were founded within the 
city borders.175 The flocks of labourers who 
continued to pour into Moscow settled ever-
further from the centre, meaning that the 
actual city border, the motorway ring, had to 
be broken through at several points. In 1985, 
the authorities finally yielded to population 
pressures and incorporated numerous 
settlements, leading to Moscow’s now 
characteristic ring shape with tumour-like 
formations on all sides. At the Soviet Union’s 
demise, about nine million people lived in 
Moscow, which had also grown substantially 
in surface area. 
Marginal groups in a boom town
The fragmentation of the Soviet Union meant 
that international migration, compared to 
internal migration, became more significant, 
although it did not actually exceed the latter. 
It began in the 1990s with Russians who 
had been cut off from the homeland by new 
borders and were now returning. These 
were followed by Central Asians, Moldovans, 
Ukrainians and Southern Caucasians, which 
meant that between 1990 and 2003 alone, 
Russia took in eight million former Soviet 
Men Women
Population by age group and gender in Moscow and Russia in percentages of the total population in 2008
(Source: Rosstat)
Moscow’s migrants fortify working-age population
Since very few children are born in Moscow, the population is, on average, somewhat older than the 
population in the whole of Russia. Younger generations, in particular, are significantly underrepresented in 
the city. Nonetheless, the capital has a higher percentage of available labour than the rest of the country. This 
is due to immigrants to Moscow, who are mostly between 20 and 39 years old, and who constitute between 
30 and 40 percent of the working-age population.176
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citizens.177 At the turn of the century, South-
East Asians and Africans were among the 
migrants, of whom about half are striving to 
reach Moscow.178
Prospects in the capital certainly do 
sound seductive. Nationwide, Moscow’s 
average disposable income of about 
1,600 international dollars per month is 
unrivalled. In 2008, there was almost no 
unemployment at 0.9 percent. Over 90 
percent of the working-age population had 
regular employment, even though this rate 
is artificially high due to the numerous 
commuters from the surrounding areas.179 
And gender equality also looks good: about 
80 percent of women of working-age earned 
their own money in 2007.180
This seemingly rosy picture, however, 
cannot entirely hide spreading inequality. 
In 2008, the wealthiest quintile of the 
population earned 58 percent of total 
income while the poorest quintile had to 
make do with just three percent. Despite 
low unemployment rates, and even though 
the city administration has increased social 
benefits in the past few years, about twelve 
percent of the population lived in poverty 
in 2008, which was only slightly lower than 
the nationwide average. The Gini coefficient, 
which mirrors the degree of inequality in 
income distribution, was 0.54 in 2008, 
higher than in any other Russian region.181 
Even Hong Kong, which is considered the city 
with the largest income differences in Asia, 
has a value of no more than 0.43.182
It is migrant workers especially who suffer 
from the interplay of low wages and high 
living costs. They are often forced to live in 
small spaces and in meagre circumstances 
in order to survive on their low wages 
and to support relatives in the homeland. 
Nonetheless, the difference in wealth 
between Russia and its nieghbouring 
countries is so blatant that Moscow remains 
attractive.
No warm welcome for migrants
The Russian authorities are not amused by 
the wave of migrant labourers. In order to 
secure employment for the native population, 
the administration has on several occasions 
made it harder for migrants to settle in 
Russia and pursue regular work. Nationwide, 
even about half of the registered migrants 
worked in the shadow economy in 2007.183 A 
lucrative business for human traffickers and 
dubious employment agencies has long taken 
root.The regular labour market and public 
coffers lose valuable potential, for the capital 
needs more labour due to demographic 
changes: by 2030, the number of people 
of retirement age will have increased from 
23 to over 35 percent while the number of 
people in the working-age range of 16 to 59 
years for men and 16 to 54 years for women 
will probably have decreased from 64 to 54 
percent.184
Moscow is especially dependent upon 
the labour of unskilled migrants. Its own 
population is seldom prepared to work 
for starvation wages in construction or 
cleaning. Migrants from Central Asia, on the 
other hand, often seek this kind of work, 
which provides one of the few alternatives 
to crime. However, it is the latter that has 
become the subject of discussion in both the 
political arena and the media. And Moscow’s 
citizens respond accordingly: In a 2005 
survey, the majority of those questioned 
condoned tougher migration policies.185 A 
fourth of those questioned wanted a general 
prohibition on international migrants. And 
the readiness to resort to violence among 
the native population has also grown to 
frightening proportions. In another survey, 
almost 60 percent of the Africans living in 
the city said that they had been the victims 
of racially-motivated violence.186 Statistically 
speaking, a foreigner is shot, stabbed or 
beaten to death in Moscow every six days.187
2007 seemed to constitute a turning point 
in migration policy. Instead of restrictive 
measures, the Russian government passed 
a law for the first time making it easier for 
migrants to live and work legally in Russia. 
Where employers used to be able to decide 
whether or not to apply for a work permit and 
to determine how many permits to apply for, 
“visa-free” migrants could now claim this 
right for themselves. The measures quickly 
proved successful. In comparison to the 
beginning of the century, the share of legal 
migrants in the total population of migrant 
labourers grew considerably. Tax revenue 
also increased.188
But these policies do not follow a long-term 
strategy: despite the population decrease 
in many parts of the country, Moscow’s 
migration programme for 2008 through 
2010 sought to replace international 
migrants with migrants from other Russian 
regions. In order to curb racist attacks, it 
further planned to separate foreigners from 
natives by settling them in separate towns.189
Demographic pioneer
So what will Moscow look like in the future? 
According to estimates, the city’s population 
will reach its peak, with eleven million 
people, in the course of the next decade 
before it gradually begins to decrease 
to about ten million people in 2030.190 
This projection will probably be adjusted 
upwards, however, as soon as numbers from 
the 2010 census are available. Then those 
inhabitants of Moscow who have not yet been 
registered will also be statistically accounted 
for. The last census of 2002 added 1.7 million 
to the city practically overnight.191
The most recent population projections 
highlight one particular aspect of Moscow 
which had been obscured for decades by the 
countless numbers of migrants: the dearth 
of children. Even in the 1960s, women in the 
capital had the lowest fertility rate in Russia, 
bearing only 1.4 children in the course of a 
lifetime.192 In 1999, women were only having 
0.93 children before the number grew to 
1.32 in 2008. Without migration, Moscow’s 
population would have shrunk by one million 
people since 1989. In reality, it has grown by 
two million.193 Moscow benefits greatly from 
the fact that the majority of its newcomers 
are between 20 and 39 years old. The 
migrants do not only contribute to the city’s 
economic strength but increase the number 
of its potential parents.
After adopting the two-child family model 
earlier than the rest of the country, the capital 
has once again become a demographic 
pioneer. Moscow’s women give birth later in 
their lives, following the childbearing patterns 
of developed western nations. At the same 
time, the number of abortions is decreasing 
and more and more women use safe, modern 
methods of contraception. In 2000, the 
number of abortions was still higher than 
the number of births. Today, the ratio of 
newborns to abortions is about two to one.194
In contrast to the city, Moscow Oblast will 
continue to grow after 2015.195 For migrants, 
it is not only easier to find affordable housing 
here; it is also much easier to register. 
Furthermore, Moscow’s surrounding areas 
have undergone remarkable economic 
development since 2003, with growth rates 
of an average of 17 percent annually.196 The 
attractiveness of the “new industry and 
logistics belt” around the city is also attested 
to by the level of foreign investment, which 
almost doubled between 2006 and 2007.197 
Incomes rose as a consequence, by 121 
percent between 2003 and 2008.198 This 
trend could continue in the future when 
the Skolkovo innovation centre west of 
Moscow, where up to 40,000 scientists and 
engineers are supposed to find employment, 
is completed by about 2015.
This notwithstanding, migrants still see the 
urban surroundings as a springboard to the 
city. That migration to the city proceeds step 
by step eases the situation in the centre’s 
housing market but it also leads to more and 
more commuters, which only exacerbates 
traffic problems. Despite innovative 
suggestions, the city’s administration has yet 
to find a solution. Currently, there are plans 
to construct high-speed motorways over 
Moscow’s roofs and to erect pontoons on the 
Moskva River as floating parking garages.
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Moscow is the only destination for university graduates
A third of all working people in the Central Federal District have a university degree. This means that Central 
Russia has the greatest density of highly-qualified labour. The regional analysis shows, however, that only 
Moscow and its surroundings contribute to this high value. Banks, research institutes and modern industrial 
enterprises require a steady influx of skilled labour. In contrast, the old industrial sites north of the capital, 
in particular, count among the least attractive destinations for university graduates. Less than one-fifth of 
the employed population in this area has a university degree.
Percentage of highly-
qualified people 
in relation to the 
working population 
in 2008
(Source: Rosstat, 
Regiony Rossii: 
Sotsialno-
Ekonomicheskie 
Pokazateli – 2009 
g., Moscow)
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The consequences of low fertility
17 of the Central Federal District’s 18 regions will suffer population losses by 2030, in comparison to 2009. 
In 15 of these regions, the losses will even be greater than the Russian average. Only Moscow Oblast and the 
economically thriving Belgorod Oblast on the Ukrainian border will remain demographically stable. Even 
though many territories of the Central Federal District can rely upon immigration, population losses – in 
some cases drastic ones – are unavoidable, since women in Central Russia have been bearing few children for 
decades.
Gradual demise outside the city
Moscow city and Moscow Oblast comprise 
but two of the 18 regions which make up the 
Central Federal District. This centre hardly 
reflects the situation of the entire territory. 
The further one goes from the capital, the 
greater the demographic problems: the 
numbers of children are extremely low, 
the society is ageing more rapidly than 
elsewhere, and more people die relative 
to the population than anywhere else in 
Russia. The Tver and Tula Oblasts, which 
border Moscow Oblast on the north and 
southwest respectively, lose far more than 
one percent of their populations annually due 
to mortality. Over a fourth of the population 
have already passed employment age. In 
rural areas, this share is even more than 30 
percent.199
The consequences of the early decrease 
in fertility in the Central Federal District 
have hit the territories outside of Moscow 
particularly hard since they can only 
partly make up for continuing population 
ageing with young migrants. The majority 
of regions in the Central Federal District 
have not been able to create a competitive 
economy following the transition from the 
Soviet era. Mechanical engineering and 
foodstuffs production, which dominate in 
many regions, cannot compete with cheap 
imports and continue to lose their markets. 
In many places, the economic downfall 
triggers depression and social problems. 
An above-average number of men die in 
the Central Federal District before reaching 
retirement age. The most common causes 
of death – poisoning, accidents and heart 
disease – indicate that alcohol consumption 
and unhealthy lifestyles as the greatest risk 
factors. 
Few regions stand out from this otherwise 
grim picture. One of them is Belgorod 
Oblast, located on the Ukrainian border. 
Agriculture and, in particular, mining and 
iron ore processing flourish. The world’s 
largest-known iron ore basin, the Kursk 
Magnet Anomaly, hides 90 percent of its 
treasure within the oblast. This has ensured 
that Belgorod has experienced the most 
rapid industrial growth in the Central Federal 
District in the last ten years. In order to 
meet the demand for labour and to respond 
to an ageing population, the oblast actively 
recruits migrants. It is primarily Russian 
refugees from the North Caucasian republics 
who easily find work in cities such as Gubkin 
or Stary Oskol, thanks to public support, 
and who use the benefits they receive for 
housing.200 As a result of this continuing 
stream of migrants, current population 
growth in Belgorod will continue in the next 
decade. 
Population projections for the Central Federal District’s regions to the end of 2030, 
1 January 2009 = 100 percent
(Source: Rosstat, Predpolizhitelnaya Chislennost Naseleniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2030 goda, Moscow)
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Disagreement over the planned Okhta Centre 
on the Neva River has been escalating in St. 
Petersburg for years. The massive building 
complex, a 403-metre-high sky-scraper in 
the form of a corn stalk, would be Europe’s 
tallest office building. Following completion, 
the oil giant Gazprom Neft would make this 
its headquarters. The city initially authorized 
the building but many citizens feared the ruin 
of Petersburg’s historical cityscape. After 
the UNESCO World Heritage Committee also 
protested, the governor of St. Petersburg, 
Valentina Matviyenko, announced that the 
complex would not be built in the centre but 
on the outskirts of the city.
Yet the willingness to invest and the 
megalomania of large corporations have 
shown that St. Petersburg is once again a 
political and economic darling. It is not only 
state-controlled firms such as Gazprom 
Neft or VTB, Russia’s largest bank (formerly 
Vneshtorgbank), which have begun to 
pay taxes on the Neva; foreign firms are 
also increasingly taking advantage of the 
convenient transport situation in Russia’s 
second-largest city.
At the same time, the Northwestern Federal 
District, which stretches over 1,500 
kilometres from the Baltic Sea to the Urals, 
suffered extremely from the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Here more than elsewhere, 
the economic collapse resulted in social 
problems. Between 1990 and 2003, life 
expectancy dropped from 69.1 to 63.3 
years. Nowhere in Russia was the decline 
so drastic.201 Since then, life expectancy 
has risen again to 67.4 years, but 11.8 of 
1,000 men of working-age still die annually 
in Northwestern Russia. In the Pskov and 
Novgorod Oblasts south of St. Petersburg, the 
number even exceeds 16.202 In Germany, the 
mortality rate is only 3.2.203
One reason for the grave health crisis 
in Northwestern Russia is the above-
average number of ethnic Russians who 
have responded to economic uncertainty 
with particularly unhealthy lifestyles. 
Furthermore, processing industries play an 
important economic role, the very sector 
in which the end of the planned economy 
resulted in the greatest loss of jobs. Finally, 
people in the northern areas of the district, 
in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts as 
well as the Komi Republic, are subject to an 
extremely harsh climate, otherwise familiar 
only to the inhabitants of Siberia’s northern 
regions. 
While mortality rates increased, fertility in 
Northwestern Russia, which was relatively 
low to begin with, sank. In 1999, the total 
fertility rate in St. Petersburg dropped 
to an all-time low of 0.86 children per 
woman. Since then, it has risen to 1.40. 
But the federal district still holds last 
place nationwide, with only 1.41 children 
per woman. Among Russia’s 80 regions, 
Leningrad Oblast surrounding St. Petersburg, 
which has an average rate of 1.19 children per 
woman, was at the lowest end of the scale.204
In 2009, 13.5 million people lived in 
Northwestern Russia, 1.8 million fewer 
than right after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Since the federal district registered more 
immigrants than emigrants in this period, the 
population decline can only be explained by 
excess mortality. At some periods, 120,000 
more people died annually than were born. 
The real extent of this demographic crisis 
Recovery following a steep fall
NORTHWESTERN Federal District
Population in 2010 13.44 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 11.42 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 8
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.41
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 68.2
Annual net migration 2005-2010 27,721
Mean age in 2010 39.8
(Source: see page 139)
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will make itself felt in the upcoming years, 
when the thinned-out generations of the 
1990s reach parenting age and the number 
of births declines once again. By 2030, the 
district’s population could have decreased to 
11.4 million people. Only the Far East would 
experience a greater loss.205
Shortage of skilled workers in 
St. Petersburg
The last few years have seen some relief. 
Between 2005 and 2009, the birth deficit 
decreased by half, to 53,000 people, while 
the annual migration surplus tripled to 
28,000 people.206 The main beneficiary 
of these developments was St. Petersburg, 
which in 2009 gained over 30,000 
inhabitants from migration alone and has 
enjoyed a growing population for the first 
time since 1991. Since the average inhabitant 
here is quite old, however, Russia’s second-
largest city will shrink substantially in the 
future.207
Currently, 4.6 million people live in St. 
Petersburg, which has managed to once again 
become a pole of economic growth following 
the serious crisis of the 1990s. Since 2000, 
GDP has grown by an average of 9.6 percent 
annually.208 Alongside the traditionally strong 
machine and ship-building industries, the 
city has become the centre of the Russian 
automobile industry. Toyota, General Motors 
and Nissan now produce their goods at the 
mouth of the Neva and have established many 
of their suppliers in Northwestern Russia. This 
is also why St. Petersburg is doing relatively 
well in the development of small and medium 
enterprises so crucial to the growth of the 
middle-class.* In comparison to Moscow, the 
city has a higher density of firms with 100 
or 250 employees respectively.209 In both 
cities, small enterprises generate one-fifth of 
GDP, markedly more than in all other regions 
of the country.210 And St. Petersburg is also a 
significant locus of science and innovation, 
with 120 universities and colleges. In 2008, 
the city’s expenditures for research and 
development constituted three percent 
of GDP. Only Kaluga Oblast and Nizhny 
Novgorod in the Volga Federal District, the 
stronghold of information technology, had a 
higher percentage.211
St. Petersburg’s biggest plus points are 
its access to the ocean and proximity to 
Western Europe and Moscow. For a long time, 
investors could also rely on a comparatively 
large pool of qualified labour. Boasting an 
employment rate of 86.5 percent and a very 
low unemployment rate of two percent, the 
city is, however, beginning to suffer from a 
shortage of skilled workers. Immigrants can 
only partially make up for the growing gap. 
From 2012 on, the working-age population in 
St. Petersburg will shrink by about 40,000 
annually despite migration.213
One reason for this is the enormous pull 
of Moscow, which is still more popular 
among Russian migrants than the Baltic 
Sea metropolis. St. Petersburg only recruits 
more immigrants than the capital from its 
neighbouring regions and the country’s 
European north.214 International immigrants 
cannot make up for the loss of qualified 
labour due to the frequently low level of 
their skills. As in Moscow, there are also 
many migrants living in St. Petersburg who 
are not registered and therefore cannot 
Young north, old south
In Russia’s European north, less than one in ten 
inhabitants is older than 64. This goes back to the 
Soviet era, when many young men went to work in 
Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and the Komi Republic. 
Since 1991, the same age group has been emigrating 
in huge numbers, resulting in an older society. 
Nonetheless, there is still twice the number of older 
people in some areas of the southern regions of 
Northwestern Russia than in the northern ones. In 
Pskov Oblast, 41 percent of all women in rural areas 
have reached the retirement age of 55. Pskov as well 
as Tver Oblast in Central Russia are the two Russian 
regions in which more people die than are born every 
year already since the 1970s.212
less than 8
8 to under 10
10 to under 12
12 to under 14
14 to under 16
16 and above
* Small businesses in Russia may have a maximum of 
100 employees and an annual turnover of 400 million 
roubles. Medium-sized businesses employ up to 250 
people and have a turnover of one billion roubles.
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(Source: Rosstat)
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pursue regular employment. This is also why 
social problems such as crime, drug abuse, 
prostitution, homelessness and xenophobia 
are spreading.
The economic upswing in Leningrad 
Oblast surrounding St. Petersburg is best 
demonstrated by its poverty rate: whereas 
in 2000 over half of the population had to 
survive on incomes below the subsistence 
minimum, only 13.8 percent had to in 2008. 
Following regions with natural resources, 
Leningrad Oblast has had the country’s 
highest rate of capital investments in 
proportion to the number of inhabitants in 
the last few years.215 The area has shaken 
its economic dependency on the crude oil 
refinery in Kirishi, which was responsible for 
up to 40 percent of the region’s tax revenues 
in the mid-1990s. The foodstuffs industry, 
wood processing, trade and mechanical 
engineering have grown significantly.216
Proximity to the enormous sales market and 
transportation hub of St. Petersburg has 
helped promote economic diversification 
as have regional policies, which banked on 
tax breaks for foreign investors at an early 
phase. In addition, the rouble crisis of 1998 
helped tap formerly idle economic potential: 
investors sold collapsing government bonds 
and redirected their capital into the real 
economy. The devaluation of the rouble made 
it easier, as well, to sell export goods. And 
since import goods became more expensive 
at the same time, it was once again worth 
producing for the domestic market, too.
Similarly to the rest of the country, poles of 
growth have emerged in Leningrad which 
account for the bulk of total investment. 
Cities on the ocean near St. Petersburg such 
as Vsevolozhsk and Primorsk have especially 
profited from the influx of capital. Since 
2001, the petroleum pipeline from Yaroslavl 
at the Volga has terminated in Primorsk; 
today, the largest oil terminal on the Baltic 
Sea is located here. In Vsevolozhsk, firms 
such as Ikea and Ford use the logistically 
convenient location near the Petersburg 
motorway ring.
That enterprises in Leningrad Oblast will 
spread to cover greater surface area is, 
however, unlikely, since the region has too 
few people for widespread development. 
Currently, the area loses about one percent 
of its population annually because more 
people die here than are born. Nationwide, 
the situation is more dramatic only in the 
neighbouring regions of Pskov and Novgorod, 
as well as in the Tver, Tula and Smolensk 
Oblasts in Central Russia.221
Street children: the young victims of the transition period
It wants to be the shining gateway to Europe. The economic boom of the last few years 
has brought St. Petersburg much closer to its goal. Yet behind the bright façades of the 
Hermitage and the Peter and Paul Cathedral, poverty and unemployment are part of the 
reality of Russia’s second-largest city. Many young couples are compelled to give up the 
idea of children for financial reasons. Others have children but cannot get a handle on 
their own problems: alcohol-addicted parents and domestic violence are major reasons 
for Russian children to run away from home and to seek happiness on the streets. 
They find subway shafts, cellars and sewers, the only places in cities such as St. Petersburg 
or Moscow which provide protection from the winters. These cities have a particularly high 
number of children living on the streets. According to official figures, there are 150,000 
homeless children nationwide, some of whom are not older than six. No one knows exact 
numbers.217 The children, who are often physically and mentally underdeveloped, survive 
by begging, petty theft and prostitution. Many anesthetize themselves with all kinds of 
drugs in order to temporarily shut out the cold, hunger and boredom. Those who consume 
drugs intravenously increase their risk of infection with HIV more than twenty-fold. In St. 
Petersburg, about 40 percent of all 15 to 19 year-old street dwellers were HIV positive in 
2007.218 Many die before their lives have really begun.
Not all street children actually live on the street. Many are sent on a daily basis by their 
parents to beg or steal in order to improve the family’s income. A growing number of these 
are the children of labour migrants, especially from Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. 
There are hardly any alternatives to life on the street, since the children and their families 
live in the city without being registered, making school attendance impossible. 
When Russian children are picked up by the police, they end up in one of the country’s 
1,147 orphanages, which proliferated rapidly in the 1990s.219 These homes lack personnel 
and sufficient supervision, which leads many children to return to the streets. Prevention 
programmes for families at risk are only being developed slowly. Nonetheless, a growing 
number of children find a new home with foster parents. In the 1990s, it was possible to 
find adoptive parents for more and more children. Since 2005, this trend has once again 
declined, since new hurdles have been set up for foreign adoption in  particular.220
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GDP and foreign trade in Kaliningrad Oblast between 1998 and 2008
(Source: Rosstat, Tsentralnaya Baza Statisticheskikh Dannykh, Moscow)
Imports as growth 
engine
Economic strength has 
increased in proportion 
to import-growth in 
Kaliningrad Oblast since 
the beginning of the 
century. Only Moscow 
imports more goods per 
capita than Kaliningrad. 
But the upswing is in 
danger: Russia’s possible 
entry to the World Trade 
Organization could mean 
the end of the tariff 
reductions which made 
massive import growth 
possible in the first place. 
Kaliningrad: Russia’s island in the EU
Kaliningrad, formerly Konigsberg, is wedged 
between Poland and Lithuania, cut off from 
the rest of the country. After Josef Stalin 
drove out the remaining 100,000 Germans 
immediately following the Second World 
War, he began to expand the strategically 
important Baltic Sea region and the western 
tip of the Soviet empire and to turn it into a 
central base for the Baltic fleet. He did this, 
as well, because the area had a harbour 
which remained free of ice throughout the 
year. When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the 
military employed about 120,000 people 
here.222 Today, the armed forces remain an 
important employer. Since the independence 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1991, 
many soldiers have been redeployed here. 
For other economic sectors, however, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union was a very 
tough break. Agriculture and industry 
suffered from the fact that, in one fell swoop, 
the next domestic sales market lay 300 
kilometres away. Industrial production 
sank between 1990 and 1999 by over 70 
percent, over 20 more than in the rest of the 
country.223
Despite its economic downfall, Kaliningrad’s 
population grew between 1991 and 1999 
from 890,000 to 961,000 people. A wave of 
Russian immigration from Soviet successor 
republics, especially from the Baltic states 
and Kazakhstan, was responsible. Including 
inner-Russian migration, the region gained 
a total of more than 10,000 people and was 
therefore able to compensate for the natural 
population loss of about 5,000 people. But 
since the beginning of this century, the extent 
of Russian immigration has largely dwindled, 
and the Kaliningrad region has lost about 
25,000 inhabitants.224 In the future, this 
shrinkage will accelerate since the region’s 
fertility rates count among the country’s 
lowest. 
In order to counter the crisis of the 
1990s, the exclave has had to open up to 
international trade. A special economic zone 
established in 1996 is supposed to act as 
a catalyst for the port city’s manufacturing 
industry. Import duties were abolished 
immediately for any enterprise which 
could process imported products such that 
their respective value increased by 15 or 
30 percent, depending on the type of the 
product. In fact, these “finishing industries” 
have contributed substantially to the fact 
that annual economic growth in Kaliningrad 
Oblast since 2000 has averaged 10.4 
percent and that the unemployment rate fell 
from 15.6 to 3.4 percent between 2000 and 
2007.225* It is primarily electronic consumer 
goods which are being manufactured. In 
2007, enterprises in Kaliningrad produced 
about 87 percent of all Russian TV sets.226 
A second special economic zone established 
in 2006 has also benefited the economy. 
It guarantees corporations six years of tax 
exemption as well another six years of halved 
tax-rates provided that at least 150 million 
roubles are invested in the region within 
three years. Foreign direct investments 
promptly rose between 2005 and 2007 from 
15 to 120 million euros; primarily soya bean 
and synthetic processors as well as logistical 
enterprises have profited from the boom.227
How sustainable current growth really 
is remains to be seen. Only when the 
concessions of the first special economic 
zone come to an end in 2016 will it become 
clear to what extent the new industries can 
survive without subsidies. Alongside tax 
breaks, Kaliningrad’s second large locational 
advantage – its low wage levels – may 
become less significant in the future due to 
limited skilled labour. Between 2005 and 
2009, the average monthly wage already 
grew by about 240 percent, the highest 
increase in Northwestern Russia.228 On the 
other hand, tourism, which has also recently 
enjoyed government support, has growth 
potential.
Nominal gross domestic 
product in million roubles
Exports and imports 
in million US dollars
Exports
Imports
Nominal gross 
domestic product
* In 2008, the rate increased once again to 8.7 percent 
due to the economic crisis. As in the 1990s, fluctuations 
in the Russian economy were over-proportionallly 
noticeable in Kaliningrad. 
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Emigration from northern regions
While there is a shortage of labour in 
St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, people 
continue to emigrate from the district’s 
northern regions. In the country’s European 
north, Soviet planners established military 
institutions, natural resource companies and 
processing industries with no regard for their 
competitiveness. This economic construct 
fell with the Soviet Union. As late as 2009, 
the Komi Republic lost over 7,000 people 
or about one percent of its population to 
emigration. A similar development could be 
observed in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk 
Oblasts.229 Since the last Soviet census in 
1989, Murmansk Oblast has lost 28 percent 
of its population and the other two northern 
regions have lost about one-fifth. In stark 
contrast to the federal district’s southern 
regions, emigration was responsible for over 
half of the losses.230
Murmansk Oblast has become symbolic 
of the Soviet planners’ short-sightedness. 
The area was the main base for the former 
Soviet, and for today’s Russian Northern 
Fleet. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the Russian leadership weeded out a large 
number of its ramshackle nuclear submarines 
but could not safely scrap them due to a 
lack of both money and know-how. Instead, 
they sank the submarines in the Barents 
Sea or simply let them rot in the harbours. 
It was only when they received billions in 
subsidies from the G8 nations in the wake of 
a global disarmament and atomic security 
campaign that the approximately 200 
submarines were properly disposed of in 
2002. While the non-radioactive submarine 
parts were largely recycled and sold, the 
German Energiewerke Nord GmbH, a special 
enterprise to scrap nuclear plants, created 
a long-term temporary storage facility for 
the reactor blocks. The reactors will stay 
there, embedded in sarcophagi, for about 70 
years, until their radioactivity has decreased 
enough to finally dismantle them.231 
Emigration from the closed city of Severo-
morsk, the Northern Fleet’s main port, and 
the region’s capital of Murmansk were not 
solely responsible for the population decline 
on the White Sea. In Apaty and Monchegorsk, 
centres of the metal industry, there were also 
not enough jobs for the people who had in 
many cases come only a few years earlier. 
In addition, there are – similarly to many 
regions in the Far East – relatively few women 
in Murmansk Oblast due to the significance 
of the military as well as mining and other 
industries. This has had demographic conse-
quences: in the 20 to 29 year-old age group 
so crucial to reproduction, there are five men 
to four women whereas the ratio in the rest of 
the country is almost perfectly balanced.232
(Source: Author’s calculations based on Rosstat, Tsentralnaya Baza Statisticheskikh Dannykh, Moscow; 
Demoscope Weekly, Perepisi Naseleniya Rossiyskoy Imperii, SSSR, 15 novykh nezavisimykh gosudarstv, 
Moscow)
High degree of specialization 
carries risks
One of Northwestern Russia’s problems 
is that the region’s well-being is closely 
connected to the vitality of a few economic 
sectors. This is true of the wood industry n 
the Republic of Karelia on Finland’s border. 
About one-fourth of Russian paper is made 
from the trees felled here.233 When demand 
crashed during the economic crisis of 2009, 
Percentages of 
ethnic Russians 
in the total 
population 
in the 2002 
census and the 
development of 
life expectancy 
for children 
born between 
1990 and 2008 
by Russian 
region; regions 
in Northwest 
Russia are 
marked in red
Crisis-prone Russians
Life expectancy fell most drastically during the transition from a planned to a market economy in those areas 
where the number of ethnic Russians was highest, including the Northwestern Federal District. Russians live 
primarily in the wealthier, industrialized areas, but they also suffered most from the Soviet Union’s dissolution. 
A tried-and-true Russian antidote to unemployment and a lack of prospects is alcohol, which has extensive 
health-related consequences. In areas which are poor, on the other hand, where a more ethnically diverse 
population often lives, the danger of economic downfall is lower. For religious reasons, non-Russian groups 
frequently consume less alcohol.
Percentage of ethnic Russians in the total population
Moscow
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unemployment shot up to over ten percent. 
In 2006, it had only been 3.6 percent.234 In 
2008, Karelia already belonged to the 14 
Russian regions in which GDP per capita 
decreased in comparison to the previous 
year. The same was true for the neighbouring 
regions of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk as 
well as Nenets Autonomous Okrug, where 
natural resource industries are responsible 
for a large portion of GDP.235 The Republic of 
Karelia is an example of how seriously the 
crisis can affect demographic developments: 
statisticians noted in 2000 that the 
republic had the country’s highest rate of 
alcohol-related deaths.236 The decline in life 
expectancy was more marked here between 
1990 and 2005 than anywhere else in 
Russia. 
Steel is to Vologda Oblast what wood is to 
Karelia. With a GDP per capita of roughly 
15,000 international dollars, Vologda Oblast 
counts among the federal district’s wealthiest 
regions; but the steel giant Severstal alone 
contributes about 70 percent to the regional 
budget.237 Half of the 1.2 million inhabitants 
live in the capital, Vologda, or in Cherepovets, 
where Severstal has its headquarters. Large 
swaths of the region, which is almost four 
times the size of the Netherlands, are by 
contrast demographic distress areas. The 
last census in 2002 counted a total of 8,000 
villages, of which only nine percent had more 
than 100 inhabitants. The average number of 
inhabitants was 49.238 Since primarily older 
people live in the villages, many settlements 
will soon disappear from the map entirely. 
Even though Russia’s steel industry in 
the last few years has slipped into a 
crisis and Severstal had to lay off about 
9,000 employees in 2008 alone, the 
firm’s prospects are not bad. In times 
of strongly fluctuating prices for iron 
ore – the main natural resource for steel 
production alongside coal – the company 
profits from the fact that it has its own 
storage facilities in Vorkuta and on the Kola 
Peninsula. Furthermore, the Priraslomnoye 
and Dolginskoye oil fields as well as the 
gigantic  Shtokman gas field in the Russian 
Arctic promise lucrative contracts. For 
off-shore production in the Barents Sea, 
not only drilling sites but oil refineries, gas 
liquefaction plants and pipelines need to be 
built. 
The development of Arctic fossil fuel reserves 
has made Nenets Autonomous Okrug, which 
is part of Arkhangelsk Oblast, one of the 
country’s wealthiest regions. Statistically 
speaking, every one of the mere 42,000 
inhabitants generates an annual 88,000 
international dollars.239 In reality, wealth 
remains in the hands of large firms while the 
indigenous population, which constitutes 
a third of the entire population, lives in 
perennial poverty.240 The natives often have 
no access to running water or sufficient 
medical care. This affects life expectancy, 
which is only 65 years old. On average, men 
only reach 59, living about twelve years fewer 
than women.241 
Births per 1,000 women 
of different age groups 
in 2008
(Source: Rosstat, 
Demograficheskii 
Yezhegodnik Rossii 
2009 g., Moscow)
Few young mothers
Nowhere in the Russian Federation do women have 
fewer children than in the Northwestern Federal 
District. This is primarily due to the fact that they 
begin to start families later than anywhere else. Well-
educated women, in particular, seldom have children 
before the age of 24. From 25 on, fertility rates begin 
to match the nationwide average. At the time that 
women in Northwestern Russian have their first child, 
however, women elsewhere in the Federation already 
have a second or third. The late-birth trend, which 
is also typical for Western Europe, is strongest in St. 
Petersburg. 
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When the Soviet Union collapsed at the 
beginning of the 1990s, many observers 
expected the country’s vast, inefficient and 
run-down agricultural corporations, the 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes (collective and 
state farms), to quickly shift to family farms. 
They would learn to produce more efficiently 
taking Western Europe’s successful, family-
run farms as a model. Yet 20 years later, 70 
percent of sunflower seeds, 80 percent of 
grain and even 90 percent of sugar beets in 
Russia are produced by large corporations. 
Only vegetable and potato cultivation as well 
as cattle breeding are primarily in the hands 
of small farmers.242 The Southern Federal 
District, the country’s agricultural centre, is 
no exception.
Fertile black soil (chernozem), a sunny 
climate and proximity to important Black Sea 
ports create optimal agricultural conditions 
in the south. About one-sixth of Russia’s 
agricultural commodities hail from just three 
of the district’s provinces: Krasnodar, Rostov 
and Volgograd.243 On the fields of Krasnodar 
Krai, about 185 billion roubles worth of goods 
were produced in 2008, more than in any 
other region nationwide. Grain production 
topped the list at eleven million tonnes even 
though there is more arable land in other 
areas.244 Nonetheless, people employed in 
agriculture either earn little or are paid in 
kind.245 At 799 international dollars, monthly 
income in Krasnodar in 2009, for example, 
was significantly lower than the national 
average of 912.246
For producers, however, the cultivation of 
grain and sunflowers is especially lucrative. 
Giant so-called “agriholdings” often provide 
integrated supply chains; this means that 
they do not only produce, they also process, 
transport and market their own products. 
The “Yug Rusi” company from Rostov 
Oblast, which has approximately 200,000 
hectares of land, is the region’s largest 
corporation and directly presses harvested 
sunflower seeds into cooking oil, producing 
80 percent of Russia’s sunflower oil.247 Yug 
Rusi, like other large companies, can rely on 
the newest technical plants for production 
and processing since investors from other 
branches of the Russian economy like to put 
their money into agriholdings. 
When it comes to transportation and 
shipping of their produce, however, firms 
need to use infrastructure that dates back 
to the Soviet era and urgently requires 
modernization. The necessary reconstruction 
and expansion of Black Sea port terminals is 
well underway, but by no means sufficient to 
meet the increased volume of export. 
Russia’s breadbasket
 SOUTHERN Federal District
Population in 2010 13.71 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 12.47 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 33
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.50
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 69.9
Annual net migration 2005-2010 28,440
Mean age in 2010 39.5
(Source: see page 139)
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Congenial geographic location
Despite relatively low incomes, many 
regions of the Southern Federal District 
attract immigrants from other regions 
such as the North Caucasus, as well as the 
South Caucasus, Central Asia and Ukraine. 
In Krasnodar Krai, there has been a net 
migration surplus of 600,000 people since 
1993. This is why the population grew from 
5.05 to 5.14 million inhabitants between 
1989 and 2009 even though significantly 
more people die here than are born. Due to 
the number of economic possibilities, which 
encompass trade in Novorossiysk, Russia’s 
only deep-water port on the Black Sea coast, 
agriculture and tourism, Krasnodar Krai 
is one of Russia’s most densely populated  
regions, with 68 inhabitants per square 
kilometre.248 Nonetheless, there are 
disproportionately high numbers of families 
with children and pensioners among the 
immigrants, which is due, among other 
things, to Krasnodar’s attractive location 
on the Black Sea and the Mediterranean 
climate.249 The latter is also one reason for 
the fact that the life expectancy of 70.7 years 
is the highest in the Southern Federal District 
and two years higher than the Russian 
average.250
In addition to immigrants, Krasnodar Krai 
also attracts a lot of tourists, who by now 
generate more money than the flourishing 
agricultural sector.251 In the last few years, 
numerous newcomers and visitors have 
led to a veritable construction boom in 
Krasnodar, creating more jobs for immigrants 
who also accept lower wages. In 2009 alone, 
3.4 million square metres of housing went up 
in the region, more than twice as much as in 
the entire Far East.252
A large part of the construction branch’s 
rise rests upon the 2014 Olympic Winter 
Games in the exclusive Sochi resort, Russia’s 
most popular, although it is best known as 
a summer destination with a sub-tropical 
climate. The actual winter sport locations 
will be built about 70 kilometres away in the 
west Caucasian mountains; in many cases, 
to the detriment of local citizens who will fall 
victim to illegal eviction and confiscation and 
to the detriment of the climate, since several 
sites will be erected in the buffer zone of 
a biosphere reservation. Several hundred 
complaints have already been made in local 
courts.253
In Sochi in particular, immigration has also 
led to racism and xenophobia, problems 
familiar to Russia. The discrimination of 
ethnic minorities has even been condoned 
by the public administration. At the end of 
2009, for example, Sochi’s mayor, Anatoly 
Pakhomov, wanted to force Roma to work 
in construction in 24-hour shifts and then 
to leave the region when they were done.254 
But inter-ethnic tensions do not only crop 
up in Krasnodar Krai. In Rostov, Volgograd 
and Astrakhan Oblasts, which have had 
significant net immigration since the Soviet 
Union collapsed, there have been repeated 
conflicts between the settled population, 
mostly Cossacks, and the newcomers. 
In addition to Krasnodar, the Southern 
Federal District’s economic and social 
centre is Rostov Oblast, to the north, where 
4.2 million people live. It profits from its 
convenient transport location between 
Moscow and the Caucasus as well as from 
the Don River, which flows at this point into 
the Sea of Azov. In addition to its agricultural 
significance, it has become an important 
centre of trade and industry. Wholesale and 
retail trade generates more than a fifth of 
GDP, one of the highest nationwide. Another 
fifth is generated by the processing industry. 
Mechanical engineering, the coal industry 
and foodstuffs production are especially 
significant.255
The heart of Russian agriculture
In the three regions of Krasnodar, Rostov and 
Volgograd alone, the agricultural sector produced 
goods worth more than 370 billion roubles 
in 2009, 15 percent of the entire country’s 
production. In Krasnodar Krai, the product 
spectrum covers grain, rice, sunflower seeds, 
wine and even tea. The region is the world’s 
northernmost tea cultivation area. The conditions 
for arable farming and cattle breeding are bad 
only in the Kalmykian steppe, the mountains of 
the small Republic of Adygea and in Astrakhan 
Oblast. 
(Source: Rosstat, 
Regiony Rossii: 
Sotsialno-Ekonomi-
cheskie Pokazateli – 
2009 g., Moscow)
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Astrakhan Oblast on the Kazakh border is 
located as conveniently as Rostov. In this 
part of the Caspian Depression, a vast area 
the size of Ukraine and completely below 
sea level, the Volga flows into the Caspian 
Sea. For centuries, this has been the centre 
of the Russian fishing industry. Caviar, 
especially, long generated a lot of money. 
Yet sturgeon, which swims into the delta 
from the sea to spawn, has been extremely 
over-fished. Between 2001 and 2008, illegal 
fisheries depleted the population, which 
was small to begin with, by 40 percent. 
By now, many species are endangered. 
The Russian government has prohibited 
commercial fishing of the most endangered 
species, such as the Beluga Sturgeon and the 
Russian Sturgeon, but if similar measures 
are not taken by the neighbouring countries 
of the Caspian Sea, this has little chance 
of success.256 And the problem of illegal 
fisheries is not so easy to solve. It requires 
alternative job opportunities for the region’s 
roughly one million inhabitants. 
For a few of these, the oil and gas industries 
have provided jobs in recent years. In 2007, 
natural resource production only contributed 
2.7 percent to Astrakhan’s GDP, but this 
share will most likely rise in the upcoming 
years due to vast reserves. The Astrakhan 
Field, which has 2.6 trillion cubic metres of 
reserves, is currently the largest operated 
gas field in European Russia; nationwide, 
only the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea 
has larger reserves, with 3.2 trillion cubic 
metres, but it will only be exploited starting 
in 2016.257 The British energy corporation BP 
puts the Russian Federation’s total reserves 
at over 44 trillion cubic metres.258 
By 2030, the Southern Federal District’s 
2008 population of 13.7 will have shrunk 
to 12.5 million. The 8.8 percent decrease 
is a bit lower than the Russian average of 
10.2 percent and can probably be traced 
to immigration, which will continue in the 
future. This can also be seen within the 
federal district: Krasnodar Krai, which 
will take in the most migrants by far, with 
an annual net migration surplus of about 
25,000 to 30,000 people, will lose only 2.7 
percent of its population, even in the face of 
slightly sinking fertility rates. In 2030, it will 
have about five million inhabitants, thereby 
remaining Russia’s most populated region 
outside the Moscow and St. Petersburg 
agglomerations. In contrast, even the 
economically strong regions of Rostov and 
Volgograd will lose almost 15 percent of 
their populations. They will only be able to 
attract a few people after the stream of ethnic 
Russians from the Caucasus has ebbed.259 
This can be explained, on the one hand, by 
the fact that they are located further from 
the southern Caucasian migrants’ homelands 
than the Krasnodar region and, on the other 
hand, that they do not have the long Black 
Sea coast, which is particularly attractive to 
older people. 
It is not clear to what extent Krasnodar 
Krai will profit economically from its 
immigrants. A lot will depend upon the 
future development of the construction 
industry, which traditionally employs a 
major share of migrants. If migrants slide 
into unemployment, inter-ethnic tensions are 
bound to simmer further in the region. 
Growing birth deficit
Migration surpluses by 2030 will probably not be sufficient in the Southern Federal District or the entire 
Russian Federation to compensate for the birth deficit. Starting in 2025, they will only be able to make up for 
a third of natural shrinkage in the Southern Federal District and for one-sixth nationwide. The situation in the 
Southern Federal District, which is slightly better, can be attributed to significantly higher migration surpluses.
Natural population 
growth and net 
migration in Russia and 
the Southern Federal 
District, 2010 to 2030
(Source: Rosstat, 
Predpolishitelnaya 
Chislennost Naseleniya 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 
2030 goda., Moscow)
Net migration Southern Federal District
Annual net per 1,000 inhabitants
Net migration Russia
Natural population 
growth Russia
Natural population 
growth Southern 
Federal District
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Little hope for peace
According to local legend, a small mishap 
occurred at creation when the divine 
messenger responsible for distributing 
languages set forth: on the difficult passage 
from the Black to the Caspian Sea which 
leads over the Caucasus Mountains, his 
bundle got caught on a mountain peak; the 
bag, brimming with languages, ripped open 
and no fewer than 30 different languages 
tumbled down upon the land which, 
befitting its topography, was to be named 
“Dagestan” or “Land of Mountains”. Today, 
the constitution puts Avar, Aghul, Rutul, 
Tsakhur and nine other languages on par with 
Russian.  
The colourful mish-mash of ethnic groups and 
languages as well as the tense relationship to 
Russia has characterized the North Caucasus 
for centuries. Here, at the south-eastern end 
of Europe, where the people live wedged 
between two seas to the east and west, 
Russians constitute the largest ethnic group 
in only one of the districts’s seven regions.260 
More than 50 different ethnic groups fight 
for economic survival and political influence. 
Violence and counter-violence have spiralled 
ever-faster, impeding the region’s sustainable 
economic development. In summer 2009 
alone, 445 people were killed in attacks, 
particularly in Ingushetia, Chechnya and 
Dagestan. This was more than double the 
victims of summer 2008.261
The heavy heritage of Russian 
colonization
In the 18th century, Russia had for the first 
time occupied land in the North Caucasus 
which it then divided among the Cossack 
and Slavic settlers. The Czarist Empire 
only gained complete control of the region, 
however, in 1864, following about 50 years 
of bloody war. The founding of the Soviet 
Union created further restrictions: since 
religion had no place in the Communist state, 
the Soviets destroyed houses of prayer and 
schools, particularly those of the Muslim 
population, and prohibited the Arabic 
alphabet. In order to prevent Islamic peoples 
from joining forces to resist the state, the 
Soviets partitioned the region into several 
small autonomous territories along very 
rough ethnic and linguistic lines without, 
however, doing justice to its enormous 
ethnic diversity. This resulted in a few of 
today’s smouldering conflicts. For example, 
the drawing board assigned the Caucasian 
Kabardins and the Balkars, who are of 
Turkic ethnicity, a common territory, today’s 
Kabardino-Balkar Republic. 
For the 100,000 Balkars, the worst was yet 
to come. In 1943, Stalin accused them of 
collaboration with the German Wehrmacht 
and had them deported to Central Asia 
and Siberia alongside Chechens, Ingush 
and Karachay people. It was only in 1957 
that Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, 
allowed surviving deportees to return to their 
homeland, where new problems awaited the 
approximately 50,000 families: the Russians 
had, in the meantime, occupied many of their 
autonomous areas and reduced much of the 
territory.
 NORTH CAUCASIAN Federal District
Population in 2010 9.25 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 9.95 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 54
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.94
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 72.0
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 7,565
Mean age in 2010 34.0
(Source: see page 139)
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After the Soviet Union fell, building tensions 
exploded into a wave of nationalism: 
Chechnya declared independence from 
Russia in 1991, Ingushetia declared its 
independence from Chechnya one year later 
and the Balkar minority voted – in vain – to 
isolate itself from the Kabardino-Balkar 
Republic. Since then, people in the North 
Caucasus have suffered through two wars in 
Chechnya. They are also subject to unending 
terror by militant nationalists and Islamists 
as well as the Russian secret service’s – 
often brutal – anti-terror campaign. Since 
the rebel leader Doku Umarov proclaimed 
the Caucasus Emirate in 2007, speedy 
pacification looks improbable, since religion 
unifies the once-divided radical energies of 
the region in the fight against the Russian 
government. The disastrous suicide attacks 
in the Moscow Metro in March 2010 
effectively laid any doubts to rest.
Daily life is dominated by poverty. In 
Ingushetia, almost 40 percent of the 
population survive on an income below 
the existence minimum; in Chechnya, such 
data are not even recorded.265 In 2008, 
Ingushetia’s per capita GDP, converted 
into 2,700 international dollars, was the 
lowest in the country. Even the district’s two 
wealthiest regions, the Republic of North 
Ossetia and Stavropol Krai, had a GDP of 
lower than 50 percent of the Russian average 
of 15,000 dollars in the same year.266 For 
many, Moscow’s subsidies, which constitute 
between 50 and 80 percent of the regional 
budgets, form the basis of life.267
Russification has failed
In the wake of the “Russification” of peripheral 
territories, the Soviets settled large numbers of 
Russians in the North Caucasus. Accordingly, their 
numbers grew among the population of the mountain 
republics. This settlement reached its peak in roughly 
1960.* Subsequently, many Russians left again, as 
conflicts with the native population increased. Today, 
almost no Russians live in Dagestan, Ingushetia or 
Chechnya. An exception is Stavropol Krai, which 
already served as a Slavic bulwark against Caucasian 
peoples in the 18th century. In the 1990s, many 
Russians migrated here from the federal district’s 
other republics. 
Percentage of ethnic Russians in the total population 
of the North Caucasus in selected years
(Source: Demoscope Weekly, Perepisi Naseleniya 
Rossiyskoy Imperii, SSSR, 15 novykh nezavisimykh 
gosudarstv, Moscow)
Dagestan Ingushetia Chechnya Karachay-
Cherkessia
North Ossetia Stavropol KraiKabardino-
Balkaria
Save yourself if you can
According to estimates, the two Chechen 
wars uprooted no fewer than 800,000 of 
the total of 1.1 million inhabitants.262 About 
100,000 of these fled Chechnya. Most of 
them settled in neighbouring Ingushetia, 
the population of which grew by one-fourth 
in 2000 alone due to this migration.263 But 
Ingushetia, which is hardly an oasis of peace, 
had to shoulder still more refugees: after 
the former Ingush district of Prigorodny 
was annexed to the predominantly Christian 
Republic of North Ossetia in the 1940s, 
there was continued unrest between the 
Ossetians and Ingush living in the district. 
In 1992, the Russian army helped drive a 
total of 64,000 Ingush over the border into 
Ingushetia, where many of them still survive 
in refugee camps in catastrophic conditions. 
Those who were able to return to the densely 
populated Prigorodny District were openly 
rejected by the Ossetian population, who in 
turn had taken in refugees from the Georgian 
breakaway province of South Ossetia.264
* Between 1936 and 1991 Chechnya and Ingushetia 
together formed the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic. Therefore, no separate data 
are available for the years 1959 and 1989.
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What the North Caucasian republics need 
most are regional investment programmes. 
Chechnya’s infrastructure has lain in ruins 
since both wars. The destruction of the three 
oil refineries has literally robbed the country 
of its energy. National and international 
subsidies flow into the reconstruction of 
basic supply systems and providers such as 
schools and water pipelines, but these are 
entirely insufficient: in many of the republic’s 
schools, instruction was still given long after 
the wars had ended in two or three shifts 
a day since so many buildings had been 
destroyed.268
Due to the region’s high number of children, 
the situation is becoming more urgent: the 
average Chechen woman has 3.4 children, 
the highest average in all of Russia.269 By 
2030, the federal district’s population will 
grow from 9.2 million in 2009 to ten million. 
In Chechnya, it will even grow by 47 percent 
from 1.2 to 1.8 million.270 Dagestan and 
Ingushetia will also grow rapidly while the 
other regions will begin shrinking in 2020. 
To prevent all of these children from falling 
into the hands of extremist groups, they need 
educational and work opportunities. At the 
moment, neither one of these is possible. The 
number of students is significantly smaller 
here than in the rest of the country – not even 
half as many in Chechnya and Ingushetia 
– and unemployment is particularly 
widespread among youth.271
That the percentage of highly-qualified 
people among Ingushetia’s employed 
population, at 40 percent, far exceeds the 
national average, has less to do with the 
fact that there are many highly-qualified 
people than with the fact than only one in 
five inhabitants of working-age has a regular 
job. Thus, while the North Caucasus is only 
home to one in 15 inhabitants of the Russian 
Federation, every seventh unemployed 
person lives here.272 Those who have work 
are frequently employed by the state. But 
a job here is often only possible if you pay 
several thousand dollars. The majority of the 
population works in the shadow economy, 
which, in Dagestan, is estimated to constitute 
up to 70 percent of all economic activity.273
Birth surplus in the North Caucasus
While Russia’s population is shrinking steadily, 
significantly more people are born than die in 
the North Caucasus. In 2008, the population 
grew by 0.8 percent due exclusively to a 
surplus in births. In Chechnya, there were about 
36,000 births for approximately 5,500 deaths, 
which is equivalent to a population increase of 
2.5 percent.*
Natural population growth per 1,000 inhabitants in Russia’s federal districts, 1991 to 2008
(Source: Rosstat, Tsentralnaya Baza Statisticheskikh Dannykh, Moscow)
North Caucasus
Urals
Siberia
Far East
Southern Russia
Volga
Northwest Russia
Central Russia
* No data are available  for Ingushetia for the period 
from 1991 to 1994 and for Chechnya from 1993 to 
2002. As these are the republics with the highest birth 
surpluses in the region and the whole of Russia, natural 
population growth in the North Caucasus between 1991 
and 2002 was higher than indicated in the graph despite 
the two wars in Chechnya. 
The “Mother Volga”, as the Russians lovingly 
call Europe’s longest river, arches across 
3,500 kilometres of the country, the largest 
section of which is located in the Volga 
Federal District. The Volga is the artery of life 
and transportation in a region that has played 
an enormously important role in Russian and 
Soviet history. Practically all the major cities 
in the federal district are situated on the 
Volga: the district’s capital Nizhny Novgorod, 
where the river enters the region from the 
north; Kazan, officially the “Third Capital of 
Russia” after Moscow and St. Petersburg, and 
Samara, where the Progress State Research 
and Production Rocket Space Center 
manufactures the Soyuz launch vehicles 
which heaved the first Sputnik into outer 
space and continues to ferry supplies to the 
International Space Station (ISS). 
Approximately 30 million people live in the 
Volga region – one-fifth of Russia’s entire 
population – and its inhabitants are among 
the most ethnically mixed, second only to 
the North Caucasian Federal District.274 
It contains six republics named after 
non-Russian ethnic groups – Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan, Mordovia, Udmurtia, Mari 
El and Chuvashia. The Mordovians, Udmurt 
and Mari are Finno-Ugrian peoples and the 
Bashkirs, Chuvash and Tatars are Turkic. The 
latter are said to be descendents of Genghis 
Khan’s Golden Horde. The three Finno-Ugrian 
peoples are closely associated to the Russian 
Orthodox Church. The members of the Turkic 
peoples are of Islamic background – even 
though many are now atheist following 70 
years of Soviet rule. Almost half of the 20 
million Russian Muslims live on the Volga. 
Much like the Russian Orthodox Church, 
their religion has also boomed in post-Soviet 
Russia. Just between 1997 and 2008, the 
number of mosques in the Republic of 
Tatarstan increased from 700 to more than 
1,100.275
Tatarstan – A Muslim role model?
The Tatar capital Kazan is viewed as the 
Islamic centre of Russia. Many refer to the 
city as an enlightening example of how 
people from Muslim and Christian cultural 
circles can live together constructively. While 
North Caucasian Russians and Muslims 
quarrel and clash, one-third of all marriages 
in Tatarstan involve Tatars of Muslim 
background and Russians with Christian 
Orthodox roots.276 The region is also the 
cradle of Jadidism, a progressive offshoot of 
Islam which began in the 19th century. So far 
fundamentalist undercurrents have had little 
impact on Tatarstan, because the religious 
elite are locally educated at the Russian 
Islamic University in Kazan. 
However, Tatarstan is not free of separatist 
ambitions. In 1990, it was the first Russian 
region to declare its independence. In 1992, 
together with Chechnya, its political leaders 
refused to sign the Federation Treaty with 
Russia, and when they finally did in 1994, 
they secured numerous special rights 
and privileges. Up until 2000, Tatarstan 
paid very few taxes to the federal budget, 
maintained its own diplomatic relations 
with neighbouring states, and made great 
strides in revitalising Tatar culture and 
language. At the beginning of his term, 
Vladimir Putin put an end to most of these 
concessions. According to observers, the 
reason why this did not lead to escalating 
tensions is because Tatarstan had been a 
part of Russia for centuries, and secondly, 
the economic crisis in the 1990s had soured 
the experience of relative autonomy for many 
Tatars.277 Politically, Tatarstan may have 
Diversity that works
VOLGA Federal District
Population in 2010 30.11 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 26.14 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 29
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.50
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 68.5
Annual net migration 2005-2010 26,658
Mean age in 2010 39.0
(Source: see page 139)
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lost its concessions, but in return received 
enormous amounts of regional development 
funding even though it is one of the richest 
regions in the country.283 Tatarstan officially 
regained special status in 2007, although the 
degree of autonomy is now less pronounced 
as many of its laws have been harmonised 
with Moscow’s.284
In 2008, each of the 3.8 million inhabitants 
earned about 16,000 international dollars 
on average. Tatarstan’s per capita income 
is among the highest in the country, 
surpassed only by inhabitants of Moscow 
and the resource-rich regions of Tyumen, 
Sakhalin and Chukotka. A substantial 
portion of Tatarstan’s wealth derives from 
one important natural resource – crude oil. 
With 30 million tonnes extracted each year, 
Tatarstan is one of the country’s largest oil 
producers, second only to Tyumen Oblast 
in the Urals.285 For years, the Tatars have 
invested a significant portion of their oil 
revenues into the agricultural sector, which 
has helped lessen income disparities 
between urban and rural dwellers. Thanks 
to the revenues generated by the oil, 
engineering and chemical industries, 
Tatarstan has a relatively low poverty and 
unemployment rate. There is some concern, 
however, about the region’s sovereign debt 
which soared during the recent financial 
crisis. It has made Tatarstan one of the 
country’s most indebted regions in 2010, 
second only to Moscow and its surrounding 
region.286
Due in part to its strong economy, Tatarstan 
is demographically stable. Immigration 
exceeds emigration by 10,000 people each 
year, which has helped spur population 
growth in recent years. Because Tatars 
comprise more than 50 percent of the 
total population and generally have more 
children than Russians, the republic boasts 
a fertility rate of 1.51 children per woman, 
which is relatively high for such a wealthy 
region. It may be the result of patriarchal 
family structures which are still prevalent 
in Tatarstan.287 By 2030, the population 
is expected to shrink by a maximum of six 
percent – significantly less than all the other 
regions in the federal district.288
Several growth poles
Unlike Northwest and Central Russia, the 
Volga does not have just one, but rather 
several areas that are centres of economic 
growth. Along with Tatarstan, the oblasts 
of Orenburg, Samara and Nizhny Novgorod 
as well as Perm Krai and the Republic of 
Bashkortostan all have well-developed 
economic structures. The oil industry plays 
a key role almost everywhere. Twenty-six 
million tonnes of crude oil are refined each 
year in Bashkortostan alone. This region 
currently produces about one-sixth of all 
Germans on the Volga
The history of the Volga Germans began in 1763 when the Russian Czarina Catherine the 
Great invited immigrants to Russia where they would receive 30 hectares of land. She 
also promised them freedom of religion, self-government and 30 years of tax exemption. 
In return, they would cultivate the fertile land along Europe’s longest river and, should 
the event occur, protect the country from attacks by neighbouring peoples. The majority 
of the first 30,000 Germans, who responded to the appeal, came from Hesse, which 
offered little available land and high taxes.278 Despite initial hardships, the German 
immigrants colonised the region along the Volga and their numbers swelled to around 
400,000 by the end of the following century. When the first Russian census was taken 
in 1897, statistics revealed that a total of 1.8 million German native speakers were living 
in the Russian Empire. The majority of these lived along the Volga at the time. There 
were also large German immigrant communities on the Black Sea and in the Caucasus 
and Volhynia (present-day Ukraine). Other German-speaking immigrants were living in 
former Russian Poland and the Baltic regions.279
As the Czarist Empire came to an end, and especially with the onset of the First World War 
and the October Revolution in 1917, the Russian Germans lost their privileges. However, 
they did benefit from Lenin’s Nationality Policy, which allowed them to establish their 
own Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924. The republic existed 
until 1941, at which time Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union and all Germans were 
decried as Enemies of the People. Within weeks, most Russian Germans were deported 
eastward to Novosibirsk and Omsk, the Altai region and Kazakhstan. There, they were 
forced to work under catastrophic conditions in the “Trudarmee” (work army), which was 
little more than a death sentence for many thousands of deportees.280
Although the Germans were exonerated from collaborating with the Nazis following the 
war, they were not permitted to return home and their property remained confiscated. 
Consequently, less than one-fifth of all Russian Germans were located in the European 
part of the Soviet Union in 1979 – compared with half in 1926. Haunted by their time 
in work camps and faced with ubiquitous prejudice, more and more Russian Germans 
assimilated to the Russian-speaking majority. However, their designation as “German” 
was required in Soviet passports until the fall of the Iron Curtain. According to the 2002 
census data, some 600,000 citizens of German descent were still living in Russia after 
about two million Russian Germans – and their families – immigrated back to Germany 
in the first ten years following the collapse of the Soviet Union.281 In 2002, Germans 
comprised only 0.2 percent of the population in the Volga Federal District.282
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Russian petrol and diesel fuel.289 Industrial oil 
production began in the region in the 1930s 
– three decades before the first wells were 
drilled in Western Siberia. Consequently, the 
oil reserves in the Volga region are gradually 
dwindling. Annual oil production has fallen 
from 46 million tonnes in the mid-1960s to 
just over ten million tonnes today.290 However, 
the region has been able to adapt to the 
changing circumstances through economic 
diversification. Bashkortostan is not only an 
industrial region, but also Russia’s fourth 
eastern largest agricultural producer after 
the southern Russian regions of Krasnodar 
and Rostov, and its neighbour Tatarstan.291 Its 
wide range of products includes grains, meat, 
dairy products and sugar beets.
Such diverse possibilities are not yet 
available in Tolyatti in Samara Oblast. This 
is where AvtoVAZ is located, the largest car 
manufacturer in Russia by far and home of 
the infamous Lada. With a population of 
720,000, Togliatti is the largest “mono-city” 
in the territory of the former Soviet Union.292 
Approximately 100,000 people are employed 
at AvtoVAZ, and before the recent economic 
crisis, there were almost 30,000 more.293 
The company was able to avoid bankruptcy 
in 2009 thanks only to a generous bailout by 
the Russian government. Yet even before the 
crisis, Russian customers were increasingly 
rejecting AvtoVAZ models for higher-quality 
foreign cars. As the decade drew to a close, 
sales of AvtoVAZ lines had fallen dramatically. 
If AvtoVAZ had gone bankrupt, not only 
would it have led to severe social problems 
in Tolyatti, but would have placed the future 
of the entire national auto industry at risk. 
To avert such a disaster, the government 
responded forcefully; it protected its auto 
manufacturers by significantly raising import 
duties on foreign cars. To stimulate demand 
at home, the government also began its own 
“Cash for Clunkers” programme, issuing 
vouchers to those who traded in their old 
vehicles for new Russian models. 
Despite such protectionist measures, the 
Russian government is still interested in 
having Western car manufacturers operate 
in the country in order to profit from their 
technical know-how. But even this is strictly 
regulated. For example, Vladimir Putin 
recently announced that foreign companies, 
such as Ford in St. Petersburg or Volkswagen 
in Kaluga, will soon have to add 60 percent 
of the total value of each car on site, instead 
of the current 30 percent now required.294 
This did not deter the French-Japanese auto 
company Renault-Nissan. With its takeover 
of the Russian investment firm Troika Dialog, 
it could soon boost its 25-percent stake in 
AvtoVAZ by another 25 percent, thus securing 
a majority of shares and control of the 
company. 
Tolyatti also benefits from its proximity to 
the regional capital of Samara. The entire 
region is increasingly becoming a gigantic 
agglomeration, making it an attractive place 
of business for modern service providers as 
well. 
The urban heart of 
Russia
The Volga Federal District 
contains nine of Russia’s 21 
largest cities. All of them are 
regional capitals except for 
the car manufacturing city 
of Tolyatti in Samara Oblast. 
Nizhny Novgorod is the largest 
city and district capital 
with just under 1.3 million 
inhabitants. During the 
Soviet era, it was the 
third largest city in the 
country after Moscow 
and Leningrad. Today it 
ranks fifth in population 
following Novosibirsk and 
Yekaterinburg. 
Population of cities in the Volga Federal District, 2009
(Source: Rosstat, Regiony Rossii. Osnovnye sotsialno-
ekonomicheskie pokazateli gorodov – 2009 g., Moscow)
One step further is the city of Nizhny 
Novgorod. Because of the importance of 
its arms industry during the Soviet era, 
it was all but shut off from the rest of the 
world. Today, with 1.3 million inhabitants, 
the city is the fifth largest in Russia and the 
centre of the IT industry. The American chip 
manufacturer Intel employs 500 workers 
here, and local businesses, such as Mera 
Networks and Telma produce software for 
the global market. In cooperation with the 
regional government, these companies 
invest some 25 billion roubles in R&D each 
year. This amounts to 3.4 percent of GDP – 
higher than any other Russian region.295 Of 
course, compared to other sectors, software 
development generates only few jobs. The 
industrial sector, on the other hand, employs 
more people – mostly in manufacturing 
industries and hardly any in natural resource 
extraction. This contributes to a per capita 
disposable income of 813 international 
dollars a month in the region of Nizhny 
Novgorod – significantly lower than the 
Russian average of 912 dollars. The data on 
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population migration seems positive only at 
first glance, too. The city sees a net increase 
of 5,000 migrants each year, yet practically 
all of these are poorly qualified immigrants 
from abroad. Russians, on the other hand, 
are leaving the city faster than new ones can 
replace them. In the entire Volga Federal 
District, only Tatarstan registered a migration 
surplus from other regions in Russia in 
2009.296
Many regions are worse off than Nizhny 
Novgorod. For example, Kirov Oblast and 
the republics of Udmurtia and Mordovia are 
losing several thousand residents every year 
through migration. Along with Chuvashia and 
Mari El, Udmurtia and Mordovia are among 
the regions on the Volga which have been 
most strongly impacted by the structural 
change that followed the Cold War. For 
example, the arms industry in Udmurtia 
– home of the legendary Kalashnikov – 
experienced a severe crisis at the beginning 
of the 1990s, and a similar situation occurred 
in the Mari El Republic. In Kirov Oblast, 
the economic recovery at the start of the 
millennium did little to revive its three major 
industrial branches: engineering, chemicals 
and forestry.297
Russians have fewer children
Economic strength is not the only deter-
mining factor that will impact population 
growth in these regions in the future. A large 
percentage of non-Russian ethnic groups 
live in many of the district’s republics, and 
because of their younger age structures, 
they find themselves in a better position 
than Nizhny Novgorod, Pensa, Kirov and 
Saratov Oblasts, which have a larger Russian 
population. For example, twelve percent 
of the population in Udmurtia is over 64 
years of age, while in Nizhny Novgorod, 
this group comprises 16 percent. The life 
expectancy provides no good explanation for 
this difference. In line with the nationwide 
trend, life expectancy in the “more Russian” 
regions is actually lower than in the ethnic 
republics – which may be due to the fact that 
Russians lead an unhealthier lifestyle and 
have a higher infant mortality rate.298 The real 
reason for the difference in age structures 
can be accounted for by the demographic 
trend favouring fewer children which began 
later in the ethnic republics than in the rest 
of the federal district. As a result, more 
children are still being born there than in 
predominantly Russian regions.299
Bashkortostan has the highest fertility rate 
of all the regions on the Volga with 1.69 
children per woman, directly followed by 
the Udmurt Republic with 1.67 children and 
Perm Krai with 1.61 children per woman. 
The reason for Perm Krai’s relatively high 
fertility rate is because its territory includes 
the formerly autonomous Komi-Permyak 
Okrug with a rate of over 2.1, thus ensuring 
that it will sustain its population level in the 
long term. At the bottom of the list, there are 
regions with predominantly ethnic Russians, 
e.g. Saratov, Ulyanovsk, Pensa, Nizhny 
Novgorod and the Republic of Mordovia 
with rates ranging from 1.3 to 1.4 children 
per woman.300 By 2030, these regions will 
see the greatest loss in population with a 
decrease of up to 23 percent. As for Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan, no more than a seven-
percent drop in population is expected. 
These two neighbours are the only regions 
in the district which have actually seen their 
population numbers grow since the last 
Soviet census taken in 1989. The populations 
of Udmurtia and Chuvashia are also expected 
to decrease more slowly – a maximum of ten 
percent – significantly less than the average 
in the federal district.301
Ethnic diversity
The population in the Volga region is ethnically quite diverse – yet all live together in peaceful coexistence. 
Russians make up more than two-thirds of the population and more than 50 percent of the inhabitants in just 
two of the six ethnic republics. The Tatars, at 13 percent of the population, represent the largest minority on 
the Volga. The most ethnically homogenous republic is Chuvashia where almost 70 percent are of Chuvash 
descent.
Ethnic structure of the population in the Volga Federal District in 
percent, 2002 
(Source: Demoscope Weekly. Perepisi Naseleniya Rossiyskoy Imperii, 
SSSR, 15 novykh nezavisimykh gosudarstv, Moscow)
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CENTRAL Federal District
RUS1 Belgorod Oblast 1 1.37 19.3 71.1 7.4 3 15,219 0.2 66.6 – 3.1
RUS2 Bryansk Oblast 3 1.43 19.6 67.9 – 0.0 3 7,126 0.2 70.0 – 18.5
RUS3 Vladimir Oblast 3 1.43 20.3 66.2 1.2 2 7,901 1.5 73.0 – 19.4
RUS4 Voronezh Oblast 3 1.36 21.5 68.9 2.6 2 8,500 1.1 70.8 – 18.1
RUS5 Ivanovo Oblast 3 1.38 20.7 66.7 1.5 3 5,494 0.4 69.1 – 22.1
RUS6 Kaluga Oblast 3 1.38 20.1 67.6 4.1 2 10,554 3.1 71.6 – 15.8
RUS7 Kostroma Oblast 3 1.52 19.1 67.2 – 0.3 3 8,539 0.0 69.4 – 18.1
RUS8 Kursk Oblast 3 1.44 20.4 68.1 0.5 2 10,343 1.2 77.2 – 20.6
RUS9 Lipetsk Oblast 3 1.44 20.1 68.4 1.7 3 16,602 0.0 70.2 – 16.2
RUS10 Moscow Oblast 1 1.40 19.3 68.2 11.2 2 14,565 2.4 64.9 – 0.6
RUS11 Oryol Oblast 3 1.36 20.1 68.7 1.0 3 8,976 0.2 74.4 – 18.3
RUS12 Ryazan Oblast 3 1.40 22.3 67.7 2.6 3 8,363 0.6 67.6 – 19.8
RUS13 Smolensk Oblast 3 1.39 19.6 65.6 – 0.1 3 8,662 0.5 72.2 – 23.0
RUS14 Tambov Oblast 3 1.28 21.5 68.8 – 0.6 3 7,981 0.6 69.9 – 24.0
RUS15 Tver Oblast 3 1.49 21.3 65.3 2.0 2 9,302 1.4 67.8 – 21.2
RUS16 Tula Oblast 3 1.31 22.6 66.7 2.1 3 10,436 0.6 76.6 – 24.8
RUS17 Yaroslavl Oblast 3 1.39 20.4 68.6 3.1 2 11,540 1.5 76.4 – 15.7
RUS18 Moscow 1 1.41 19.6 73.6 5.1 1 35,401 1.7 91.0 – 7.7
NORTHWESTERN Federal District
RUS19 Republic of Karelia 3 1.39 16.3 66.6 0.5 3 10,506 0.4 72.8 – 17.4
RUS20 Komi Republic 4 1.49 11.9 66.5 – 7.6 3 16,443 0.5 67.8 – 18.2
RUS21 Arkhangelsk Oblast 4 1.53 15.8 67.6 – 4.1 3 13,270 0.2 69.8 – 18.8
RUS22 Vologda Oblast 3 1.54 17.4 67.3 0.2 3 14,903 0.1 73.6 – 15.0
RUS23 Kaliningrad Oblast 3 1.46 16.8 67.7 4.2 3 11,120 0.3 72.7 – 9.3
RUS24 Leningrad Oblast 1 1.19 19.3 66.7 7.4 2 14,544 0.8 66.2 – 9.9
RUS25 Murmansk Oblast 4 1.35 11.9 67.2 – 6.6 2 12,410 0.9 70.3 – 16.6
RUS26 Novgorod Oblast 3 1.45 20.4 64.5 0.7 3 11,515 0.4 73.3 – 24.1
RUS27 Pskov Oblast 3 1.40 21.0 64.5 – 0.9 3 7,137 0.1 71.4 – 26.4
RUS28 St. Petersburg 1 1.40 20.9 71.2 5.8 2 17,950 3.0 79.7 – 12.6
SOUTHERN Federal District
RUS29 Republic of Adygeja 3 1.57 18.8 70.0 3.1 4 5,705 0.1 53.1 – 8.0
RUS30 Republic of Kalmykia 4 1.89 11.9 68.6 – 8.5 4 5,262 0.2 58.3 – 7.9
RUS31 Krasnodar Krai 1 1.57 19.2 70.7 5.9 3 10,345 0.4 67.3 – 3.1
RUS32 Astrakhan Oblast 3 1.71 15.3 68.3 3.6 3 10,184 0.2 67.6 – 5.6
RUS33 Volgograd Oblast 3 1.45 19.3 69.5 – 0.5 3 11,185 0.4 72.1 – 14.1
RUS34 Rostov Oblast 3 1.36 19.5 69.5 0.4 2 8,765 0.9 67.7 – 14.3
NORTH CAUCASIAN Federal District
RUS35 Republic of Dagestan 2 1.96 9.3 74.0 – 2.4 4 5,798 0.3 52.6 11.8
RUS36 Republic of Ingushetia 2 1.97 7.0 78.3 1.1 2,688 0.1 20.2 23.9
RUS37 Kabardino-Balkar Republic 2 1.51 13.5 72.1 – 3.2 4 4,931 0.6 50.7 – 5.8
RUS38 Karachay-Cherkess Republic 2 1.75 15.3 71.5 – 5.3 4 6,068 0.8 58.5 – 10.8
RUS39 Republic of North Ossetia-Alanya 2 1.84 17.6 71.9 – 2.7 3 6,401 0.3 64.6 – 3.9
RUS40 Chechen Republic 5 3.38 6.5 73.2 – 0.8 3,911 0.1 31.4 43.1
RUS41 Stavropol Krai 3 1.43 17.7 70.3 2.2 3 6,418 0.2 67.0 – 6.3
VOLGA Federal District
RUS42 Republic of Bashkortostan 3 1.69 16.0 69.0 1.0 3 13,451 0.4 67.1 – 7.0
RUS43 Mari El Republic 4 1.54 15.5 67.1 – 1.3 3 7,249 0.2 66.9 – 15.0
RUS44 Republic of Mordovia 3 1.27 18.8 69.1 – 2.5 3 8,604 0.5 68.7 – 22.1
RUS45 Republic of Tatarstan 1 1.51 17.0 70.8 2.9 1 18,250 0.5 71.0 – 6.3
RUS46 Udmurt Republic 4 1.67 15.0 68.3 – 1.9 3 11,652 0.2 72.6 – 10.8
RUS47 Chuvash Republic 3 1.53 16.5 69.0 0.1 3 9,146 0.3 68.5 – 12.8
RUS48 Perm Krai 4 1.61 16.1 66.6 – 1.0 2 13,580 0.9 72.1 – 13.7
RUS49 Kirov Oblast 3 1.45 18.4 67.9 – 2.9 3 7,421 0.4 72.2 – 21.5
RUS50 Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 3 1.40 19.9 67.1 1.7 2 11,309 3.4 78.5 – 18.7
RUS51 Orenburg Oblast 3 1.64 16.4 67.9 – 0.8 3 14,731 0.1 72.7 – 12.8
RUS52 Penza Oblast 3 1.37 20.4 69.4 0.4 2 7,613 1.0 72.3 – 17.5
RUS53 Samara Oblast 3 1.42 18.2 68.2 2.9 2 12,870 1.1 73.3 – 12.4
RUS54 Saratov Oblast 3 1.33 19.3 69.1 0.9 3 9,376 0.5 69.0 – 14.7
RUS55 Ulyanovsk Oblast 3 1.34 18.5 68.8 – 1.2 2 8,312 2.1 67.3 – 20.3
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(Source: author’s calculations based on 
Rosstat, Tsentralnaya Baza Statisticheskikh 
Dannykh; Demoscope Weekly. Vsesoyuznaya 
Perepis Naseleniya 1989 Goda, Moscow)
Population change in percentages
In the last 150 years, the Asian part of Russia 
has experienced economic and demographic 
rise and fall like no other region of the 
former Soviet Union. While this vast piece 
of land beyond the Urals had been virtually 
unpopulated before the Trans-Siberian 
Railway was built, it quickly became the 
country’s main natural resource site. In the 
first half of the 20th century, Soviet planners 
sent millions of prisoners to Siberia in order 
to erect cities and infrastructure as well as 
to exploit coal, ore and gold reserves. When 
immeasurable oil and gas reserves were 
discovered in Western Siberia in the 1960s, 
Siberia finally became the backbone of the 
Soviet economy. However, following the 
URAL Federal District
SIBERIAN Federal District
FAR EASTERN Federal District
ASIAN RUSSIA
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(Source: Rosstat, Tsentralnaya Baza 
Statisticheskikh Dannykh, Moscow)*
Population change from 2010 to 2030 
in percentages
Russia’s east continues to shrink
The population decline in the Asian part of Russia 
will continue in the future. However, in contrast to 
the 1990s it will to a great extent be due to the low 
numbers of children, as the mass emigration of the 
first decade following the fall of the Soviet Union has 
already ebbed in the last few years. Even regional 
centres such as Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Sverdlovsk 
and Chelyabinsk, which promise good jobs, will not 
be able to escape shrinkage despite immigration. 
Growth beyond the Urals can only be expected where 
oil and gas can be exploited and good jobs beckon, 
such as in Tyumen Oblast, or where, due to traditional 
family structures, a lot of children are born, such as in 
the mountain republics of Altai and Tuva. 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the fate of the 
region changed: many industrial enterprises 
which had once been highly subsidized were 
no longer competitive due to antiquated 
production methods and geographic 
isolation. The gigantic military bases on the 
Russian Pacific coast became less important 
following the end of the Cold War. The 
people who had once been attracted to the 
inhospitable east by high wages and other 
benefits now returned to the west in droves, 
for the climate in Russia’s eastern regions is 
only appealing in the southern area near the 
Kazakh and Chinese borders. In the north life 
expectancy reflects the harsh conditions: in 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, men live an 
average of 54 years.
less than – 20
– 20 to under – 15
– 15 to under – 10
– 10 to under – 5
– 5 to under 0
0 to under 5
5 to under 10
10 to under 15
* The regional population projections for Russia are based on the low variant 
of national calculations. These correspond most closely to the United Nations’ projections 
used for the other countries.
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In the land of oil and gas
In 1932, the Russian geologist Ivan Gubkin 
announced at a conference in Sverdlovsk 
that beneath the vast, marshy earth of 
Western Siberia, there must be massive 
stores of oil and gas from the Mesozoic 
period. Initially, however, this did not interest 
anyone: the Republic of Bashkortostan 
in today’s Volga Federal District had just 
begun with the mining of fossil fuels, which 
sufficiently supplied needs. It was only after 
three decades that the fossil fuel industry 
relocated to Western Siberia, where some of 
the world’s largest oil and gas fields can be 
found.
In Gubkin’s day, poor nomads who traversed 
the endless tundra and taiga with their 
reindeer left their mark on the land. In 1930, 
the Soviet rulers east of the Urals created 
two autonomous regions for the indigenous 
population: one for the Yamalo-Nenets and 
one for the Khanty and Mansi. At the time, 
only 139,000 people lived in the territory 
of these two regions, which together 
comprise a surface area four times the size of 
Germany.302
It was only in the 1960s that the massive 
exploitation of fossil fuel deposits began. 
Consequently, the need for labour grew 
quickly. Hundreds of thousands poured in 
from all over the country in hopes of work. In 
the years between 1970 and 1989 alone, the 
population grew from about 350,000 to just 
under two million. Many of the new arrivals 
were Russians and Ukrainians. Khanty, Mansi 
and Nenets, who once gave the region its 
name, today constitute less than five percent 
of the population.2
Despite enormous population growth since 
the mid-1960s, on average there are only 
seven inhabitants per square kilometre in the 
Ural Federal District. From the Arctic Ocean 
to the Kazakh border in the south, the district 
stretches over more than 2,000 kilometres; 
from the ridge of the Ural Mountains in the 
west to the eastern border in the Siberian 
lowlands over 1,000 kilometres. In total, 
nine percent of the Russian population 
live here, generating over 15 percent of 
GDP. Tyumen Oblast, which includes both 
autonomous okrugs of the Yamalo-Nenets 
in the north and the Khanty and Mansi in the 
south, is, measured by per capita GDP, by far 
the richest region in the country.304
Approximately two-thirds of Russian 
oil, meaning about seven percent of the 
world’s output, come from Khanty-Mansi 
Autonomous Okrug.305 Between six and seven 
million barrels of crude oil are produced 
here every day, three times Germany’s daily 
requirements. In 2005, the oil bubbled 
from a total of 249 sources. It is exploited 
primarily by the four large enterprises 
Surgutneftegaz, Lukoil, TNK-BP and the state 
corporation Rosneft, which together control 
two-thirds of the national production.306 
Business boomed especially at the beginning 
of the new century. Between 2000 and 
2007, Russian oil production increased by 
over 50 percent due to exploding world 
market prices. Following a short period of 
stagnation, the output in 2009 once again 
increased and Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia 
as the world’s largest producer.307
URAL Federal District
Population in 2010 12.28 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 11.40 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 7
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.62
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 68.6
Annual net migration 2005-2010 15,946
Mean age in 2010 37.8
(Source: see page 139)
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At the end of 2008, Russia had verified and 
exploitable oil reserves of some 80 billion 
barrels, a majority in Western Siberia.308 
If production levels remained steady, the 
amount would be sufficient to sustain 
the region’s wealth for decades to come. 
However, the deposits in some of the large 
fields, which have been exploited since the 
Soviet era, are beginning to be depleted and 
tapping new fields in many places is not yet 
profitable. So it is not saying much when the 
Russian government boasts of “prognosed 
reserves” of up to 322 billion barrels; 
this is the amount of all of the country’s 
theoretically exploitable oil reserves. The 
numbers do not take the profitability of 
exploitation, the necessary infrastructure and 
the question as to whether the world actually 
wants to exploit each and every tonne into 
account.309
Further north, in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug, natural gas plays the role of oil in 
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. Under the 
permanently frozen ground – the area has an 
average temperature of minus ten degrees 
Celsius throughout the year – 90 percent of 
Russia’s natural gas reserves can be found. 
Russia has the world’s largest reserves. Of 
the approximately 600 billion cubic metres 
produced nationwide annually, three-fourths 
are produced here.310 In contrast to the oil 
market, the Russian gas market is essentially 
dominated by a single enterprise: Gazprom. 
The world’s largest gas company controls 
about 85 percent of the nation’s production 
and, with about half a million employees, it 
is the country’s largest employer. In order 
to satisfy the steadily growing demand on 
world markets, Gazprom will need to invest 
billions of US dollars in the long-term. A large 
part of the first generation of gas fields, such 
as Urengoi and Yamburg, has been virtually 
depleted. The remaining reserves lie much 
deeper, in the north of the okrug on the Yamal 
Peninsula and before its coast, which are 
not easily accessible. An additional difficulty 
in exploiting these fields is the thawing 
permafrost, which hinders the construction 
of stable buildings, roads and pipelines.
In 2009, the volume of output already 
decreased by 12.1 percent in comparison 
with the previous year, since European 
customers were buying less gas than agreed 
upon due to the economic crisis.311 For the 
first time since 2002, Russia lost the position 
of the world’s largest gas producer. The USA 
replaced it as they had recourse to newly-
tapped shale deposits, thereby reducing its 
own imports. Nonetheless, the significance 
of gas exports in Russia will grow, especially 
since gas consumption in the domestic 
market is still highly subsidized. In order to 
reduce consumption domestically and to 
increase lucrative exports accordingly, the 
government plans to turn increasingly to coal 
and nuclear power for its energy supplies. By 
2030, coal production is supposed to have 
increased from 100 million tonnes in 2008 
to between 410 and 540 million tonnes 
annually.312 By 2020, the construction of 
numerous new nuclear power plants should 
provide an annual 43 instead of the current 
23 gigawatts of nuclear energy.313
The public budgets of the autonomous 
okrugs still number among Russia’s highest, 
even if the sources of revenue have been 
seriously reduced in the last five years. The 
regions’ previous, 60-percent share of taxes 
on oil and gas production now flows almost 
entirely into the federal budget. But revenues 
from profit and income taxes still generate 
enough wealth to subsidize poor families 
with monthly 200 to 300 roubles per 
child, whereas subsidies are less than 100 
roubles in two-thirds of the Russian regions. 
However, this is still a pittance in comparison 
with the profits of the oil industry: the sum 
just manages to cover ten loaves of bread or 
seven litres of milk. Nonetheless, by Russian 
standards the eight-percent poverty rate is 
extremely low.314
Russia
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug
Young industry, young population
The population of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug 
is markedly younger than Russia’s total average. 
In particular, the differences among retirees 
are extreme: only four percent of males in the 
autonomous region are older than 60; nationwide, 
the share is 13 percent. As for women, who retire 
at 55, the difference is hardly less marked – at 15 
and 27 percent respectively. The reason for this 
youthful population structure lies in the mass inflow 
of labour migrants. This began in the 1970s, when 
oil production started in Western Siberia. It was only 
in the last few years that the first migrants reached 
retirement age. 
Population share in terms of five-year age groups in 
Russia and in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug in 
percentages in 2009
(Source: Rosstat, Tsentralnaya Baza Statisticheskikh 
Dannykh, Moscow, author’s calculations)
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Russia’s Ruhr region
The industrial heart of the Ural Federal 
District is the oblasts of Chelyabinsk and 
Sverdlovsk. The former city of Sverdlovsk, 
which took its earlier name of Yekaterinburg 
back in 1991, is also the administrative 
centre of the federal district. It was here that 
the Bolsheviks executed the family of the 
Russian Czar Nicholas II. Whereas the city 
itself is now once again named after a Czar, 
the territory which belongs to it continues, 
ironically, to bear the name Yakov Sverdlov, 
one of the revolutionaries who were 
responsible for the murder of the last Czar’s 
family.
Russia’s “Ruhr region”, as Sverdlovsk Oblast 
is sometimes called, is Russia’s third most 
important industrial region. The aluminium 
industry is particularly significant. Six 
large factories produce more than half 
of all of Russia’s aluminium. Chemicals, 
petrochemicals, steel production, mechanical 
engineering, the wood and paper industries 
and the construction material industry are 
also part of the region’s economic basis. In 
neighbouring Chelyabinsk Oblast, aluminium, 
pipes, diverse alloys and chromium 
compounds are produced. During World 
War II, the city of Chelyabinsk acquired the 
name Tankograd (tank city), since war tanks 
were produced here en masse. After the 
war, the Mayak nuclear plant in the north 
of Chelyabinsk Oblast became the main 
production site for plutonium in the Soviet 
Union. The Mayak region now counts among 
the earth’s most radioactive places. 
The metallurgical industry has allowed the 
wealth of the oblasts of Chelyabinsk and 
Sverdlovsk to grow quickly following the 
Rouble crisis at the end of the 1990s – a 
time in which the price for metals exploded 
the world over. But now it is precisely 
this economic sector which is suffering in 
particular. Due to weak demand on the world 
market, industrial production decreased in 
2009, compared to the previous year, by 20 
percent.315 In Sverdlovsk Oblast, the number 
of registered unemployed people increased 
within one year from 38,000 to 92,000. 
Furthermore, many firms responded to the 
crisis by cutting hours.316
Despite their wealth in resources, the 
industrial regions of the Southern Urals 
depend for production upon additional 
imports of raw materials. Iron and chromium 
ore come from Georgia, Turkey or Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan is an important coal supplier. 
In order to limit this dependency, Russia is 
currently planning to exploit the rich iron 
ore and coal reserves in the polar north 
of the Ural region with investments of up 
to 14 billion euros. Until that time, several 
thousand kilometres of railway lines, roads 
Polluted atmosphere
Per inhabitant, about half a tonne of pollutants 
are emitted into the atmosphere in the Urals every 
year. More than one-third of this amount is carbon 
monoxide – a gas among others created from the 
incomplete combustion of associated gases released 
in oil production. Due to these emissions, Tyumen 
Oblast far exceeds the nation’s other territories 
in annual emissions. Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk 
Oblasts, where heavy metals constitute a significant 
amount of emissions, also count among the five most 
adversely affected regions.
Annual emissions of pollutants from 
stationary sources in tonnes per 1,000 inhabitants in 2008
(Source: Rosstat, Sdravookhranenie v Rossii 2009 g., Moscow)
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and electricity wires need to be created 
from nothing. The construction of four new 
power plants is also being planned in order to 
meet energy needs in the newly-established 
regions.317
The people in Kurgan Oblast on the Kazakh 
border could only dream of such gigantic 
investments. The region which has no 
significant raw materials and traditionally 
focuses on mechanical engineering is at the 
very bottom of the Urals’ economic ladder 
due to outdated equipment and low demand 
for its products. Whereas the inhabitants 
of Tyumen Oblast generated an average 
of 46,600 international dollars in 2008 – 
which is equivalent to the economic strength 
of a Swiss citizen in terms of purchasing 
power – the inhabitants of Kurgan Oblast, 
with an annual 7,700 dollars, did not even 
generate the equivalent of the people in 
Belize.318
Population growth in the Arctic Circle
As in almost all of Russia’s federal districts, 
the population in the Urals is shrinking. 
Between 1991 and 2009, the number of 
inhabitants decreased by about four percent, 
a loss of about half a million people. But 
the population decrease did not affect all 
areas: regions with rich reserves of natural 
resources long attracted immigrants 
hoping to find well-paid jobs. This is why 
the northern autonomous okrugs of the 
Yamalo-Nenets and the Khanty and Mansi 
both saw significant population increases in 
the above-mentioned period. This also led 
to an increase in the number of inhabitants 
in the administratively super-ordinate 
Tyumen Oblast by more than seven percent. 
But because the economic crisis severely 
affected the Russian gas industry, Yamalo-
Nenets Autonomous Okrug has experienced 
out-migration in 2008 and 2009; it 
continues to grow, however, due to a surplus 
of births over deaths. The southern oblasts of 
Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk number among 
the shrinking regions of the Urals. Since 
1991, they have lost five and eight percent 
respectively of their populations. In the 
federal district, only Kurgan Oblast exceeds 
these numbers. In 2008, about 150,000 
fewer people lived here than in 1991, a loss 
of 14 percent.319
In accordance with the nationwide trend, 
the total fertility rate in the Urals, which had 
sunk to 1.2 children per woman in 2000, has 
stabilized somewhat in the course of the last 
decade. In 2009, women had an average 
of 1.62 children. Although this value lies far 
below the 2.1 children per woman necessary 
for a stable population development, 
projections for the Urals until 2030 see 
only limited further population losses; the 
population, particularly in the autonomous 
okrugs in the north, has remained young 
due to the immigration of young labourers. 
Forty-eight percent of the inhabitants of the 
federal district are younger than 35 years 
old. At the same time, the life expectancy of 
men at 62.6 and of women at 74.7 years is 
significantly higher than in other Asian parts 
of Russia. This lends to a balance between 
the number of deaths and the number 
of births. Good wages in the oil industry 
positively affect both the living standards 
and life expectancies in the northern okrug 
of the Yamalo-Nenets in particular. Here, 
life expectancies of almost 68 years for men 
and over 75 years for women are among 
the highest in the country – despite arctic 
temperatures. Nonetheless, these are still 
about ten years less than in Germany.320
Kurgan Oblast in the south is the only region 
of the federal district which has experienced 
consistent out-migration. Consequently, 
it has been most strongly affected by the 
demographic decline. By 2030, it could 
have lost almost a fourth of its inhabitants. 
And despite immigration, the oblasts of 
Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk will also lose 
about ten percent of their populations. 
Tyumen Oblast, by contrast, will probably 
continue to grow due to its young population 
structure and continual immigration.321
The other side of the coin
Many social and demographic problems are 
alleviated by a strong economy, but pollution 
is not. And it especially affects the former 
Soviet Union in its economically strong 
regions. These continue to suffer from the 
burden of outdated plants, which are often 
run without any real filter technology and 
low efficiency. Of the 20 Russian cities with 
the highest annual pollutant emissions, five 
are located in the Ural Federal District.322 
The mining of raw materials in Tyumen 
Oblast has lead to the highest emissions of 
all regions nationwide. And the earth is also 
affected: every year, there are up to 5,000 
leakages in the region’s dilapidated pipelines. 
According to estimates by the environmental 
organization Greenpeace, between three and 
seven percent of the transported oil – several 
million tonnes per annum – seep into the 
forests, the soil and the groundwater. Over 
800,000 hectares of land in Western Siberia 
are contaminated by oil; this is five times the 
surface of London.323
The metal industry, for example in the steel 
city of Magnitogorsk, also has an enormously 
negative influence on the environment. In 
the 1930s, the construction of the city was a 
Soviet vanity project intended to make clear 
to the class enemy in the West that the East 
was equal to the significant steel centres of 
Gary and Pittsburgh. Over 70 years later, the 
city is not only known for its successful ice-
hockey team, Metallurg Magnitogorsk, but for 
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its polluted air. Every day, its approximately 
400,000 inhabitants breathe toxic 
chemicals and heavy metals belched into the 
atmosphere by the city’s enormous industrial 
complexes. An investigation in the 1990s 
revealed that only 28 percent of newborns 
and 27 percent of their mothers were healthy. 
The rest were plagued by bronchitis, asthma, 
lung cancer and similar afflictions.324
The greatest health problem in the region, 
however, is not respiratory illnesses; it 
is Aids. HIV, which is common in Russia 
primarily in wealthier regions, is spreading 
in particular among men of working-age 
in the urban centres of Yekaterinburg and 
Chelyabinsk and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous 
Okrug. In these areas, about a half percent 
of the population is infected. In contrast to 
African countries, the virus is not spread 
primarily by sexual contact but by unclean 
needles. The number of drug addicts, 
From the majority to the minority
When Soviet planners created Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug in the 1930s, indigenous 
peoples constituted over half of the population 
of 500,000. The group with the highest 
representation, and thus decisive for naming 
issues, was the Nenets, accounting for one-third 
of the population. Throughout the decades, 
their share shrank to five percent, even though 
their absolute numbers doubled from 13,000 to 
26,000. At the same time, the total number of the 
district’s inhabitants grew to over half a million. 
The main reason for this development was the 
discovery of oil and gas in the 1960s, inspiring 
many Russians, Ukrainians and other ethnic 
groups to make their way north. These groups 
now constitute the overwhelming majority of the 
district’s population.
(Source: Demoscope Weekly, Perepisi Naseleniya 
Rosiskoy Imperii, SSSR, 15 novykh nezavisimykh 
gosudarstv, Moscow)
Population of Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug by ethnicity in 
selected census years
about 0.5 percent in the region, is about 
three times as high as in the rest of the 
country. The cities in the south of the Urals 
constitute important terminals for heroin 
from Afghanistan – and the inhabitants of 
Russia’s resource regions are highly solvent 
customers.325
Reindeer breeders
The Nenets constitute Russia’s largest indigenous population group. Currently, they 
number about 40,000 people, with a slightly upward trend. Their home is the tundra on 
both sides of the Ural Mountains in the autonomous okrugs of the Nenets and the Yamalo-
Nenets as well as the north of Krasnoyarsk Krai. A few, the so-called Forest Nenets, are 
also settled in the taiga of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.
The Nenets are a nomadic people. Year after year, they traverse the arctic landscape with 
their reindeer herds and tents. In summer, they traverse the Arctic Ocean coasts and in 
winter the forested hinterlands. Fish and the meat, blood and marrow of reindeer are the 
Nenets’ staples. They use the animals’ pelts to make tents and clothes and the innards to 
fashion diverse tools. More than other indigenous peoples, the Nenets have managed to 
maintain their traditions despite collectivization in the Soviet Union and enormous oil 
and gas discoveries on their territory.326
But modernity has not come to a complete standstill in Russia’s far north. The Nenets’ 
children attend boarding schools, learn Russian and are becoming used to the comforts 
of settled life. Rather than return to the vast tundra, many prefer to look for work in cities 
after they have completed their education. Natural gas production in the Arctic plays an 
ambivalent role. On the one hand, the construction of transport and telecommunications 
infrastructure has made life easier for northern peoples. On the other, the production 
plants destroy large areas of grazing ground, cut through hiking paths and contaminate 
the tundra’s ground through leaking pipelines. Additionally, immigrants attracted by the 
production plants do not come with much sympathy for the cultural traditions of the 
indigenous populations. 
Those Nenets who have nonetheless unswervingly maintained their traditional ways 
benefit little from progress and the relative wealth which have found their way into the 
autonomous okrugs. Life expectancy is still about 20 years lower than among the rest 
of the Russian population.327 Conversely, infant mortality is extremely high. Alcoholism 
and suicide have become serious problems. According to estimates, there are 134 
suicides per 100,000 people annually in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and in the 
far-eastern homeland of the Koryaks. The critical value established by the World Health 
Organization is 20.328
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A trip on the Trans-Siberian Railway has 
always been considered the ultimate 
adventure for travelers to Russia. The journey 
itself is the reward: during the 150 hour 
trip from Yaroslavl train station in Moscow 
to Vladivostok, virtually nothing happens. 
Outside the windows, there is a kind of 
unending film of birch and pine forest in the 
Siberian taiga, interrupted only seldom by 
a scene of a large, gray industrial city with 
ominously smoking chimney stacks or the 
silver-blue surface of Lake Baikal.
Yet the myth of the „Trans-Siberian“ has been 
become somewhat tarnished: since 2010, 
the Russian railway corporation RZD has 
offered the trip virtually in cooperation with 
the Internet search engine Google. Since 
then, a ride on the world’s longest transport 
route can be taken at home while sitting on 
the couch.
Initially, construction of the railway, which 
at 9,288 kilometres exceeds the distance 
between Cairo and Cape Town by about 
2,000 kilometres, was designed for purely 
economic rather than touristic purposes. In 
order to economically exploit Siberia, which 
was blessed with rich natural resources, new 
kinds of transportation were required in the 
second half of the 19th century. Transport by 
land, usually by horse-driven vehicles, was 
difficult. Furthermore, only small volumes of 
goods could be transported. Travel by water 
was equally unsuitable as Russia’s large 
rivers flow along the North-South axis, rather 
than eastwards or westwards.
In 1891, construction of a railway line 
connecting the European part of Russia with 
the Pacific coast seven time zones away 
finally began. The first trains traveled to 
Irkutsk even before the turn of the century. 
Shortly thereafter, they went further east 
to Chita and Khabarovsk. Soon, in the wake 
of the Stolypin agrarian reforms, millions 
of farmers settled along the railway line 
and exported their goods, primarily butter 
and grain, to Central Russia and Western 
Europe. The cities of Omsk and Novosibirsk 
– then Novonikolayevsk – became trading 
centres and important financial markets. 
Industrialization of the land also profited 
from the Trans-Siberian Railway. Hard coal-
mining began in the Kuznetsk Basin in today’s 
Kemerovo Oblast. Coal-mining in Kemerovo 
still accounts for 56 percent of Russia’s total 
coal production.329
But the Russian rulers did not only build 
the Trans-Siberian Railway to transport 
goods: both the Czar and the Bolsheviks 
sent millions of forced labourers, and 
later, prisoners of war, eastwards. These 
labourers contributed significantly to the 
development of Siberia’s industries. After the 
Soviet government had evacuated important 
industries from the country’s endangered 
western region to today’s Ural and Siberian 
Federal Districts during World War II, the 
region ultimately became the Soviet Union’s 
industrial core. This led to marked population 
growth. Whereas in 1939, the year in which 
the last pre-war census was taken, about 
12.7 million people lived in today’s Siberian 
Federal District, in 1959 the region already 
had over 15.5 million inhabitants. By 1990, 
the number had increased to 21.1 million. 
When the Soviet Union fell, however, the 
population began to decrease gradually but 
inexorably, so that today the federal district 
only has about 19.5 million inhabitants.330
The Trans-Siberian Railway: Siberia’s lifeline
SIBERIAN Federal District
Population in 2010 19.56 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 17.46 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 4
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.64
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 67.0
Annual net migration 2005-2010 14,396
Mean age in 2010 37.4
(Source: see page 139)
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Cumulative population exchange between Siberia 
and the other Russian federal districts, 1998 to 2008
(Source: Rosstat, several demographic yearbooks, Moscow, author’s calculations)
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Going West
Every year, Siberia loses inhabitants to all 
western federal districts. Siberia only remains 
a popular destination for migrants from the 
Far East, even if it is only a temporary stop 
on the way to the country’s European centre. 
The East-West movement started right after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, when absolute 
migration numbers surpassed today’s several-
fold. Due to massive immigration from the 
Far East, a few regions, such as Novosibirsk 
Oblast, were able to compensate for the 
wave of westward emigration in the 1990s. 
Meanwhile, the number of immigrants is no 
longer sufficient to make up for the loss.
Settlement still takes place along the Trans-
Siberian route, which traverses seven of 
the district’s twelve regions and constitutes 
the life-blood of the Siberian economy. 
Virtually all significant cities such as Omsk, 
Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk are 
connected to the railway, which is supported 
by the Baikal Amur Mainline (BAM) running 
north and parallel to it. The BAM was 
completed in 1989 and forks off from the 
Trans-Siberian Railway in Tajschet, running 
on for over 4,000 kilometres to the coast 
opposite Sakhalin island. Construction of 
the BAM had already begun in the 1930s 
under Stalin, who needed an alternative 
route to the Trans-Siberian, which was 
especially vulnerable due to its proximity to 
the Chinese border. Economic considerations 
were of secondary importance. Indeed, in 
the 20 years following its opening, the BAM 
stretch by no means achieved the economic 
significance of the Trans-Siberian Railway.
Regions which remained cut-off from the 
railway when the country was developed 
lead a shadow existence today. The sparsely 
settled republics of Altai and Tuva on the 
mountainous southern margin of Siberia 
are among Russia’s poorest and most 
underdeveloped regions. Their GDP of just 
over 5,000 international dollars per capita 
is only about a third of the Russian average 
and is generated to a comparatively great 
extent in the fields. In order to promote the 
economic development of both mountain 
republics, they are to be connected for the 
first time to the railway in the wake of the 
planned expansion of the Russian railway 
system by 2030.331
Transit station
While the picturesque landscape of the 
mountainous Altai and Tuva Republics, 
replete with lakes, could very well profit 
in the future from tourists from the West, 
Siberian villages which are already 
connected to the railway system have had 
to deal increasingly with migrants from the 
eastern parts of the country since 1991. 
The extensive East-West migration of the 
Russian population, which commenced 
immediately following the fall of the Soviet 
Union, has turned Siberia into a collecting 
point for migrants. Migrants from the Far East 
often try to gain a foothold in cities such as 
Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Irkutsk or Krasnoyarsk 
just as the already-settled population seeks 
to go west. Thus, Siberia has experienced 
immigration from the far eastern regions 
of Russia for several years while the 
balance with all western areas is negative, 
significantly exceeding eastern gains.332 In 
total, Russia’s second-largest federal district 
has lost about 430,000 people to other 
Russian provinces since 1993.333
That Siberia’s net migration, with a minus 
of about 4,000 people since 1993, is 
nonetheless minimal, is due to foreign 
immigrants. These are primarily Russians 
and Russian-speaking peoples who have 
returned to the country of their ancestors 
mainly from Central Asia.
19
9
3
19
9
4
19
9
5
19
9
6
19
9
7
19
9
8
19
9
9
20
0
0
2
0
0
1
20
0
2
20
0
3
20
0
4
20
0
5
20
0
6
20
0
7
20
0
8
Mortality surplus explains population 
decrease
Between 1993 and 2008, the number of deaths 
exceeded the number of births in Siberia. Until 2005, 
this cost the federal district an average of more than 
60,000 people annually, thus constituting the bulk 
of the population decrease. Since 2006, the figures 
have somewhat improved as women in all age-groups 
are having more children. Contrary to birth and death 
numbers, emigration and immigration have almost 
achieved a balance since 1993. In the 1990s, Siberia 
profited from thousands of Russians returning from 
Central Asia, of whom many passed the border at this 
point. Since 2004, there is once again an upward 
trend. One reason for this is that out-migration of 
ethnic Germans has almost come to a standstill.  
Net migration, natural population growth (births minus deaths) and total population growth 
in Siberia, 1993 to 2008
(Source: Rosstat, Tsentralnaya Baza Statisticheskikh Dannykh, Moscow, author’s calculations)
It is the northern and eastern regions 
of Siberia in particular which are losing 
inhabitants, as no immigrants from abroad 
are counterbalancing the population loss to 
the country’s western regions. Thus, both 
Evenk and Taimyr Autonomous Okrug, which 
have been incorporated into Krasnoyarsk 
Krai meanwhile, have lost about a fourth 
of their populations due to out-migration. 
And even the Republic of Buryatia and 
Zabaykalsky Krai, which border to the south 
China and Mongolia respectively, have lost 
more than five percent of their populations 
to emigration since 1993. By contrast, the 
regions bordering Central Asia, in particular, 
have experienced population increases: 
Novosibirsk Oblast has grown by almost 
five percent, with approximately 130,000 
additional inhabitants. Kemerovo Oblast has 
attracted just about 80,000 people, which 
constitutes an increase of 2.5 percent. The 
development in Altai Krai, located directly on 
the border of Kazakhstan, is characteristic 
of the population fluctuations. It had a 
migration surplus of over 70,000 people 
between 1993 and 2000, before the number 
of Russian immigrants from Central Asia 
began slowly to decrease. Since then, the 
region has lost more than 50,000 people.334
That Siberia has lost over 1.5 million people 
since 1991 can be attributed almost entirely 
to natural population developments. As 
everywhere else in Russia, the upheaval of 
the transition period also stopped many 
women in Siberia from having children 
while the lack of prospects and the risky 
lifestyle of many men contributed to a 
significant increase in mortality rates. In 
contrast to emigration, the decrease in 
birth rates was marked in all regions of the 
federal district. At the turn of the century, 
Novosibirsk, Omsk and Tomsk Oblasts had 
the lowest fertility rates, with fewer than 
1.2 children per woman, although women 
in these industrial regions had already 
been having comparatively fewer children 
during the Soviet era. On a percentage 
basis, the decrease in fertility was strongest 
in Zabaykalsky Krai. Since this region also 
suffers from emigration, it has had to deal 
with the greatest population loss: over 15 
percent since 1991.335
In line with the nationwide trend towards 
somewhat higher fertility rates, the situation 
in Siberia has eased a bit. In 2009, for the 
first time in 17 years, more births than deaths 
were registered. It is the over-24s above all 
who are now starting families which they had 
previously postponed. An increase in total 
fertility from 1.3 to about 1.6 children per 
woman between 2005 and 2009 in Siberia 
was the largest among Russia’s eight federal 
districts. The crude birth rate increased in 
the same period from 11.4 to 13.7 newborns 
per 1,000 inhabitants, despite the fact 
that the number of women of childbearing 
age between 15 and 44 years old slightly 
decreased in proportion to the total 
population.336 This, as well as an increasing 
life expectancy, which is currently 67 years 
in Siberia or more than four years higher 
than it was in 2005, point to improved living 
conditions. Men, in particular, profit from this 
development. Their average life expectancy 
has increased from 56.3 to 61.0, which is 
nonetheless less than male life expectancy in 
Bolivia or Mongolia.337
Since the positive natural population 
developments were accompanied by the first 
migration surplus in a decade in 2008, half 
of the Siberian regions had a higher number 
of inhabitants at the beginning of 2009 than 
they had had a year earlier.338 The positive 
migration balance can also be explained 
by the fact that emigration to Germany has 
markedly decreased in the last several years. 
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of the population.340 However, also in 
Siberia, the small cohorts of the 1990s will 
soon reach childbearing age and reduce the 
number of potential parents significantly.
Highly-qualified Siberians
In order to maintain population stability 
long-term, the federal district needs to 
attract many more immigrants than it has 
so far. The experience of Novosibirsk Oblast 
has shown that it will be difficult to attract 
highly-qualified immigrants to advance the 
modernization of the economy. This is the 
site of Akademgorodok, something of an 
academics’ colony and a centre of Russian 
science. About 40 research institutes 
employ an estimated 22,000 researchers. 
In its Soviet heyday, there were three 
times as many.341 The Budker Institute for 
Nuclear Physics, among others, became 
world renown. Today, the Russian “Silicon 
Valley” is particularly interesting for western 
companies in the field of information 
technologies. Corporations such as Intel, IBM 
and Microsoft have part of their programming 
done here. Despite the emigration of many 
scientists to Moscow and western countries, 
there is no dearth of young scholars, for 
Akademgorodok attracts students from all 
over Russia. To make sure that the most 
recent boom does not simply dissipate, 
the Russian government, in 2005, ordered 
the construction of a technology park on 
9,000 square kilometres which should 
provide space for 40 firms from the fields of 
biotechnology, mechanical engineering and 
information technology.342
In order to stem emigration of highly-
qualified people and to solve one of the 
cardinal problems the country faces on 
its path to modernization, the Russian 
government has significantly expanded its 
financial support of scientific organizations 
in the last several years. But Russia cannot 
solve the problem on its own, as private 
enterprises are not yet sufficiently integrated 
into science. The private sector in Germany, 
for example, contributes 70 percent to 
expenditures for research and development, 
in Russia only 30.343
Tomsk Oblast has developed astonishingly 
well. Its GDP per capita constitutes more than 
14,400 international dollars.344 In Siberia, 
only the resource-rich region of Krasnoyarsk 
and Kemerovo Oblast exceed it. Tomsk 
has mastered the balance between oil and 
natural gas production and the development 
of a knowledge-intensive service economy. 
In the west of the primarily swampy territory, 
drilling takes place in the off-shoots of the 
large oil fields of neighbouring Khanty-Mansi 
Autonomous Okrug while the inhabitants of 
the cities in the south-east frequently work 
Re-Centralization
In recent years, the Kremlin has pursued a strategy of reducing the number of Russian 
regions. Generally, economically weak regions are merged with stronger bordering 
regions. The latter are viewed as engines to jump-start economic development in the 
weaker areas, which are frequently autonomous regions with ethnic minorities. The 
capital in the “mother region,” for example, should make infrastructural projects possible 
in poorer regions. The government further hopes that mergers will increase administrative 
efficiency and that the enlarged labour market will generate more jobs.
Accordingly, on 1 January 2007, the government merged Evenk and Taimyr Autonomous 
Okrugs with Krasnoyarsk Krai in Siberia, where many regions have particular difficulties 
pursuing sustainable development due to their isolation and the extreme climate. Later, 
Irkutsk Oblast incorporated Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug, while Zabaykalsky Krai 
was created by merging Chita Oblast and Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug. 
The mother region must be in an economic position, however, to help the smaller region 
if these mergers are to produce the desired results. In Krasnoyarsk Krai, the merger has 
been positive because the annexation of the two autonomous districts created access 
to oil and natural gas resources. The opposite is the case in Zabaykalsky Krai, where the 
actual engine, Chita Oblast, is economically battered and hardly in a position to take care 
of its junior partner, Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug. The Russian government has not yet 
taken these regional problems into consideration when pursuing mergers. Apparently, it 
is satisfied that each merger deletes a backwards region from the official statistics and 
regional inequality seems to shrink.345 
The reservoir of ethnic Germans from the 
Omsk and Altai regions has slowly been 
drained as this group has been returning 
since the 1990s to their ancestral homeland. 
Nonetheless, current developments are by 
no means sustainable. Even slight increases 
in immigration and fertility will not prevent 
Siberia’s long-term shrinkage. The number 
of children per women was too low in the 
1990s and it remains so. Currently, Siberia 
profits from a population structure with a 
large percentage of women of childbearing 
age. They constitute 23.5 percent of the 
total population, which is even higher than 
the already-high nationwide average of 
22.8 percent. By comparison: In Germany, 
where the number of children has decreased 
significantly since the 1970s, 15 to 44-year-
old women constitute a mere 18.5 percent 
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The focus in the special economic zone of 
Tomsk, whose special conditions are limited, 
like all other economic zones, to 20 years, 
is materials research and nanotechnology. 
Geographically, the zone is divided into 
two parts: the northern part borders the 
premises of the Tomskneftekhnim company, 
a nationally leading petrochemical enterprise 
and is thus located at the crossroads of 
research-intensive production in the region. 
The larger southern part of the zone is in 
the immediate neighbourhood of the Tomsk 
section of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
just west of the city.
Soviet legacies
Both Novosibirsk and Tomsk have profited 
from their location on the most important 
East-West traffic artery and their relative 
proximity to the European part of the country. 
Together with the very fertile land, these 
factors have resulted in a relatively high level 
of economic diversification in both regions as 
well as in the oblasts of Omsk and Kemerovo. 
Elsewhere, the regions often developed 
only when raw material seemed to make 
development profitable, even at human or 
environmental cost. 
The effects of Soviet industrial policy on 
health can be observed in Norilsk, the 
world’s northernmost and coldest large 
city, which has profited from its proximity 
to the Yenisey River. Built and operated by 
prisoners of the Norilsk gulag in the 1930s, 
the city quickly developed to become a 
centre of the heavy metal industry in the 
Soviet Union. The “Norilsk Combine” first 
achieved international significance, however, 
in the 1960s, when newly-discovered 
nickel reserves made it possible to increase 
production tenfold within 20 years from 
20,000 to 200,000 tonnes annually and to 
export a significant amount to the West.347 
That the mining and smelting of nickel, 
copper and cobalt released several million 
tonnes of toxic gases annually which rained 
down upon the city and the surroundings 
bothered but few of those in power during 
the Soviet era.
Today, the successor corporation MMC 
Norilsk Nickel still provides 80 percent 
of all employment in the city, despite a 
consolidation period in the 1990s in which 
half of all employees lost their jobs.348 With 
just about 20 percent of the nickel and 13 
percent of the palladium mining globally, it 
is a two-fold market leader.349 In addition, 
the company maintains the world’s largest 
Not enough work in the South
Next to the North Caucasus, Siberia is the only 
federal district in which unemployment is higher in 
all regions than the Russian average, which was 8.4 
percent in 2009. It is particularly difficult to find 
work in the Altai mountain region and east of Lake 
Baikal. Young people, above all, have few prospects. 
In the Tuva Republic, where high fertility rates 
traditionally ensure a continuously growing stock 
of new labour, over a fourth of 20 to 29-year-olds 
are unemployed. Only the Caucasian republics of 
Chechnya and Ingushetia have higher rates.
(Source: Rosstat, 
Trud i Zanyatost 
v Rossii 2009 g., 
Moscow)
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as researchers and developers. In proportion 
to the number of inhabitants, more patent 
applications are registered annually than 
in all other regions of the country, with the 
exception of the cities of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg.346
Among other things, Tomsk has profited from 
the fact that it won a tender by the Russian 
government in 2005 to establish a special 
economic zone of technology-innovative 
type. The tax on profits in such a zone is only 
16 rather than 20 percent and social security 
contributions constitute 14 rather than 25 
percent. Furthermore, corporations do not 
have to pay any real estate tax and they get 
back their value added tax. With 18 similar 
zones, the Kremlin gives various locations 
a chance to exploit their own potential in, 
among others, industry, tourism or trade by 
providing the most advantageous conditions 
as possible to private corporations.
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complex for the smelting of heavy metals. 
The corporation’s smoke stacks still emit 
500 tonnes of copper and nickel oxide 
respectively as well as two million tonnes 
of carbon dioxide annually. At least Norilsk 
Nickel invested several million US dollars in 
its exhaust systems in 2006 and is planning 
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to 400 
tonnes annually by 2015.350
Pollution endangers livelihoods
As a result of extreme pollution, which 
leads primarily to respiratory illnesses, the 
life-expectancy of factory workers is ten 
years lower than the Russian average. The 
city regularly finds itself among the world’s 
ten most polluted places in the world in 
a list drafted by New York’s Blacksmith 
Institute.351 That Norilsk’s inhabitants do not 
leave in greater numbers than they currently 
do is owing to a high average monthly 
wage, which, converted, amounts to 2,100 
international dollars.352 Since social benefits 
are also correspondingly high, Norilsk was 
a popular place for migrants, in particular 
for Central Asians and Southern Caucasians. 
Since 2001, this has changed: under pressure 
by the city’s administration and Norilsk 
Nickel, the then Russian prime minister 
Kasyanov closed the city to foreigners.353
The elderly, in particular, who have for 
decades been breathing toxic air, suffer from 
pollution. Diverse programmes to resettle the 
population, which would enable pensioners 
and the unemployed to move away from the 
inhospitable city, have so far failed.354 The 
financial support is frequently insufficient 
and most people stay in Norilsk because their 
families are there.355
The region around Lake Baikal is much 
more attractive. It lies in the southeast 
of the federal district. With 23,000 cubic 
kilometres of fresh water, the Baikal 
contains more than all of America’s Great 
Lakes taken together. In terms of surface, 
it is only the world’s seventh-largest lake, 
but at 1,620 metres, it is by far the deepest. 
And in contrast to other deep lakes in which 
the lowest depths contain no oxygen or 
biological life, the ground of the Baikal is 
home to a unique if fragile fauna. 
For the approximately one million 
inhabitants of the Baikal region, the lake 
constitutes an important basis of life. But 
amidst the solitude, a battle between the 
environment and industry is being waged 
which the latter has usually won in the past. 
The industrialization of the area began after 
World War II, when the newly-constructed 
railway permitted access to the lake to 
visitors and workers from the European part 
of the country. Above all, the pulp and paper 
mill in Baykalsk founded in 1966 which 
supplies, among other things, the defence 
industry, was a major polluter: the factory 
dumped about 100,000 cubic metres of 
unfiltered toxic sewage in the lake daily.356
In 2008, following a protracted legal battle, 
it seemed that environmental activists 
would succeed in shutting down the factory. 
The environmental protection authorities 
required the company to install a closed 
water circuit in order to stop the flow of 
pollutants. Because the requirements, in 
combination with sinking prices during 
the economic crisis, made business 
unprofitable, the Baikal TsBK temporarily 
closed its doors in October 2008. Not two 
years later, however, Vladimir Putin signed 
a declaration permitting the production 
of pulp and paper without a closed water 
circuit. According to the official version, the 
prime minister had personally inspected the 
water by mini submarine and could attest to 
its cleanliness. 
But the trip to the earth’s deepest lake was 
probably not the only reason for Putin’s 
decision. Baykalsk is the incarnation of one 
of post-Communist Russia’s most sensitive 
topics, namely the future of about 450 so-
called mono-cities which were built around 
single factories during the industrialization 
of the Soviet Union. Today, the existence 
of many of these cities is threatened since 
the life-sustaining corporations, with their 
outdated machines and production methods 
are no longer competitive. A fourth of the 
Russian population lives in mono-cities, 
which constitute 40 percent of nationwide 
industrial production.357 In Baykalsk, one of 
the mono-cities, the paper mill is the only 
large-scale employer for the city’s 14,700 
inhabitants.
The Russian government first tackled the 
problem in 2009, when the economic crisis 
sparked social unrest in the mono-cities. 
A few former employees of the Baykalsk 
paper mill went on a hunger strike, while 
in Pikalevo, near St. Petersburg, where 
the population is primarily employed in 
the cement industry, thousands took to 
the streets to demonstrate. The Kremlin 
immediately created a list of potential 
cities at risk, of which 27 were to be state 
subsidized. The first three names on the 
list were Tolyatti, where the automobile 
manufacturer AvtoVAZ gave rise to the 
largest mono-city, with 700,000 inhabitants, 
as well as Pikalevo and Baykalsk.358 Millions 
in subsidies from the federal budget are 
intended to promote the restructuring of 
local companies in the subsidized cities, to 
create new employment opportunities or, 
as a last resort, to shut down the site and 
resettle the population. Since the last option 
is not particularly popular, the government 
is hoping to maintain jobs in the short-term, 
even if the environment suffers. Whether or 
not this will improve livelihoods on the Baikal 
in the long-term is questionable. 
Right-hand traffic prevails on Russia’s roads. 
Nonetheless, many drivers in the harbour city 
of Vladivostok have their steering wheel on 
the right side. The erroneous seat is the result 
of the mass import of Japanese used cars 
designed for left-hand traffic. For decades, 
the business of importing automobiles 
into Primorsky Krai flourished. This is the 
south-eastern tip of Russia, over 6,000 
kilometres from Moscow but cheek by jowl 
with China, North Korea and the Sea of Japan. 
Russian automobiles were not economically 
competitive because transport from the 
factories west of the Urals was so expensive.
In 2009, the Russian government put an end 
to imports by significantly increasing tariffs 
on automobiles. Shortly thereafter, the state 
Vneshekonombank gave a loan of about 
40 million euros to the Russian automobile 
manufacturer Sollers to build a car 
manufacturing plant in Vladivostok. Vladimir 
Putin personally had jump-started the deal, 
for Moscow had noticed that the economic 
bonds between Russia’s eastern-most federal 
district and the rest of the country had worn 
thin. The domestic economy’s share in the 
entire economy of Khabarovsk Krai, which 
together with Primorsky Krai constitutes the 
social centre of the federal circle, increased 
from 20 to 75 percent in the first ten years 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. At the 
same time, the share of exchange with other 
Russian regions fell from 75 to 10 percent 
while foreign trade increased slightly from 
five to 15 percent.359
It remains a question as to whether or not 
efforts to re-integrate the Far East into the 
Russian economy will succeed. The end of 
the planned economy instigated the fall of 
numerous highly-subsidized production sites 
in the defence and consumer industries. 
People who were once compelled by fixed 
state wage subsidies, longer vacation and 
early pensions to move to one of the many 
small industrial cities in the East now follow 
the incentives of the free market. Under 
these circumstances the Far East is not a 
popular destination – due to insufficient 
infrastructure as well as the high cost of 
living and harsh climatic conditions. In 
areas far away from the coast, in particular, 
a strong continental climate generates 
extreme temperatures in many places. In 
1933, temperatures of minus 68 degrees 
Celsius in the Sakha Republic were recorded 
as the lowest ever in the world outside of the 
Antarctic.
While the 1989 census recorded 7.9 million 
people in the Far East, in 2004 there were 
only 6.6 million.360 This means that almost 
half of Russia’s demographic shrinkage in 
this period can be traced to the Far East, an 
area in which less than five percent of the 
entire Russian population live. The northern 
regions, in particular, experienced a veritable 
exodus: while agriculture, transport and trade 
in the south partially absorbed the industrial 
crisis, people in the north often had no 
FAR EASTERN Federal District
The difficult transition to a market economy
Population in 2010 6.44 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 5.46 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 1
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.58
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 65.9
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 17,919
Mean age in 2010 36.7
(Source: see page 139)
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choice but to leave. The next markets were 
too far away and even subsistence farming 
was impossible in the icy months of winter 
and the miry months of summer. Thus, the 
sparsely-populated Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug lost two-thirds of its inhabitants by 
2004 and Magadan Oblast over half. Entire 
settlements disappeared. Those who left 
were primarily ethnic Russians or Ukrainians 
who first came to the East during the Soviet 
era. In Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, the 
number of Russians dropped from 108,000 
in 1989 to 28,000 in 2002, while the 
number of indigenous people, more strongly 
connected to the region by family and 
tradition, increased slightly.361
Economic structure influences 
population development
Why did the Soviet Union invest vast 
quantities of capital into the settlement of the 
most inhospitable stretches of its empire in 
the first place? The answer lies in part in the 
region’s rich natural resources and in part in 
its military significance during the Cold War. 
The world’s largest known diamond reserves 
can be found on the territory of the Sakha 
Republic, while the Chukotka Peninsula, 
Magadan Oblast as well as Amur Oblast on 
the Chinese border are replete with gold. 
Before the coast, around the Sakhalin Island, 
there are large and to a great extent untapped 
oil and natural gas fields. As for the military, 
the main stronghold of Russia’s Pacific 
Fleet, which served, among other things, 
as a nuclear deterrent against the USA, still 
lies in Vladivostok and in Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatsky on the Kamchatka Peninsula. 
From here, nuclear submarines bearing 
atomic weapons could reach the east coast of 
America within days.
While the military bases in the Far East 
have been scaled down since 1991, the 
exploitation of natural resources remains the 
region’s most important economic branch. 
But because this creates comparatively 
few jobs, not all inhabitants profit equally. 
Because labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries fell into ruin due to the crisis and 
the loss of state subsidies, a large portion 
of the population has no prospects for 
employment. And even those who have found 
work suffer from extremely high prices in 
Russia’s east, where six of the country’s ten 
most expensive regions can be found.362 Even 
though the local administration managed 
to reduce poverty levels significantly with 
transfer payments, an above-average number 
of people in 2009 still had to cover daily 
expenses with an income below the official 
subsistence minimum.363 In the agricultural 
regions east of Lake Baikal – Amur Oblast 
and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast – the rate 
was approximately 25 percent.
In contrast, poverty in Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug fell dramatically, from 50 to 13 percent 
between 2000 and 2007.364 During this 
period, the governor and oligarch Roman 
Abramovich radically overhauled the gold-
producing region. He built schools and 
hospitals, repaired homes and acquired new 
investments. Abramovich also filled public 
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Emigration and mortality surpluses
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, more people have 
been leaving than moving to the Far East every year. 
In the early 1990s, Russia’s easternmost federal 
district lost 100,000 people annually due to out-
migration. Since then, migration has decreased 
substantially since the remaining population is more 
strongly rooted in the region than were the initial 
emigrants, who had often come to the Far East but 
a few years earlier for professional reasons. The 
mortality surplus remained relatively stable in this 
period and is now almost as great as the population 
decrease resulting from emigration.
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coffers with tax revenues from the fortunes 
of Sibneft, his own oil company. Due to 
low tax rates, other companies set up their 
headquarters on the peninsula, without, 
however, expanding their actual activities 
there. The employees of these companies 
nonetheless count as employed people in 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, leading to 
a fictitious employment rate of over 100 
percent. In reality, the rate is well below 
full employment, since a large share of the 
indigenous population still raise reindeer or 
hunt fish and sea mammals, activities not 
often reflected in statistics. The fragility of 
Abramovich’s construction became apparent 
in 2006, when the former governor sold 
Sibneft to Gazrom and the region’s budget as 
well as the scope of investment drastically 
shrunk immediately after.368 Even though 
Abramovich was able to decelerate the 
population loss during his reign, he could not 
turn it around.
The structure of the Far East’s economy, 
providing jobs primarily in traditionally 
male sectors such as the military, resource 
extraction and the fishing industry, has 
had demographic consequences: there is a 
dearth of women. At the beginning of 2008, 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug and Kamchatka 
Krai were the only Russian regions in which 
there were more men than women. In 
particular, in the 20 to 29 age group, which 
is especially important for the starting of 
families, the disproportion was enormous: 
in both regions named above, there are four 
men to three women. The situation is similar 
in Primorsky and Khabarovsk Krais, Sakhalin 
Oblast and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast.369 
Despite a relatively young population, more 
people die in large parts of the Far East 
than are born. Only Sakha Republic and 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug have stable 
birth surpluses, as the large indigenous 
populations contribute to high fertility rates. 
While women in the entire Far East bear an 
average of 1.58 children in their lifetime, 
women in Sakha Republic and Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug have an average of two 
children.370
Despite these exceptions, the demographic 
dynamics in the Far East, compared to the 
Soviet era, have made a 180 degree turn. 
Where once young immigrants created a 
stable birth surplus, today the population 
is losing due to out-migration and mortality 
surpluses. Since the beginning of the century 
the latter are as high as migration losses. A 
few areas, such as Khabarovsk Krai and the 
Jewish Autonomous Oblast, recently recorded 
slight immigration gains since many people 
who wanted to leave the region have already 
done so. 
The Birobidzhan experiment
The Jewish Autonomous Oblast, including the capital city of Birobidzhan, is located in 
southernmost Russia. About 185,000 people live here on the border to China on a piece 
of land roughly as large as Switzerland.365 In spite of the region’s name, the majority of 
the population is not Jewish. The 2002 census counted but 2,327 Jews, which constituted 
1.2 percent of the population. This means that only about every 100th Jewish inhabitant 
of Russia lives in the Jewish autonomous region.366 Even though so few Jews live in the 
territory, Yiddish is taught in schools. There is also a Jewish daily paper and a Jewish 
radio station.
The idea for the autonomous territory arose at the end of the 1920s as a logical 
consequence of Lenin’s policies. He wanted to divide the Soviet Union into territories in 
which various cultures could practice their traditions – within a socialist framework. But 
there were also practical reasons for the founding of Birobidzhan: Judaism and Zionism 
were contrary to state-mandated atheism and soviet nationalism in the early Soviet 
Union. By resettling Jews in far-off and almost uninhabited Siberia, the Kremlin sought to 
solve this problem. Furthermore, the settlers north of the Amur were meant to strengthen 
the border to China and to help access the region’s immeasurable natural resources.
Despite extensive propaganda, Soviet rulers did not manage to convince a significant 
number of Jews to move east from the European part of the country. The small province 
at the southernmost tip of the country experienced something like a boom only at the 
end of World War II and prior to the founding of Israel. The 30,000 Jewish inhabitants 
– a third of the population – in 1948 constituted the peak of this development. Then, 
within a decade, the territory lost more than half of its Jewish population.367 In the wake 
of Stalin’s ethnic cleansings, which had already adversely affected the region in the 
1930s, the Soviet rulers closed down schools and detained numerous intellectuals and 
clergy. Additionally, Israeli independence gave Jews an alternative homeland to flee to, 
as long as the state permitted. This increasingly became the case. There remained an 
autonomous Jewish territory with almost no Jews.
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The Far East loses most
Compared to the national average, all regions of 
the Far East have lost a disproportionately high 
share of their populations since 1990. This is 
particularly true of Magadan Oblast and Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug. Both have lost well over half of 
their inhabitants. While the demographic shrinkage 
in the 1990s was due mainly to out-migration, 
mortality surpluses have been responsible for 
losses in recent years. At the same time, the 
shrinking process has been slowing down. By 
2030, the negative trend will nonetheless probably 
continue in all regions and maybe even accelerate, 
as the population is ageing.
(Source: Rosstat, Predpolizhitelnaya Chislennost Naseleniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii 
do 2030 goda, Moscow)
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Life expectancy, on the other hand, 
remains comparably low despite recent 
improvements. Male life expectancy in 
Russia’s east is 60 years, which is shorter 
than in Yemen, Madagascar and Cambodia. 
Women have an average life expectancy of 
72.2 years, which is still two-and-half years 
less than the nationwide average.371
There are several reasons for low life 
expectancy in the Far East. Average alcohol 
consumption is higher here than the Russian 
standard, which is itself high, and the harsh 
climate also plays a role. Furthermore, infant 
mortality rates of 10.5 deaths per 1,000 live 
births lie well above the Russian average 
of 8.1. The average in the European Union 
is less than five.372 Although the numbers 
have improved in recent years, agricultural 
regions, such as Amur Oblast and the 
Jewish Autonomous Oblast, lag significantly 
behind due to insufficient medical care. 
And tuberculosis is once again on the 
march, affecting primarily the indigenous 
population. In Koryak Autonomous Area, 
which has been incorporated into Kamchatka 
Krai, three times as many people die of 
tuberculosis than in the rest of the country.373
The “Yellow Peril”
Even if the military significance of the Far 
East has decreased since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, many Russians still view the uniform 
settlement of their territory as extremely 
important in order to maintain control of 
the entire Eurasian land mass. That the Far 
East currently contains 6.5 million people 
in a territory ten times the size of France 
worries many Russians. In the face of low 
fertility rates, massive immigration is the 
only thing which could change the situation. 
But where should immigrants come from 
if even Russians are turning their backs to 
the Far East? Efforts to attract Russians 
returning from other former Soviet republics 
have not proven successful.374 This leaves 
international immigration, for example, from 
China. After all, on the other side of the Amur 
River, which demarcates the Russian-Chinese 
border, more than 100 million people live in 
the three north-eastern provinces of China 
alone.375 It is estimated that per kilometre 
of border there are 63,000 Chinese to one 
Russian.376 But this is where the dilemma 
arises: many Russians see the Chinese as a 
major threat.
To understand the reasons for Russia’s fear 
of its neighbour, we need to take a look at 
the history of both countries. They first came 
into conflict at the end of the 17th century 
in today’s Amur Oblast and Primorsky Krai. 
The Chinese Qing Dynasty at first gained 
the upper hand, blocking Russian access 
to the Pacific. But Russia’s expansionist 
policies continued and they annexed the lost 
territories of Outer Manchuria to the Czarist 
Empire in 1860. In order to cement its 
hegemony north of the Amur and east of the 
Usuri, Russia created the city of Vladivostok 
following a successful campaign. The name 
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of the city, which essentially means “Rule 
the East,” did not leave any doubt as to the 
Czar’s intentions. At the beginning of the 
20th century, the Russian occupation of Inner 
Manchuria nonetheless failed south of the 
Amur after Japan entered the conflict. Most 
recently, China and the former Soviet Union 
stood at the brink of war in 1969, when 
military conflicts over the status of small 
islands in the Usuri River flared. It was only 
in 2004 that the former president Vladimir 
Putin and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao 
put an end to the conflict. Russia ceded two 
of the last three islands of undetermined 
status to China and the two countries divided 
the third.
Even though there is now, for the first time 
in history, a clearly-defined border between 
Russia and China, many Russians still see 
their neighbours to the south as a “yellow 
peril.” The Russian media conjure figures 
of two million Chinese who have allegedly 
settled in the Far East as part of a Chinese 
plot to colonize the region.377 According to 
many experts, the number of Chinese who 
have settled permanently in the north in 
hopes of earning more only approaches 
about some hundreds of thousands.378 
Moreover, more than a third of these claimed 
in 1999 to want to stay only as long as 
their current employment contracts were 
valid or until their studies in Russia were 
completed.379
Many Chinese, on the other hand, do not 
settle at all in Russia. They simply cross the 
border in order to ply their cheaply-produced 
wares on the markets of Vladivostok 
and Khabarovsk – primarily clothes and 
foodstuffs. Here, they can net higher prices 
than they can in their homeland and cover 
supply shortages, which have increased 
steadily in the Far East since the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Even though the Russian 
government has prohibited foreigners from 
street-selling since 2007, these so-called 
“shuttle traders” remain ubiquitous in the 
cities of the Far East. Consequently, they are 
much more strongly perceived by the Russian 
population than their actual population 
numbers warrant. Indeed, the Chinese 
population made up a far larger share of the 
total population before Stalin’s ethnic purges 
in the 1930s than it does today.380
Exodus following the demise of the 
planned economy
The demise of the Soviet planned economy hit the 
country’s eastern territories particularly hard. The 
loss of subsidies, wage supplements and social 
benefits made the region increasingly unattractive to 
live in. Accordingly, all territories of the Far East have 
had to face population loss as a result of emigration 
since the beginning of the 1990s. In particular, 
the cold northern regions have suffered from the 
emptying of entire stretches of land: Magadan Oblast 
has lost a third of its population to emigration since 
1993 and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug over half of 
its population.
Population loss due to 
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(Source: Rosstat, Tsentralnaya Baza 
Statisticheskikh Dannykh, Moscow, 
author’s calculations)
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Employment structure in Primorsky 
Krai, 1990 and 2004, in percentages
The “Yellow Hope”
Despite the tariff increase and extensive 
scepticism towards Chinese immigrants, 
Russia’s economic rapprochement with 
its neighbour in the Pacific is progressing. 
Accordingly, in September 2009, Russian 
and Chinese leaders gave the go-ahead for 
a project which plans to realize 205 joint 
projects in border regions. By 2018, coal, 
iron ore, precious metals and wood will 
be extracted from the Russian side and, 
subsequently, used for production purposes 
in China, where there is no shortage of 
labour or money.381 Furthermore, Russian 
and Chinese authorities established a 
joint international free trade zone in 2005 
between the Russian city of Blagoveshchensk 
to the north and the Chinese city of Heihe 
to the south of the Amur. This has led to a 
veritable boom in the trade of articles of daily 
use. 
The most economically significant industries 
in Russia’s relations to its neighbouring 
countries in the Pacific are the capital-
intensive oil and gas industries. In 2009, 
construction of the so-called Nakhodka 
pipeline began, which will transport Siberian 
oil from the Baikal region to the Sea of Japan. 
From there, the oil will be shipped to Japan. 
China will also profit from this project: via 
a branch to Daqing, Russia will deliver 15 
million tonnes of oil annually to its southern 
neighbour, with which it also signed an 
agreement for two natural gas pipelines in 
2006.382
Far more important for the Far East as a 
production site are the oil and gas industries 
in the inhospitable Sakhalin Oblast. Both 
the Czars and the Soviets used the island 
primarily as a prison camp. The Sakhalin-2 
project in the Sea of Okhotsk north of Japan, 
which has been in the hands of Gazprom 
since 2006 and is subject to fierce criticism 
by environmental organizations, is the 
world’s largest integrated project for the 
production of liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
In contrast to its gaseous counterpart, LNG 
can be shipped. Main buyers of the Sakhalin 
products are Japan and South Korea.
Even though 95 percent of tax revenues from 
oil and gas production flow towards Moscow 
and the companies increasingly depend upon 
foreign expertise to build wells and pipelines, 
many inhabitants of Sakhalin, particularly 
those in the capital of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 
have profited from the natural resources 
boom. The unemployment rate, one of the 
country’s highest at 13.2 percent at the turn 
of this century, had fallen by 2007 to under 
five percent – it rose again, however, in the 
wake of the economic crisis in 2009. Work 
on the construction sites of the emerging 
infrastructure, which was also intended 
to make the island accessible to tourists, 
provides about 500,000 inhabitants with 
an alternative to fishing and the hunt for 
Kamchatka crabs. Real income has also risen: 
from 2002 to 2009, it increased from 440 to 
1,018 international dollars per capita.383
Saying good-bye to illusions
The oil and gas boom notwithstanding, fewer 
people will live in Sakhalin in the upcoming 
years. Projections predict that the island 
will lose over 100,000 inhabitants by 2030, 
a fourth of its current population. Only the 
northern region of Magadan, which can only 
be reached by unpaved roads or airplane, 
will be harder hit by shrinkage in the Far 
Eastern Federal District. Russia’s largest 
district (in terms of surface) will continue 
to have the smallest population by far. With 
slightly falling fertility rates, the number of 
inhabitants will decrease another 15 percent 
to 5.46 million by 2030. As everywhere else 
Industry
Agriculture
Construction
Transportation
Trade
Education, culture, social welfare
Other
A crisis facing industry and construction
Primorsky Krai epitomizes the post-Soviet crisis in the Far East and Russia. Many former combines were not 
able to survive without state subsidies, which meant that employment in the industrial sector sank significantly 
in the 15 years following the fall of the Soviet Union. In Primorsky Krai, it was primarily the defence industry 
which lost in importance. Construction also suffered in the wake of mass emigration. On the contrary, trade 
is growing throughout the country. The diagram does not depict the shadow economy which sustains many 
people in Primorsky Krai.
(Source: Nezavisimy Institut Sotsialnoi Politiki, Sotsialny Atlas Rossiskikh Regionov)
in Russia, the working-age population will 
be hit particularly hard: the number of men 
between 16 and 59 years old and women 
between 16 and 54 years old will shrink by 
about 23 percent.384
Both Khabarovsk Krai and Primorsky Krai will 
remain regional centres. More than half of 
the district’s population already live in these 
regions today. In contrast to the rest of the 
Far East, both regions have clear advantages: 
they are located in temperate climate zones, 
they are connected to the rest of the country 
by the Trans-Siberian Railway and they 
have the best educational institutions. With 
western capital, the pride of Russia’s civil 
aviation industry, the Super Jet 100, is now 
being built in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. In order 
to attract foreign capital long-term, however, 
Far Eastern regions, and Primorsky Krai in 
particular, need to rigorously fight corruption 
and economic crime.
Russian politicians will undoubtedly have 
to relinquish fantasies of dense settlement 
in the Far East. Without state support, many 
companies which the Soviets settled in the 
east for geo-political reasons cannot survive. 
There is a dearth of both people and financial 
power. Regional planners seem to have 
recognized that their economically powerful 
Asian neighbours could help as investors. But 
they find it harder to accept immigration. In 
the long-term, they will nonetheless have to 
get used to Chinese and Korean immigration, 
first, because they will soon experience a 
shortage of labour and secondly, because 
earning opportunities in Russia, which is rich 
in natural resources, are better than they are 
in China.
Demography Economy
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URAL Federal District
RUS56 Kurgan Oblast 4 1.61 18.5 67.4 – 4.1 3 7,744 0.2 64.8 – 22.1
RUS57 Sverdlovsk Oblast 3 1.55 17.3 68.4 2.0 2 13,569 1.1 69.6 – 10.2
RUS58 Tyumen Oblast 5 1.75 9.1 69.5 2.4 1 46,628 0.2 76.5 5.6
RUS59 Chelyabinsk Oblast 3 1.57 17.4 68.3 1.2 2 12,947 0.9 71.1 – 11.8
SIBERIAN Federal District
RUS60 Altai Republic 5 2.36 10.7 65.8 0.7 3 5,726 0.2 68.0 10.8
RUS61 Republic of Buryatia 4 2.00 12.5 65.3 – 2.7 4 8,196 0.3 62.5 – 8.6
RUS62 Tuva Republic 5 2.81 7.4 60.0 – 5.1 4 5,136 0.5 52.0 13.0
RUS63 Republic of Khakassia 4 1.75 14.4 67.3 0.5 3 9,226 0.1 66.2 – 6.6
RUS64 Altai Krai 3 1.51 17.2 68.5 – 1.9 3 7,688 0.3 64.2 – 15.6
RUS65 Krasnoyarsk Krai 3 1.54 14.6 67.6 0.2 3 15,051 0.6 70.9 – 11.5
RUS66 Irkutsk Oblast 4 1.77 14.4 65.5 – 2.2 3 11,608 0.6 67.5 – 11.0
RUS67 Kemerovo Oblast 3 1.60 16.3 65.4 2.5 3 15,001 0.1 68.2 – 12.3
RUS68 Novosibirsk Oblast 3 1.54 17.5 68.9 2.8 2 10,869 2.1 70.3 – 10.4
RUS69 Omsk Oblast 3 1.49 16.1 68.7 – 0.3 2 12,503 0.7 67.9 – 12.1
RUS70 Tomsk Oblast 3 1.41 14.5 68.1 3.0 2 14,468 1.8 67.4 – 6.3
RUS71 Zabaykalsky Krai 4 1.84 12.3 64.7 – 3.1 3 8,387 0.1 64.1 – 10.9
FAR EASTERN Federal District
RUS72 Sakha (Yakutia) Republic 4 2.00 8.8 66.5 – 6.2 3 14,585 0.4 72.8 – 3.9
RUS73 Primorsky Krai 4 1.47 16.1 66.7 – 1.4 2 8,142 1.2 70.0 – 19.4
RUS74 Khabarovsk Krai 4 1.49 14.9 66.3 0.2 3 9,384 0.3 73.8 – 12.9
RUS75 Amur Oblast 4 1.56 13.9 64.4 – 3.6 3 8,844 0.2 70.4 – 17.0
RUS76 Kamchatka Krai 4 1.50 11.7 66.1 – 5.2 2 8,336 1.3 72.9 – 17.2
RUS77 Magadan Oblast 4 1.51 10.6 64.1 – 13.3 2 11,540 1.9 75.3 – 23.0
RUS78 Sakhalin Oblast 4 1.51 13.2 64.8 – 4.7 1 27,406 0.2 78.7 – 20.9
RUS79 Jewish Autonomous Oblast 4 1.53 13.7 63.3 0.2 3 8,057 0.1 63.7 – 13.5
RUS80 Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 4 2.01 5.9 58.2 – 12.7 1 19,190 0.1 101.3 – 18.1
Asian Russia 87
Data for the Asian part of Russia
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Since the eastern enlargements of the Euro-
pean Union in 2004 and 2007, the western 
Soviet successor states have bordered EU 
countries. The three Baltic states have even 
become part of the Union. This has resulted 
in profound changes for the entire region: 
more and more people, from the Baltic Eu-
ropean Union states as well as from Ukraine 
and Moldova, go west in search of work, 
since – especially in the latter two countries 
– the enormous economic and social changes 
caused by the Soviet Union’s collapse con-
tinue to reverberate. These countries have 
not entirely managed to liberate themselves 
(Source: Derschawni Komitet Statistiki Ukraini; 
 United Nations, World Population Prospects: 
The 2008 Revision Population Database, New 
York;  Demoscope Weekly. Vsesoyuznaya Perepis 
 Naseleniya 1989 Goda, Moscow)
1989 (census) until the end of 2009
Beginning of 2010 to the end of 2030
Population change in percentages
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BELARUS
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
UKRAINE
THE WEST
* All national values (Belarus, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania) for 2009 and 2030 refer to 1 July of the fol-
lowing year, not the end of the year in question. For the 
beginning of 2010, the value of 1 July 2010 was used for 
reasons of availability of data.
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Demographic downturn in the hinterlands of the EU
The western regions of the former Soviet Union are shrinking, virtually without 
exception. Emigration is an important factor in this, although the numbers of 
children also lie well below the 2.1 children per woman which would ensure stable 
population development. Stability or even population growth is limited to but 
a few cities. One exception is the rural area of Volhynia in the country’s outer 
reaches of the northwest. With 1.87 children per woman, it has the country’s 
second highest fertility rate after neighbouring Rivne Oblast. Alongside these, 
regions such as the Black Sea coast near Odessa or the Crimean Peninsula, which 
are attractive to tourists, will lose relatively few people. 
(Source: Dershkomstat; 
United Nations, World 
Population Prospects: 
The 2008 Revision 
Population Database, 
New York)*
Population change 
from 2010 to 2030 in 
percentages
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from Russia’s influence, however. Ukraine 
and Belarus are important transit-stations for 
Russian natural gas. And many labour mi-
grants from the eastern parts of these coun-
tries are attracted to Russia’s large cities. 
All of these developments are taking place 
against a backdrop of extremely low numbers 
of children and a rapid ageing of society, 
which also affects the comparatively wealthy 
Baltic states. Massive population losses can 
be expected almost everywhere. 
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* The regional population projections for Ukraine are 
based on the medium variant of national calculations. 
These correspond most closely to the United Nations’ 
projections used for the other countries. 
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“We walked over water because we did not 
know it was impossible.” This was said by 
the former Estonian prime minister Mart 
Laar regarding his country’s first bold steps 
towards a market economy.385 At the tender 
age of 32, the former teacher took hold of the 
reigns of the northernmost Baltic republic in 
1992, shortly following independence. Under 
Laar’s leadership, Estonia rigorously pursued 
western policies, was the first European 
country to introduce a uniform income tax 
rate and pegged the Estonian kroon to the 
euro. Together with its Baltic neighbours, 
Estonia became a member of the EU in 2004. 
As a result of Laar’s reform programme, the 
Estonian economy, adjusted for price level 
increases, grew an average of eight percent 
annually between 2000 and 2007.386 In the 
World Economic Forum rankings of the most 
competitive countries in 2009/2010, Estonia 
was 35th. Germany ranked only 133rd.387
Yet the economic and financial crisis hit 
Estonia hard. In 2009, GDP fell by 14 
percent. The unemployment rate, which had 
been less than four percent at the beginning 
of 2008, rose again to over 15 percent by the 
end of 2009.388 The construction industry, 
which had ballooned during the boom period, 
lost thousands of jobs. Those who were laid 
off will find it difficult in the future to regain 
a foothold in the labour market without 
re-training or additional qualifications. 
Nonetheless, Estonia came through the 
recession in better shape than its Baltic 
neighbours. Thanks to quickly-implemented 
and severe cuts in domestic expenditures, 
it was able to adopt the euro in 2011. Even 
in 2009, the year of the crisis, Estonia had 
a budget deficit of a mere 1.7 percent and 
a sovereign debt of 7.2 percent of GDP, the 
lowest in the European Union by far.389
In the past few years, Estonia has moder-
nized at an astounding pace. The country is 
especially proud of its quick and extensive 
expansion of electronic communication 
technology, such as e-learning and 
e-government. In 2005, Estonia held 
local elections using online voting for the 
first time; an electronic ID was sufficient 
to identify voters. Bank transactions 
and income tax declarations can also be 
extensively executed electronically since 
the country created a programme in 1997 
to introduce nationwide wireless internet 
access. Since 2000, all Estonians have 
enjoyed the fundamental right to free 
Internet access. Estonians have been able to 
surf on ships and in trains and buses for free 
for years. 
Due to its “Tiger’s Leap” programme 
introducing modern information technology, 
Estonia has a strong services sector in which 
over 60 percent of the employed work. This 
is significantly more than in most other 
former Eastern Bloc countries.390 Up until 
the outbreak of the economic crisis, the 
construction and tourist industries counted 
among the most strongly growing economic 
sectors. At times, tourism generated up to 15 
percent of GDP. It is primarily Finns, Swedes 
and Russians who are interested in Estonian 
tourism, as well as in trade and investment.391
Tiger’s leap into @-stonia
ESTONIA
Population in 2010 1.34 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 1.30 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 30
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.64
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 73.1
Annual net migration 2005-2010 0
Median age in 2010 39.6
(Source: see page 139)
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To visitors, Estonia is a paradise of endless 
forest and sparsely-populated stretches 
of land. But the Soviet’s planned economy 
has left grave environmental problems. For 
example, about 90 percent of electricity 
produced in Estonia comes from the burning 
of native oil shale in open-pit mines.392 
Large power plants puff away especially 
in the industrial city of Kohtla-Järve, in the 
country’s northeast. Worldwide, only China 
continues to depend so extensively on 
such a filthy method of generating energy, 
in which aggressive sulphur dioxide and 
gases containing heavy metals are released. 
A governmental programme now aims, 
however, to significantly reduce the quantity 
of oil shale in generating energy.393 In order 
not to become too dependent upon Russian 
oil and gas supplies, the Estonians have 
already laid the first underwater electric 
cable to Finland. The “Eastlink 2”, another 
650 watt cable, is planned to follow by 2014. 
The European Union wants to invest up to 
100 million euros in the cable.394 
Integration problems
Up until the Second World War, Estonia 
was a relatively ethnically homogenous 
country with 88 percent ethnic Estonians. 
Subsequently, the Soviet leadership pursued 
the immigration of Russians and the share of 
Estonians sank to a mere 61 percent by 1989. 
Since then, it has once again risen to 69 
percent, especially because Russians have 
emigrated.395 In 1991, all non-Estonians who 
had entered the country since the “Soviet 
occupation” – a third of the population – 
received a permanent residency permit. 
However, only those who can demonstrate 
sufficient knowledge of Estonian are granted 
Estonian citizenship. Almost 150,000 people 
have so far become Estonian citizens.396
There are, nonetheless, integration problems 
with regard to the ethnic Russian population, 
particularly among adolescents. The boom 
of the past few years may have obscured 
discrimination, but the economic crisis 
and increasing unemployment have once 
again brought it to light. Yet, already in 
2005, shortly before the economic boom 
peaked, the unemployment rate among 
non-Estonian youth was three times as 
high as among Estonian youth. One reason 
for this was that more than half of non-
Estonians – meaning those who are not 
citizens – cannot communicate in Estonian. 
The social marginalization of ethnic Russian 
youth is also revealed by the spread of Aids. 
Starting in Narva, the country’s third-largest 
city right on the border of Russia and in 
which almost 90 percent of the population 
is Russian-speaking, HIV has rapidly spread 
to other parts of the country since 2000. As 
everywhere else in the post-Soviet region, 
this is primarily due to injecting drug users.397
In other areas, Estonia bears greater 
resemblance to Central European countries, 
where demographic crises following the fall 
of the Soviet Union were less drastic than 
in most of the CIS countries. The average 
number of children per woman did, indeed, 
sink in the mid-1990s to 1.3, but increased 
again to 1.65 in 2008. This was the highest 
rate in all of Europe east of the former 
Iron Curtain.398 The natural population 
development, which, due to more deaths 
than births, deteriorated significantly since 
the beginning of the 1990s, has now once 
again achieved balance. This is also due to 
the fact that the large generations of the 
1980s are now old enough to start families. 
Nonetheless, the most recent population 
projections predict a slight population 
decrease of about three percent by 2030, 
because the future generation of parents has 
already shrunk significantly due to a shortage 
of births in the past few years.399
 
Northern Europe is well connected
69 percent of all Estonian adults are online. 
This is more than in any other Soviet 
successor state and even more than in France 
or Germany. It is only in Europe’s north, in 
the Scandinavian countries, Great Britain 
and the Netherlands that a larger portion of 
the population has access to Internet than in 
the small country on the Gulf of Finland. 
Percentage of adults with access to 
Internet, 2010
(Source: GfK Austria, Central Eastern 
Europe Network. Aura presentation in 
London, May 2010)
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2009 was a fateful year for Latvia. The 
Baltic country’s GDP dipped by almost 19 
percent. No other EU country fell so deep as 
a consequence of the global financial and 
economic crisis; only neighbouring Lithuania 
experienced an equally strong undertow.400 
In February 2009, the Latvian government 
had to step down as a result of the crisis. In 
December, Latvia’s insolvency could only be 
avoided by a 7.5 billion euro loan from the 
International Monetary Fund. The “Baltic 
Tiger’s” great leap forward almost ended in 
national bankruptcy; up to 2008, the country 
had still registered economic growth rates of 
over ten percent.
Upon independence in 1991, Latvia emerged 
as one the wealthiest countries from the 
former Soviet Union.401 This was also why 
the country managed its “return to the West” 
fairly quickly: in 1992, Latvia joined the 
International Monetary Fund, in 1999 the 
World Trade Organization and in 2004 both 
NATO and the European Union.
Yet in the last few years, the country has lived 
well beyond its means. The economic boom 
at the beginning of the new century did, 
indeed, temporarily lower unemployment 
rates, but because skilled labour grew 
scarce, wages rose drastically. High inflation 
was the result, reaching its peak at 15 
percent in the summer of 2008.402 The 
belief in the country’s rise was so strong 
that people continued to live on credit. 
Between 2004 and 2006, some banks 
even offered customers loans when the 
monthly repayments were as much as half of 
disposable income. When the economic crisis 
destroyed many jobs and reduced incomes, 
many Latvians could not pay back their 
debts. The unemployment rate exploded at 
the beginning of 2010 to 20 percent, an EU 
record.403 Property prices plummeted during 
the crisis by about 50 percent.404 
The proceeds from Latvia’s most important 
export commodities – foodstuffs, wood, 
furniture and metal goods – could not 
replace the once flowing loans. Pressured by 
international creditors, the government had 
to introduce drastic cuts: the salaries of state 
employees were cut back by about 15 percent 
and civil service jobs were reduced. Value-
added tax was increased according to the 
commodity by anywhere from three to eleven 
percent to a uniform 21 percent. Ministerial, 
university and public institutional budgets 
were reduced by up to 40 percent. The 
upcoming years may also face higher taxes, 
further debt, sinking public expenditures, 
lower wages and fewer jobs. 
Latvians becoming more important
In 1939, the two foreign ministers Joachim 
von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov 
assigned Latvia and neighbouring Estonia to 
the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence in the 
wake of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression 
Pact. Lithuania was obtained one month 
later in a swap involving parts of Poland. This 
was the cornerstone of the incorporation 
of the three Baltic states into the Soviet 
Union in 1940. Stalin immediately deported 
Great rise, deep fall
LATVIA
(Source: see page 139)
Population in 2010 2.24 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 2.05 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 35
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.40
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 72.4
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 2,000
Median age in 2010 40.0
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tens of thousands of nationalists, property 
owners and deposed officials to Siberia. 
In all Baltic states, marked opposition to 
membership in the Soviet Union grew, 
leading to a bloody, years-long partisan 
battle following the German occupation from 
1941 to 1944.  In order to gain control of the 
situation, Stalin initiated a second wave of 
Siberian deportations of more than 100,000 
Baltic citizens in 1949. Others escaped 
imprisonment by fleeing to the West as the 
Kremlin stationed more and more Russian 
labourers and military in the Baltic. Up until 
the end of the 1980s, the Latvian population 
in the former Latvian Soviet Socialist 
Republic fell from its pre-war 75 percent to 
about 50 percent.
There was a turn-around following the 
demise of the Soviet Union. Ethnic Russians 
were now emigrating and a few thousand 
Belarusians and Ukrainians also left the 
country so that the Latvian population rose 
once again to 60 percent.405 Migration was 
encouraged by both open and disguised 
discrimination of non-Latvians. For example, 
until 1994, citizenship laws made all non-
Latvians stateless and prevented them 
from voting. This clause was only abolished 
when international pressure was brought to 
bear as well as to fulfil a prerequisite for EU 
membership. Nonetheless, whoever wants to 
become a citizen must still master Latvian. 
This is not a matter of course for Russians. 
Still, every child born in Latvia to non-Latvian 
parents now automatically receives Latvian 
citizenship. 
The investment and economic boom at the 
beginning of the 21st century almost led to a 
standstill in emigration in Latvia. Between 
2003 and 2005, the country had an annual 
net emigration of about 1,000 people. 
The country’s entry into the EU and, most 
recently, the economic crisis, have now 
led once again to a significant increase in 
emigration. In 2009, 4,700 left the country, 
meaning that emigration once again reached 
the levels of 1998 through 2001. Russia 
remains the main destination, followed now 
by Ireland, Great Britain and Germany.406 
The number of newborns also sank due to 
the uncertainties of 2009, from just about 
24,000 to 21,700. According to the National 
Statistical Office, the total fertility rate fell 
within a year from 1.45 to 1.32. Fluctuations 
in birth rates are something, however, which 
Latvians have had to get used to for a while: 
while there were two children per woman 
towards the end of the Soviet era, fertility 
fell in the first years after the Soviet Union’s 
demise to an absolute low of 1.11 before 
rising again until 2008. These fluctuations 
led to a “birth gap” in the 1990s, when 
18,000 more people died annually than were 
born.407 This means that young people who 
could be starting their own families will soon 
be sorely missed. This is also why Latvia’s 
population will probably shrink by ten 
percent by 2030, from today’s 2.25 to a mere 
2.04 million people.408 Since 1989, Latvia’s 
population has already decreased by more 
than 15 percent from over 2.6 million. 
About a third of the population live in Riga, 
the capital. The next-largest city, Daugavpils, 
which lies on the Daugava River, has but 
105,000 inhabitants and Liepaja, in the 
country’s far west on the Gulf of Finland, has 
just 85,000 inhabitants even though it is the 
country’s third-largest city.409
EU membership and economic crisis lead 
to increasing emigration
Following massive emigration by ethnic Russians in 
the 1990s, which constituted up to 60,000 people 
annually, emigration from Latvia ceased almost 
entirely in the economic boom years. Most recently, 
however, migration losses have again risen slightly. 
The reason for this is, on the one hand, Latvia’s 
membership in the EU, which has made it easier for 
inhabitants to settle in Western Europe, and, on the 
other hand, the grave recession in 2009, which sent 
many citizens on the search for work abroad. 
Immigration and 
emigration in Latvia, 
1998 to 2009
(Source: Latvijas 
Statistika, Online 
Database, Riga)
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On 14 June 2004, the Lithuanian government 
passed the “National Strategy of Overcoming 
the Consequences of Ageing”. The document, 
containing 176 points, has established 
that older people should receive a suitable 
income, participate longer in working life 
and receive the best-possible access to 
health and social benefits in order to lead an 
independent, fulfilling life.410 That Lithuania’s 
government is concerned about the question 
of a long life and an ageing population is the 
consequence of a comparably high standard 
of development, inherited from the Soviet 
era, which made entry to the EU for the three 
Baltic states possible already in 2004. 
Although the number of people over 59, in 
proportion to Lithuania’s total population, 
is, at 20.9 percent, currently lower than in 
Western Europe, these measures have by 
no means been taken prematurely. In the 
upcoming decades, Lithuanian society will 
age more quickly than most other European 
countries. In 2050, about 38 percent of the 
population will most likely be 60 or older. 
Lithuania will then count among Europe’s 
oldest societies.411 
Such rapid ageing is explained by the fact 
that the primarily Catholic Lithuanians, 
while they had many children during the 
Soviet era, now have low fertility rates, even 
when compared to their primarily Protestant 
neighbours to the north. Within twelve 
years, the average number of children per 
woman fell from over two in 1990 to 1.23 
in 2002. It then began to recover gradually 
and is now 1.55.412 Even though a part of the 
intermediary low can be traced to the fact 
that young women temporarily put off their 
desires for children, there will be a growing 
number of older people in proportion to 
young people in the future. This will be 
exacerbated by the emigration of primarily 
young people.
Despite all progress in social policy and 
economic development, the position of older 
people has deteriorated in Lithuania. For 
example, the EU estimated that the risk of 
poverty for people over 64 years old was 
17 percent in 2005; within three years, it 
then rose to 30 percent. In the same period, 
the risk of poverty for working-age people 
decreased from 20 to 17 percent due to an 
improving economy. The relative position of 
the elderly thus deteriorated.* But even using 
absolute criteria reveals insufficiencies: 
looking at the “Material Deprivation Rate”, 
also documented by the EU and which takes 
into account non-monetary indicators such as 
access to warm water, quality of nutritional 
intake and possession of household goods, 
more old people (37 percent) are deemed 
poor than in the relative poverty-risk 
estimation. In the EU the situation is worse 
only in Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and 
Poland.413 
The increased poverty risk can be traced to 
the fact that pension growth in the boom 
years until 2008 could not keep pace 
with the growth of household income. In 
order to prevent the costs for the steadily 
rising number of pensioners from getting 
out of hand, the Lithuanian government 
already passed a comprehensive pension 
reform in 1995: it increased the pension 
age by two-and-half years and five years 
respectively to 62.5 years for men and 60 
years for women and it also increased the 
number of contribution years required for 
pension claims. It later added a voluntary 
funded component to the traditional pay-
as-you-go system, of which a large portion 
of the population has been able to take 
advantage.414
The challenge of an ageing society
LITHUANIA
(Source: see page 139)
* According to EU criteria, every person earning less 
than 60 percent of a country’s median income is at risk 
of poverty. The measure allows no conclusions on the 
absolute level of poverty in a country.
Population in 2010 3.26 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 2.91 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 50
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.34
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 71.7
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 20,000
Median age in 2010 39.8
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In addition to pension reform, Lithuania 
has created a series of labour market 
programmes to address the problem of 
demographic ageing. Its employment 
promotion law of 2006 guarantees 
preference for people over 49 in training 
programmes and access to many civil 
service jobs. It also subsidizes employers 
who hire older people. These measures have 
successfully increased the employment rate 
of the population between 55 and 64 years 
to 51.6 percent, which is five points more 
than the EU average.415 Men have enjoyed 
disproportionate success, which is, however, 
only in part due to their higher pension age. 
Integrating older female employees into the 
labour market better, for example by creating 
greater opportunities for part-time work, is 
an important task for the future. 
Further improvements in labour market 
conditions will also be necessary since 
Lithuania, measured in terms of the 
number of inhabitants, revealed the highest 
migration loss of all EU member states four 
years after entry to the Union. According 
to official figures, emigration exceeds 
immigration by 10,000 people annually; 
in reality, it is probably up to three times 
that many.416 The migrants go, above all, to 
Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden in search 
of work; countries which entirely opened 
their labour markets to migrants from new 
member states immediately following the 
EU’s eastern enlargement in 2004. In 2011, 
when the free movement of labour will be 
established all over the EU, migration could 
even temporarily intensify. In contrast, many 
migrants from the east are already trying to 
gain access to the Schengen area by way of 
Lithuania.417 Combined with people returning 
from other EU countries, these could even 
lead to migration gains for Lithuania in the 
medium-term. The experience of Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland shows that economic 
developments inspired by EU membership 
can transform traditional emigration 
countries into immigration countries. 
Varied integration success
At the beginning of 2010, 3.33 million 
people lived in Lithuania, about as many 
as live in Berlin. This was 360,000 fewer 
than in 1990, when Lithuania was the first 
country to secede from the Soviet Union. 
The population decrease was greatest in the 
eastern regions of Utena and Panevezys, 
where between ten and 15 percent fewer 
people live today than did 15 years ago. The 
number of older people is also higher here 
than elsewhere. 
A large share of the Polish minority also lives 
in the country’s east, in the rural regions 
around the capital of Vilnius. With 200,000 
people, the Polish minority is larger than 
the Russian minority.418 Polish settlement 
of Lithuania began in the 14th century, when 
the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jogaila married 
the Polish heiress to the throne, upon 
which followed a 400-year state union. 
The marriage turned Lithuanians – up until 
that point, Europe’s last heathens – into 
Catholics. Unlike Estonians and Latvians, 
they did not convert to Protestantism during 
the Reformation. It was only in the wake of 
the Partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th 
century that Lithuania fell into the Czarist 
Empire’s sphere of influence. It remained 
under Russian and then Soviet occupation, 
with the exception of the period between the 
First and Second World Wars, until 1990.
Despite long-lasting foreign occupation, 
Lithuania today is a relatively ethnically 
homogenous country. After all, 83 percent 
of the population hail from the titular 
people.419 In contrast to the other Baltic 
countries, their relationship to the Russian 
minority is relatively good, which is also 
due to the fact that the latter is quite small.* 
There is more often tension with the Polish 
Lithuania is ageing faster
Lithuania’s population is currently markedly younger 
than the EU average and, in particular, the “old” 
Western European member states (EU 15). Due to 
drastically falling numbers of children and expected 
increases in life expectancy, this will change in the 
future. As of about 2040, the number of people aged 
60 and older will be higher in Lithuania than the 
EU average. This means that Lithuania will take the 
same path of development as many other Central and 
Eastern European countries. 
Percentages of people 
over 59 years of age in 
the entire population 
of the EU 27, EU 15 and 
Lithuania, 2008 to 2050
(Source: Eurostat)
EU 27
Lithuania
EU 15
* Reasons for the limited immigration of ethnic 
Russians during the Soviet era are the low degree of 
industrialization in Lithuania and the long-lasting 
partisan campaign against Soviet occupation after the 
Second World War.
95Lithuania
96  The Waning World Power
population.420 Many Polish people strive 
for cultural autonomy, a particular thorn in 
the side of nationalistic organizations such 
as “Vilnija”, the largest of these. “Vilnija” 
would like to force the “Lithuanization” of 
the Polish population. The government also 
relies on assimilation: the members of ethnic 
minorities with Lithuanian citizenship must 
“translate” their last names into Lithuanian. 
Nonetheless, Lithuania’s minority policies 
have been evaluated positively by observers, 
primarily due to its very liberal citizenship 
law of 1989 allowing all people who lived 
legally in Lithuania in February 1989 to 
become Lithuanian citizens. The number 
of stateless people, which runs into the 
hundreds of thousands in neighbouring 
Latvia, is well under 10,000 in Lithuania.421 
Due to better knowledge of the country’s 
language, migrants are generally more 
evenly distributed throughout the economy 
than in Estonia or Latvia. But because not 
every non-Lithuanian masters the language, 
unemployment among Russians and Poles 
was significantly higher than the nationwide 
average of 13.7 percent in 2009. The fact 
that a mere 5.8 percent of the labour force 
had been unemployed in 2008 shows, on the 
other hand, how unstable the employment 
situation throughout a broad spectrum of 
the population in Lithuania continues to 
be.422 There was hardly a region which was 
able to counter the economic crisis: the 
used-car market in Marijampole, once the 
flourishing centre of trade between East and 
West, lost its Russian customers. The FlyLAL 
airline, located in the capital of Vilnius, had 
to file for bankruptcy and the liquidity of 
the state social security fund Sodra was 
acutely threatened at the end of 2009. Even 
the pensions, low to begin with, had to be 
reduced by five percent. 
In addition to the economic crisis, the 
only nuclear power plant, Ignalina, in the 
country’s north, had to be shut down at the 
end of 2009. Electricity bills for Lithuanian 
households, which were already deep in 
debt, rose by up to one-third as a result. 
Before the plant closed, Lithuania had the 
world’s second greatest dependency, at 
70 percent, upon nuclear energy following 
France. For security reasons, the reactor, 
structurally identical to Chernobyl’s, had 
to be shut down; it was even a requirement 
for entry to the EU. Since the beginning of 
2010, Lithuania has had to rely more and 
more on energy imports from neighbouring 
countries. That this is risky, particularly 
with regard to Russia, is revealed by the 
experience of 2006, when Russia stopped 
crude oil deliveries to its neighbours through 
the Druzhba pipeline, officially for technical 
reasons, after Lithuania had sold its largest 
enterprise, the Mazeikiu Nafta oil refinery, to 
the Polish PKN Orlen instead of to a Russian 
company. In order to steer clear of long-term 
dependency on Russia, and because it will 
take some time until Lithuania is completely 
integrated into the European power supply 
system, the government is planning to build 
a successor nuclear plant for Ignalina. At 
the moment, however, the project is not 
financially feasible. 
One of the bright spots for the future, in 
addition to the oil refinery, is the port of 
Klaipeda, where, with 21 million tonnes of 
commodities annually, almost twice as many 
goods are handled as in Russian Kaliningrad 
120 kilometres away.423 Tourism also 
attracts ever-more Western Europeans to 
the Coronian Spit or to the country’s 3,000 
lakes. And in the high-tech race, especially in 
bio-technology, Lithuania is comparatively 
well-positioned. With the aid of the world’s 
fastest Internet, Lithuania aims to become 
Northern Europe’s centre of innovation by 
2020. Foreign investors are supposed to be 
attracted by, among other things, special 
economic zones and industrial parks, as they 
are increasingly to be found in Russia.424 The 
comparatively well-educated workforce and 
a wage level which is still low in comparison 
with the rest of Europe are further business 
advantages. 
Up and down
In the first eight years of the new century, the three Baltic states underwent an 
economic boom exceeding even Russia’s. Using GDP per capita as a measure, they 
reached a welfare level comparable to that of Poland or Portugal in 2008. Yet a 
large part of this achievement was destroyed by the most recent crisis: during 
the boom, the financial sector’s dependency upon foreign markets had increased 
enormously and now Lithuania’s, Latvia’s and Estonia’s economies fell by up to 20 
percent within a year. The losses were not greater anywhere else in the EU. 
GDP per capita in 
international dollars
2000
2008
2009
(Source: International 
Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook 
Database, Washington DC)
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About 7.1 million people lived in urban 
settlements in the Republic of Belarus 
in 2010. This was 74 percent of the total 
population of 9.6 million. That makes Belarus 
the most urbanized Soviet successor state. 
In contrast to Russia or Ukraine, the absolute 
number of city-dwellers has even increased 
since the beginning of the 1990s, despite the 
fact that the population has been shrinking 
nationwide.425
The differences between the city and the 
country in Belarus, which is extensively 
covered by forest and moors, are enormous. 
Rural areas were little valued and largely 
neglected during the Soviet era, when 
industrial cities were regarded as a sign 
of progress. Planners often deemed 
villages as “not promising” and resettled 
the population, cutting off many areas 
from further development. Meanwhile, the 
government turned cities into industrial 
centres. Important sectors were mechanical 
engineering, particularly for trucks, 
tractors and other agricultural machinery; 
petrochemistry; wood processing and the 
foodstuffs industry.
Paradoxically, industry profited from the fact 
that today’s Belarus suffered more than any 
other area of the Soviet Union during the 
Second World War. At the end of the war, the 
republic was almost completely destroyed 
and the German occupation had killed more 
than two million Belarusians, including 
almost the entire Jewish population, which 
had numbered more than a million people 
before the war.426 During reconstruction, 
planners equipped Belarus’ factories with 
the newest facilities, which made Belarus, in 
comparison to other Soviet republics which 
often depended upon pre-war machinery, 
particularly productive.427
As a result of industrialization, many 
Belarusians moved from the country to the 
cities. This migration reached its climax 
in the period before independence, but 
for entirely different reasons: after the 
nuclear reactor in Ukrainian Chernobyl, 
near the border, caused the world’s largest 
civil nuclear disaster in 1986, hundreds of 
thousands fled from the afflicted oblasts 
of Gomel and Mogilev to other parts of the 
country. A large part of the radioactive cloud 
rained upon Belarus and contaminated up to 
a fifth of the farmland and forests. In Gomel 
Oblast, the cases of thyroid cancer rose to six 
times the normal number.428
In the early 1990s, urbanization slowed 
down somewhat but it did not, as in Russia, 
become a reverse trend. After the economic 
crisis in the first years of independence hit, 
above all, industries in urban areas, it was 
particularly felt in the mid-1990s in rural 
areas. Periods of drought as well as a lack of 
equipment, fertilizer and fuel for agricultural 
vehicles have resulted in a decrease from 19 
to ten percent of the employed population 
working in agriculture since the early 
1990s.429 In 1999, the year of the census, 
over 70 percent of Belarusian villages had 
fewer than 100 inhabitants. Many of these 
villages will disappear from the map.430
Rural areas facing grim future
BELARUS
(Source: see page 139)
Population in 2010 9.59 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 8.56 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 46
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.28
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 69.1
Annual net migration 2005-2010 0
Median age in 2010 38.2
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Small demographic dividend
After the Second World War, 7.7 million 
people lived in the Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic. Stable birth surpluses 
led to continuing population growth for over 
four decades and the number of inhabitants 
reached 10.2 million in 1993, its historical 
peak, before it began to decline once again.
In fact, there are still a few islands of growth 
in the country, which, measuring 208,000 
square kilometres, is a third smaller than 
neighbouring Poland. Minsk, the capital, 
grew between the last Soviet census in 1989 
and 2009 from 1.6 to 1.8 million inhabitants, 
due primarily to immigrants from other parts 
of the country. Among Belarus’ six other 
regions, only the more rural areas of Brest 
and Grodno have been able to maintain 
fairly constant numbers of inhabitants. Even 
if the numbers of children per woman, at 
1.64 and 1.57 respectively, are substantially 
higher than the national average, they are not 
sufficient to maintain population stability in 
the long-term.431 Nonetheless, fertility rates 
since 2004 have recovered a bit from the 
period in which, at 1.2, they reached their 
historical nadir.432 
Yet young people, above all, are migrating to 
urban centres. The less-mobile elderly remain 
in the countryside, which is why the trend of 
more people dying than being born there will 
only intensify in the future. About 30 percent 
of the rural population was already ready 
for retirement in 2009; nationwide, this 
group only constituted 21.5 percent of the 
population. At the same time, 33.5 percent 
of all women in rural areas were between 15 
and 44 years old, meaning potential mothers, 
while the share of this age-group constituted 
41.8 percent nationwide. In 2008 alone, 
the rural population shrank by 58,000 
people, half of which was due to mortality 
surpluses.433
A significant number of deaths in rural areas 
can be attributed to alcohol abuse, accidents, 
suicide and other “unnatural” causes. Many 
villagers, particularly men, who have no 
economic prospects, lead self-destructive 
lives. This behaviour has contributed 
decisively to the fact that people in Belarus 
now die on average at 70.5 years old, earlier 
than in the 1970s. In rural areas, people have 
an average life expectancy of a mere 66.6 
years. 
In spite of all this, mortality surpluses in 
Belarus have declined in the last few years. 
In urban areas, the number of newborns in 
2007 exceeded deaths for the first time since 
1997, even though the average number of 
children per woman is remarkably lower here 
than in the countryside.434 That this does 
not constitute a long-term trend, however, 
is revealed by a glance at the population 
structure: since the beginning of the century, 
the large cohorts born between 1983 and 
1986 have reached childbearing age, while, 
at the same time, the thinned-out cohorts 
of the Second World War have reached 
retirement age. These are good times for the 
labour market and state revenues. But this 
“demographic dividend” has long been used 
up. This is recognizable from the fact that the 
ratio of children and pensioners to people of 
working-age shifted in 2009 in favour of the 
young and old, who must be taken care of by 
society, for the first time since 1993.435
Urban growth in the west
Despite the nationwide population decline, the 
urban population in Belarus has grown since 1991. 
Brest and Grodno Oblasts, which border Poland, 
have indeed lost three and seven percent of their 
populations respectively since independence, but 
the populations of their cities have each grown by 
nine percent. The reason for this has to do both 
with the young population structure in the cities, 
which has resulted in birth surpluses, and country-
to-city migration which could already be observed 
in the 1960s. In the eastern part of the country, the 
average number of children per woman is lower than 
that in the western part, which means that mortality 
surpluses, even in the cities, cannot be compensated 
for by immigration. 
(Source: Belstat, 
Naseleniye 
Respubliki Belarus, 
Minsk)
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And this so-called “dependency ratio” 
will increase: in the future, the low-birth 
generations of the 1990s will reach 
childbearing age as the baby-boomer 
generation reaches retirement age. Even 
if the number of children per woman rises 
further, more people will die than will be 
born. According to estimates, the population 
of Belarus could shrink by 2030 to 8.5 million 
people or by about twelve percent despite 
immigration.436 
Belarus is the only Soviet successor state to 
which more people have migrated from every 
other Soviet successor state than emigrated 
since the beginning of the 1990s.437 This is 
due to the fact that many ethnic Belarusians 
have returned to the land of their ancestors 
from other parts of the former Soviet Union 
as well as to the fact that ethnic Russians, 
in contrast to Central Asia or the South 
Caucasus, have not extensively left the 
country. Their share of the total population 
sank negligibly between 1989 and 1999 from 
13 to 11.4 percent.438 The reason for this is 
the extraordinarily successful “Russification” 
of the country following the Second 
World War. Relations between the ethnic 
groups are good and both the Russian and 
Belarusian cultures have mixed extensively. 
This is also revealed by the fact that the 
Belarusian language in its pure form is almost 
exclusively spoken in urban, academic circles 
even though it has been an official language 
since 1990. Since 1995, Russian has been 
the second official language of the Republic 
of Belarus. The majority of the population 
speaks a dialect called “Transianka”, a mix of 
Belarusian and Russian. 
The Soviet Union’s most Soviet relic
In hardly any other Soviet successor state 
have the former structures of the planned 
economy been maintained so well. The 
country is internationally isolated and its 
borders are largely closed to migrants. 
Annual migration is thus low and has barely 
affected demographic developments: in 
2008, there were 17,000 international 
immigrants and 9,000 emigrants.*439 With 
its restrictive migration policies and targeted 
border controls, the autocratic Belarusian 
leadership attempts to hinder foreign aid to 
the opposition. Belarus also manages thereby 
to create a kind of bulwark against illegal 
transit-migration of people who traverse 
Belarusian territory on their way to the 
European Union.440
Economic figures from Belarus should 
be treated cautiously. They are often 
deliberately manipulated by the state, which 
largely controls the economy. According 
to official figures, Belarus, measured in 
terms of GDP per capita, is poorer than the 
Baltic states and Russia but richer than its 
southern neighbour, Ukraine. In 2008, every 
inhabitant generated an average of 12,300 
international dollars or almost 70 percent 
more than citizens of Ukraine, which had a 
higher GDP than Belarus at the beginning of 
the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2008, Belarus’ 
economy grew by an average of eleven 
percent before the worldwide crisis in 2009 
quelled growth to 3.4 percent.441
Unsteady upswing
Belarus, which was economically weaker than Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 1992, has meanwhile exceeded the 
two other former Soviet countries in economic strength, profiting from cheap energy imports from Russia. 
The Belarusian refineries turned crude oil into fuel and resold it with large profit margins. In this way, Russia 
subsididized its neighbour with several billion US dollars annually. In the meantime, however, this source of 
revenue has dried up. 
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Russia
Ukraine
GDP per capita in four 
Soviet successor states 
in international dollars, 
1992 to 2008
(Source: International 
Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook 
Database, Washington 
DC)
* Since many emigrants do not notify authorities, net 
emigration may now be slightly negative. 
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US dollars.443 Moreover, the Nord Stream 
pipeline, which is currently being built, 
will make it possible as of 2012 to bypass 
Belarusian territory and to supply Europe 
directly. 
Belarus’ government has by now realized 
that dependency upon Russian subsidies 
will lead sooner or later to a crisis. Besides 
modernizing its economy, whose upswing 
in the last decade is only partly explained 
by increased productivity, the government 
created a list of 147 state companies to be 
privatized by 2010. These include national 
gems such as the pipeline operators and the 
potassium fertilizer producer Belaruskali. 
President Lukashenko sees China, especially, 
as an important partner in the future. 
Despite these changes, Russia remains the 
country’s most important international 
partner. Following gas pipelines, Russian 
firms have long been trying to acquire 
shares in oil refineries from Belarus. Trans-
border investments could be facilitated if 
the customs union founded in 2010 jointly 
by Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan can 
be expanded, as planned, to a common 
market. This has already boosted trade 
between Belarus and Russia. Furthermore, 
its eastern neighbour is by far the Belarusian 
regime’s largest creditor. Between 2007 
and 2010 alone, the Kremlin provided three 
billion US dollars in loans.444 And even the 
construction of the first Belarusian nuclear 
plant agreed upon in 2008, intended to 
make Belarus less dependent on Russian gas 
supplies two decades after Chernobyl, is only 
possible with the help of the Russian firm 
Atomstroiexport. 
With its system of “market-oriented 
socialism”, president Alexander Lukashenko’s 
government keeps the prices of many 
commodities low while it simultaneously 
prints new money in order to finance 
further growth. Important sectors such as 
the pipeline and electricity networks, the 
banking system, agriculture and heavy 
industry are either entirely or extensively 
controlled by the state and half of all 
employed people are paid from public 
coffers.442
Ambivalent relationship to Russia
The dependency of the Belarusian economy 
upon Russia, its large neighbour and ally as 
well as the most important sales market for 
Belarusian export goods, is problematic. 
Furthermore, the Russians supply Belarus 
with fossil fuels at bargain prices. The 
resale of refined crude oil from Vitebsk and 
Gomel Oblasts long generated large profits 
for Belarus. But because it largely failed 
to give Russia its share of the profits, as 
contractually agreed upon, the Kremlin levied 
an export tariff on oil for the first time in 
2007, plunging Belarusian refineries into the 
red.
The situation is similar for the natural gas 
trade. While Russia supplied its neighbour 
at the highly subsidized domestic price until 
2004, it has since gradually raised the price 
to meet world market levels. As with the oil 
conflict, Belarus has generally responded to 
the new price hikes with higher transit fees 
for the use of its national pipelines pumping 
Russian gas to Europe. But Russia has the 
upper hand: in 2007, Gazprom acquired 
a 50-percent share in Beltrangas, the 
Belarusian pipeline operator, for 2.4 billion 
Population of Belarus according to age-group in thousands, 2010 to 2015
(Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population 
Database, New York)
History’s echo
Even generations later, the Second World War and 
the post-war baby boom affect Belarus’ population 
structure. The labour market in Belarus, for example, 
has profited in the last several years from the fact 
that the thinned-out war generation has entered 
retirement while at the same time baby boomers have 
reached childbearing age. Nationwide birth surpluses 
have been the result. In the upcoming years, the 
situation will worsen dramatically, however, when 
the sparse cohorts of the 1990s reach childbearing 
age. 
Men Women
Fall of the Iron Curtain
Second World War
Baby boom
In 2008, 4,967 Moldovans were granted 
additional Romanian citizenship.445 If the 
Romanian president Traian Basescu gets 
his way, twice that many will soon become 
citizens annually. Basescu has declared it a 
“blood obligation” to incorporate Moldovans 
into Romania, following a tug of war over 
the land-locked country which has persisted 
between Romania and Russia since the 18th 
century.
The Moldovans are happy to take on second 
citizenship as it facilitates travel to European 
Union countries, the dream destination of 
almost all of Moldovans. At home, in Europe’s 
poorest country, once called the “Garden of 
the Soviet Union” for its fertile soil, there 
is hardly any work. About 400,000 people 
left the country between the censuses in 
1989 and 2004 alone. Of the 3.38 million 
remaining, another 273,000 stayed abroad 
in 2004; by now, probably more do so. They 
find jobs in Russia or Ukraine, as well as in 
Italy, Portugal and Romania. As in Russia, 
the Moldovans have no communication 
problems with their neighbours to the west 
due to Moldovan being a Romance language. 
The only difference to Romanian was that, 
until the end of the Cold war, Moldovans were 
ordered by the Soviet leadership to use the 
Cyrillic alphabet only.
Rural areas especially are suffering from 
labour migration. Those who do not go 
abroad try to find their fortune in Chisinau, 
the capital, home to 660,000 inhabitants 
or more than a third of the nation’s urban 
population.446 That urban areas have 
nonetheless shrunk more than rural areas 
since independence is owing to the fact 
that in the 1990s, Russians and Ukrainians 
who had lived primarily in cities left the 
country.447
In addition to economic uncertainty, there 
was the civil war of 1992, sparked by the 
secession of the Transnistria province 
on the Ukrainian border. A large portion 
of the primarily Slavic population in this 
strip of territory east of the Dniester River 
feared that the Republic of Moldova would 
attempt annexation to Romania following 
independence and suppress Russian 
language and culture. In contrast to the 
Gagauz people, who are of Turkic ancestry 
and live in the southern part of the country, 
the Transnistrian leadership rejected the 
offer of partial autonomy within Moldova. 
Moldova itself could not afford to relinquish 
Transnistria, since important economic 
enterprises were located there. Today, 
almost 20 years following the cease-fire, the 
problem remains unresolved. Transnistria 
does, in fact, have its own government, 
currency and police force, but so far, not 
a single UN member state has officially 
recognized it.
Abandoned Garden
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
(Source: see page 139)
Population in 2010 3.58 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 3.18 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 106
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.50
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 68.4
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 34,000
Median age in 2010 36.2
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Taken together, Moldova and Transnistria 
have lost about 800,000 people or 18 
percent of their inhabitants since 1989; as 
a percentage, this is the greatest decrease 
in any post-Soviet state. Nonetheless, the 
country still has the greatest population 
density with 106 people per square 
kilometre. About 60 percent of the people 
live in rural areas,450 where it is particularly 
difficult to find decently-paid work. 
Agriculture may still employ about 40 
percent of the working-age population, but 
average monthly earnings barely exceed the 
official subsistence minimum of 1,100 Lei, 
which, converted, corresponds to about 70 
euros. Many people even continue to be paid 
in kind.451
Losing Transnistria meant that Moldova has 
lost about a third of its industry. The loss of 
power plants was particularly painful and 
led in the 1990s to frequent power failures. 
This, in addition to the impoverishment of 
a large portion of the population, inspired 
Moldovans in 2001 to re-elect a Communist 
government – so far unique in a Soviet 
successor state. Indeed, the Communist 
leadership did supply continuous electricity, 
but failed to get a handle on corruption and 
had to make way in 2009 for the western-
oriented opposition. The opposition’s main 
task now is to solve the Transnistrian conflict 
in order to earnestly pursue Moldova’s goal of 
EU membership.
High wages are only paid abroad
There is contradictory data regarding 
Moldova’s current population size. According 
to United Nations estimates as well as figures 
by the National Bureau of Statistics, about 
3.6 million people live in the country. But 
while the international organization includes 
Transnistria’s 500,000 citizens, national 
data exclude them.448 In light of the fact that 
the 2004 census already counted but 3.4 
million people, national data seem too high: 
since the census, the population has probably 
decreased, due not only to emigration but to 
the fact that since the end of the 1990s more 
people die than are born here.449
One-and-a-half countries, 
five languages
About 60 percent of Moldova’s population speak 
Moldovan, followed by Romanian (17 percent), 
Russian (eleven), Ukrainian (six) and Gagauz 
(four). These figures, however, obscure serious 
regional differences. Russians in Moldova live 
primarily in the large cities of Chisinau and Balti, 
where their language is widespread. Alongside 
native Russian speakers, many Moldovans still 
use the language of their former occupiers in 
everyday life. Ukrainians, on the other hand, 
live primarily in the north of the country, and 80 
percent of the inhabitants of the “Autonomous 
Territorial Unit of Gagauzia” speak Gagauz in the 
southern part of the country. Romanian, which 
is hardly distinct from Moldovan, is spoken 
primarily by the population in central areas. 
There is no data for the Transnistrian Republic, 
since it did not take part in the census and the 
results of its own population count in the same 
year have not been published in detail. Due to the 
population’s ethnic make-up, more children grow 
up here speaking Russian and Ukrainian than in 
the rest of the country.
Population in Moldova’s 
regions according to native 
language in the 2004 census
Moldova
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(Source: Biroul National 
de Statistica al Republicii 
Moldova, Recensamintul 
Populatiei 2004, Chisinau)
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Thanks to the land reform of the 1990s, in 
the wake of which two-thirds of the country 
changed from state to private hands, a new 
rank of peasant farmers has emerged. They 
tend small plots of about two hectares to 
provide for their own needs. How little they 
still produce is revealed by the fact that 
the average agricultural family business in 
most EU countries has between 17 and 70 
hectares at its disposal. Moldovans, on the 
contrary, do not even tend continuous plots 
of land, since every individual received a 
share in farmland as well as in orchards and 
wine-growing regions. To more than half of 
the farmers, working the land under such 
conditions does not seem worth the trouble. 
They lease the land to enterprises which can 
make significantly higher profits with mid-
sized plots of up to 800 hectares.452
If this trend continues and productivity 
increases further, many of those employed 
in the fields will lose their jobs. This could 
produce the next group of emigrants. So far, 
it has been primarily well-educated civil 
servants, who frequently earn less at home 
than construction workers, who have gone 
abroad. And it is as construction workers that 
most of these emigrants earn their money 
in foreign countries.453 They often transfer 
over half of their income to their families 
back in Moldova. In 2008, there were official 
remittances of 1.9 billion US dollars, which 
was about 31 percent of Moldova’s GDP.* 
Only Tajikistan and Tonga are more highly 
dependent upon labour migrants.454
Few children, often alone
Since independence, having children has 
become a luxury in Moldova. This is also 
due to the fact that high inflation rates in 
the 1990s rendered state subsidies for 
young families virtually worthless. Between 
1990 and 2002 alone, the average number 
of children per woman decreased by half, 
from 2.39 to 1.21, before rising slightly again 
to 1.33 in 2009.455 In reality, it could even 
be somewhat higher, as official statistics 
overestimate the actual population size and 
thus the number of potential mothers. 1.5 
children per woman, as estimated by the 
United Nations, may be more realistic. 
In addition to material hardship, greater 
individual freedom for women has also 
played a role in the decreasing number of 
children. Prior to independence, Moldovan 
women married and had children very young. 
Since independence, they take more time 
searching for a partner and have children 
when they are significantly older. Since 
1990, the annual number of marriages has 
decreased from 41,000 to 27,000, or by 35 
percent; marriages of women under 20 years 
old, which constituted a third of all weddings 
prior to independence, have gone down by 75 
percent.456
Since many adults work abroad, up to one-
third of all children in Moldova grow up with 
a single parent or no parents. Due to their 
parents’ remittances, these children have 
fewer financial worries, but they often feel 
abandoned and alone, develop aggressive 
behaviour and have difficulties in school. 
This is particularly true when it is the mother 
who lives abroad and the children need to 
take over household responsibilities, leaving 
little time for friendship and a “normal” 
childhood. In the past few years, however, 
it has been observed that more and more 
migrants try to take their children with 
them.457 This requires that migrants live 
legally in their new country and have regular 
work. This is easier in the EU than it is in 
Russia, where primarily the poorer rural 
population seeks its fortune. Despite bilateral 
labour agreements and governmental 
legalization programmes, almost half of all 
migrants commute seasonally between their 
homeland and their place of work in Russia. 
They do not seek permanent residency 
permits.458
Due to continuing wage differentials, an 
increasing number of young Moldovans see 
their future abroad. In a survey conducted by 
the National Bureau of Statistics, 70 percent 
of all 15 to 29-year-olds said they would go 
abroad to work if they had the opportunity. 
Over half of them would even take on a job 
for which they were overqualified in their 
target destination.459 The unconditional 
desire to leave their homeland often drives 
young women into the hands of human 
traffickers, who promise lucrative jobs in 
Russia, the Middle East or Western Europe. 
A life of prostitution frequently lurks behind 
these promises. If the women manage to free 
themselves and return to their homeland, 
they are usually faced with their next ordeal, 
for Moldovan society often excludes and 
stigmatizes former prostitutes. 
* Since up to half of the money transfers were made 
using informal channels, dependency upon remittances 
are probably significantly higher than officially 
recorded.
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Ukraine’s longest river, the Dnieper, divides 
the country in half, flowing from north to 
south past the metropolitan cities of Kiev and 
Dnepropetrovsk before emptying into the 
Black Sea near Kherson. For Ukrainians, the 
Dnieper is not only a symbol of national unity, 
but also of the internal divisions between 
east and west. Despite numerous claims to 
the contrary, Ukraine is in no danger of falling 
apart, but large differences do exist between 
the economies and the inhabitants in the 
eastern and western parts of the country.
The western half of the country is more 
agrarian. Over the past centuries, parts of 
it belonged to Poland, Lithuania, Austria, 
Czechoslovakia and Romania. Its largest 
city Lviv – formerly the Austrian city of 
Lemberg – is home to 734,000 people.460 
Lviv is surrounded by the economically 
weak oblasts of Ternopil and Zakarpattia.461 
In the eastern half, there are numerous 
coal mining operations, steel works and a 
higher percentage of Russian inhabitants. 
The country’s two economic powerhouses, 
the oblasts of Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk, 
are located in the Don River delta region on 
the Sea of Azov. However, the burgeoning 
economy has caused damage to the 
environment in these districts, where mining 
and heavy industries have contaminated 
the air, water and soil for years.462 This is 
certainly one of the reasons why Ukraine’s 
average life expectancy is four years lower 
in the east than in the west.463 Furthermore, 
drug abuse and prostitution have led to a 
surge in HIV infections in the urbanized 
eastern half. An estimated 1.6 percent of the 
adult population in Ukraine is HIV-positive – 
the highest rate in all of Europe.464
The chaotic 1990s
After gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine 
slid into an economic crisis far more severe 
than those suffered by most of the other 
post-Soviet states. Ukraine’s industrial 
production fell by 50 percent within one 
decade. Real GDP steadily decreased every 
year until 1999. In 1992, Ukraine was the 
fourth wealthiest state in the territory 
of the former Soviet Union based on per 
capita GDP, following Russia, Lithuania and 
Estonia. By 2010, it had sunk to eighth place, 
surpassed by Latvia, Azerbaijan, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, with possibly Turkmenistan 
soon to follow.465 In the tumultuous years 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
clan structures formed which still influence 
the economy and politics in Ukraine.
It did not take long for the catastrophic 
economic situation to leave its mark on the 
country’s demographics; the birth rate sank, 
more people died prematurely, and many 
fled the country. Out of the 51.9 million 
Ukrainians who lived to see their country gain 
independence, less than 46 million people 
remained at the beginning of 2010.466 Almost 
90 percent of this decrease is due to the 
disparity of birth and mortality rates, which 
as a percentage of the population is even 
higher than in Russia or Belarus.467 In 1990, 
Ukrainian women had an average of 1.84 
children, but in 2001, the average had fallen 
to 1.09.468 Meanwhile, the average has risen 
to 1.46 children per woman, yet the rates 
vary considerably depending on the region. 
Volhyn, Rivne and Zakarpattia Oblasts 
bordering the EU register fertility rates higher 
than 1.8 children per woman, while the 
north-eastern oblasts of Sumy, Kharkiv and 
Luhansk report averages below 1.3.469 There 
are various reasons for this disparity. For 
example, western Ukraine is home to a large 
percentage of rural dwellers who traditionally 
value religion and family to a larger degree 
than those in the east. Furthermore, modern 
contraceptives are not as prevalent in the 
west as they are elsewhere in the country.470
A sleeping giant between the EU and Russia
UKRAINE
(Source: see page 139)
Population in 2010 45.43 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 40.19 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 75
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.31
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 68.2
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 16,000
Median age in 2010 39.5
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In 2005, the government began funding a 
generous family support programme, aimed 
at encouraging Ukrainian woman to have 
more children. This included significantly 
expanding the financial support for families 
with young children up to three years of age. 
Such measures may well have contributed to 
the recent rise in fertility rates. In the long-
term, however, financial incentives like birth 
benefits will not be enough to reverse the 
population loss. Poverty and unemployment 
are not the only causes of low birth rates. The 
fact is that more and more Ukrainian women 
are simply choosing to have children later 
and wish to focus instead on advancing their 
professional careers.471
Looking for work abroad
In contrast to Russia, it took quite some time 
for Ukraine to attract migrant workers from 
other countries. Following independence, 
many Ukrainians – and descendents of the 
Crimean Tatars who had been deported by 
Stalin – returned to their home country from 
the former Soviet republics. However, by 
1994, the migration flows began reversing 
when hundreds of thousands moved to 
neighbouring Russia in response to the 
persistent economic crisis. Others – including 
many soldiers – left Ukraine in the wake 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union to seek 
citizenship in another country. Although 
the exodus slowed down considerably in 
the following years, tens of thousands of 
Ukrainians departed for Russia in search 
of work every year.472 An equal number, 
if not more, chose to head west and seek 
employment in the EU, the United States or 
Canada. In most cases, they entered these 
countries with a regular tourist visa, which 
enabled them to remain there legally for only 
the first few months.473 Ukraine is currently 
negotiating a visa-free travel regime with 
the EU as part of its planned Association 
Agreement. This could make it easier for 
migrant workers to enter the European Union 
in the near future.  
Since 2005, Ukraine has registered a slight 
immigration surplus – primarily the result 
of a drop in emigration.474 However, various 
studies in recent years have shown that the 
official statistics do not correctly reflect 
the extent of emigration. Many leave the 
country without notifying the authorities of 
their change in residence, and a majority of 
migrant workers live in Ukraine but commute 
to their workplace across the border. 475 
Although they are registered as Ukrainian 
residents, they earn their living in another 
country altogether. An estimated two to 2.5 
million Ukrainian residents work abroad, i.e. 
one in ten working-age Ukrainians.476 The 
western half of the country has suffered the 
heaviest losses as a result. Up to 30 percent 
of the working-age population in the oblasts 
of Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi, Lviv and Ternopil 
have already left the country. Most of these 
emigrants work in Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe, e.g. in Poland, Czech Republic, Italy 
or Portugal. There are also many people 
leaving Luhansk Oblast in eastern Ukraine. 
These migrant workers generally move to 
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Increasing imbalance
Demographic ageing in Ukraine is not as pronounced as in many Western European countries. The higher age-
groups comprise only a small proportion of the current total population. This can be attributed, among others, 
to the catastrophic impact of World War II and the famine of 1932 and 1933, caused by Stalin’s policies which 
claimed an estimated 3.5 million Ukrainian lives. In the coming decades, the largest demographic groups will 
advance in age and reach (today’s) retirement age until the middle of the century.
Ukraine’s population by sex and age-group in 1,000 
persons, 2010, 2030 and 2050
(Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: 
The 2008 Revision Population Database, New York)
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Russia as it offers better economic and social 
conditions.477 The central and southern 
areas of Ukraine, on the other hand, have 
seen the largest influx of migrant workers. 
International and internal migrants are 
attracted to the growing capital of Kiev, the 
Crimean peninsula, the province of Odessa 
on the Black Sea and Kharkiv, the second-
largest city in Ukraine.478
According to United Nations projections, 
Ukraine’s population may shrink by more 
than five million people by 2030. To prevent 
this from happening, Ukraine must find a way 
to both curb the demographic loss of labour 
emigration and attract larger numbers of 
immigrants. This could also slow down the 
ageing of its society, which is increasingly 
becoming a problem as more young people 
leave the country and fewer children are 
born. But the question remains: where will 
these immigrants come from? Although 
Ukraine has a higher income level than many 
countries in the region, the potential number 
of immigrants from neighbouring states will 
not suffice to close the demographic gap 
completely. As a result, it is rather unlikely 
that the second-most populous post-Soviet 
state can prevent its workforce from rapidly 
shrinking; the number of working-age 
Ukrainians already decreased by 400,000 
in 2010.479
Few new economic sectors
During the Soviet era, Ukraine’s economy 
was closely interwoven with Russia’s. The 
weapons and space industry, in particular, 
manufactured components and finished 
products for its northern neighbour. The 
engineering sector was badly hit when these 
economic ties were cut. Even today, Ukraine 
has not yet fully recovered. But not all was 
lost. Ukraine continues to sell its Antonov-
brand aircrafts as well as “Cyclone-4” and 
“Mayak” missiles on the world market. One 
of the reasons why Ukraine is able to produce 
such high-tech products is because of its 
relatively large pool of well-educated workers.
In addition to manufactured goods, Ukraine 
exported coal, steel and foodstuffs during 
the Soviet era. Many of these sectors still 
exist today. Coal is still mined in the Donets 
Basin and either exported or sold to the local 
steelworks at lower-than-market prices. The 
exports of Ukraine’s energy-intensive steel 
industry are the backbone of the national 
economy. Agriculture is also a traditionally 
strong sector. Corn and sunflowers are 
cultivated near the Black Sea in the oblasts of 
Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad and Kherson. 
Fruit and vegetables are produced along 
the coast and there is even a wine-growing 
industry on the Crimean peninsula. Wheat 
production plays a vital role throughout the 
country. Ukraine is the world’s fifth largest 
wheat exporter after the USA, Canada, Russia 
and Australia.480 Farmland accounts for 54 
percent of the country’s surface area, the 
majority of which lies on extremely fertile 
chernozemic soils. Aside from Bangladesh 
and Moldova, no other country in the world 
has a higher percentage of agricultural land.481
Between 2000 and 2008, per capita GDP 
in Ukraine increased from 3,300 to 7,400 
international dollars.482 However, the 
economy started overheating due to rising 
world-market prices for export commodities 
and capital inflow from abroad, while the 
national currency, the hryvnia, remained 
pegged to the US dollar. In May 2008, the 
annual inflation rate had soared to more than 
30 percent – at the time the third-highest 
inflation rate in the world after Zimbabwe 
and Venezuela.483 As a consequence, the 
crisis that followed hit home all the harder. 
Capital inflows from foreign banks fell 
to a trickle practically overnight and the 
world-market prices for steel and chemical 
products collapsed in the second half 
of 2008. The Ukrainian banking system 
tottered at the brink of bankruptcy and a 
wide array of industrial sectors was forced to 
drastically cut production. Within one year, 
the country’s GDP had fallen by 15 percent 
and industrial production by 22 percent.484 
The economic slump translated into an 
official unemployment rate of 8.8 percent in 
2009, though this did not accurately reflect 
the true scale of the crisis. The Ukrainian 
unemployment rate accounts for the entire 
population between the ages of 15 and 
70. But because most 60 to 70-year-olds 
are already retired, they suffer very little 
unemployment.485 Other figures illustrate the 
scale of the crisis far better. For example, 20 
percent of young urban workers between 15 
and 24 years of age were unemployed and 
the percentage of short-time work increased 
from eleven to 19 percent.486 In addition, 
employees were forced to accept massive 
wage cuts.487
Backlog of reforms after the crisis
Although the economy recovered in 2010, 
per capita GDP in Ukraine is only half of that 
in Romania, the poorest member state of the 
EU.488 Clearly, Ukraine still has a long way 
to go until it can finally become a member 
of the European Union. In order to take the 
necessary steps to achieve that goal, to offer 
its citizens secure and rising incomes in the 
long-term and stop the flow of emigration, 
Ukraine has no alternative but to enact far-
reaching reforms. And there are a myriad 
of problems that need to be addressed. 
For example, 50 percent of the production 
facilities are considered outdated, steel 
production devours huge amounts of energy, 
its coal is too expensive and of poor quality 
and agricultural yields – especially in the 
western half of the country – have long been 
lower than they could be. The most serious 
problems in Ukraine, however, are political 
instability and corruption, which continue to 
scare off foreign investors. 
Many of the country’s problems are 
evident in the energy sector. Before energy 
consumption dropped as a result of the 
economic crisis, Ukraine consumed about 
70 billion cubic metres of natural gas each 
year – the most important source of energy 
in Ukraine, covering 40 percent of its 
consumption. Because domestic production 
cannot fully meet its requirements, Ukraine 
imports two-thirds of its natural gas from 
Russia.489 For many years, Ukraine received 
special discounts and free shipments in 
“exchange” for allowing Russia to pipe its 
natural gas to Western Europe. The Russian 
monopolist Gazprom conducts four-fifths of 
its business in Western Europe via Ukraine’s 
dilapidated pipelines. But Gazprom has 
been gradually increasing prices to market 
levels since 2006, which in turn has caused 
financial difficulties for the Ukrainian-based 
Naftogaz, the state-owned natural gas 
producer, importer and pipeline operator, as 
well as the largest employer in the country. 
The pricing conflict between the two 
countries most recently flared up in 
January 2009 when Russia interrupted gas 
supplies to Ukraine for twelve days until 
a new agreement had been negotiated. 
The agreement tied the Ukrainian price 
of imported gas to the oil price, as is the 
convention in Western Europe. This has 
clearly weakened Ukraine’s negotiating 
position. What remains are political 
bargaining chips: For some time, Gazprom 
has shown interest in taking over Naftogaz to 
gain control of the entire natural gas market 
in its neighbouring country.490 The Ukrainian 
government has successfully prevented the 
takeover so far. In April 2010, however, it 
granted Russia the right to station its Black 
Sea Fleet in Crimea for another 25 years in 
exchange for a 30-percent discount on natural 
gas imports. 
In order to lessen its dependence on 
Russian natural gas, Ukraine will have to 
primarily reduce its energy consumption. 
There are only a handful of countries in the 
world which require such high amounts of 
energy in proportion to GDP. Central and 
Eastern European countries like Poland 
and Slovakia, and also the United States, 
consume half as much energy for the same 
economic performance, and Germany only 
one quarter.491 Understandably, the subject 
of efficiency is the most important aspect 
of Ukraine’s energy strategy announced in 
2006. The strategy calls for a three-fold 
increase in GDP by 2030, whereby energy 
consumption should increase only one and 
a half times the present level.492 However, 
there are practically no incentives to invest 
in district heating systems and building 
insulation, which would likely result in 
the biggest energy savings. Only now are 
companies beginning to install more energy-
efficient production technologies. Following 
pressure by the International Monetary 
Fund, the Ukrainian government created 
an important incentive to use energy more 
efficiently when it announced it would reduce 
the high subsidies on natural gas and slowly 
increase energy prices to market levels for 
private households and the municipal sector.
In addition to cost-saving measures, the 
energy strategy also calls for a shift to 
renewable energies. At present, these 
account for only three percent of total energy 
consumption. The only notable area of 
development is hydropower with numerous 
hydroelectric dams on the Dnieper and other 
rivers.493 But the government intends to 
change the situation. Since 2009, it has been 
actively promoting investment in hydropower, 
biomass and wind power by paying energy 
providers higher compensation for feeding 
electricity from regenerative energies into 
the national power grid. However, its main 
strategy for weaning itself from Russian 
natural gas has nothing to do with “green” 
The east is shrinking faster
Although eastern Ukraine is economically stronger 
than the west, it finds itself in a demographically 
difficult situation. Women in the western-lying 
oblasts have more children than their counterparts in 
the east and its population lives significantly longer 
on average. In the industrial areas, such as Donetsk 
and Dnepropetrovsk, environmental pollution 
and hazardous work conditions in the coal mines 
contribute to a lower life expectancy. In addition, 
the severe economic crisis in the 1990s drove many 
of the laid-off workers to alcohol and drugs – an 
HIV epidemic was the result. The combination of 
all these factors has caused the population of the 
north-eastern Luhansk Oblast to shrink by almost 19 
percent since 1989. The situation is even worse in the 
sparsely populated Chernihiv Oblast in the northern 
part of the country, which has lost more than one-
fifth of its population. The capital Kiev, however, is 
the only district in the country which has registered 
growth with a population increase of six percent.
(Source: 
Derschawni 
Komitet 
Statistiki 
Ukraini, Kiev)
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Frankivsk 
Oblast
Volhyn 
Oblast
Lviv 
Oblast
Mykolaiv 
Oblast
Odessa 
Oblast
Rivne 
Oblast
Khmelnytskyi 
Oblast
Cherkasy 
Oblast
KIEV
Sevastopol
Kirovohrad 
Oblast
Dnipro-
petrovsk 
Oblast
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energies or higher energy efficiency. Rather, 
it plans on importing more from other 
countries, increasing domestic production of 
coal and natural gas, and expanding nuclear 
energy.494
Ukraine’s agricultural sector, particularly 
strong in the heart of the country in the 
oblasts of Kiev, Cherkasy and Vinnytsia, is far 
less dependent on Russia. Following a slump 
in the 1990s, the sector is now growing 
again and contributes about 20 percent to 
total GDP, taking the upstream industries 
into account, e.g. those responsible for 
seed production, farming machinery and 
fertilizers. In 2006, the EU supplanted Russia 
as Ukraine’s largest customer for agricultural 
produce. Ukraine primarily exports sunflower 
oil, grain and rapeseed to the West, but 
hardly any “processed” goods such as meat 
or cheese.495 Trade relations could become 
even closer in the near future when the 
planned free trade agreement between the 
EU and Ukraine is signed. The agreement was 
largely made possible by Ukraine’s decision 
to join the World Trade Organization in 2008. 
Of course, this simultaneously restricted 
its autonomy in agricultural policy, which 
could lead to the stability that the sector 
so urgently needs. In the past, especially 
in times of crisis, the government often 
interfered in markets by implementing export 
restrictions and price controls so that it could 
meet the needs of its people. However, such 
measures clearly did not channel aid to the 
poorer segments of the population, and the 
producers lost potential revenues which they 
could have used to modernize their outdated 
facilities. Even today, efforts to modernize 
the agricultural sector are hindered by 
the fact that land cannot be purchased in 
Ukraine and is thus not available as collateral 
on loans.496 With an underperforming 
agricultural sector, Ukraine fails to take 
advantage of its enormous potential; around 
the world, food prices are rising and huge 
markets in India and China are just waiting to 
be tapped.
Subsistence farming accounts for approxi-
mately 55 percent of Ukrainian agricultural 
production – potatoes, vegetables, berries, 
milk and wool are almost exclusively 
produced in privately-owned gardens.497 This 
ensures the survival of almost five million 
people in rural areas. The production has no 
significance for the export business. Similarly 
negligible is the production of the 42,000 
midsized family farms which account for five 
percent of all agricultural produce. It was the 
large agrarian firms, which had once been 
the Soviet collective and state-owned farms, 
which have determined Ukraine’s position 
on the world market in the first 20 years of 
independence.498 Only in recent years have 
gigantic “agriholdings” appeared on the 
market, similar to those in Southern Russia. 
They cultivate up to 350,000 hectares of 
agricultural land and, thanks to integrated 
suppliers and processing companies, have 
exclusive access to a closed supply chain. 
This allows the holdings to produce at much 
lower cost than many of their competitors. 
Although the holdings have decisively 
increased agricultural productivity, they 
are unable to stop the demographic and 
economic crisis gripping the countryside. 
In fact, because these holdings require far 
fewer labourers per unit of land, there are 
fewer jobs available to the rural population. 
Furthermore, the holdings are often 
headquartered in cities and pay their taxes 
there, while rural communities are in dire 
need of tax revenues as more and more 
small businesses disappear. Such businesses 
often provide valuable services for the rural 
infrastructure, for example, constructing 
and operating schools, kindergartens and 
streets.499
The larger the gap in income grows and the 
levels of prosperity between Ukraine’s urban 
and rural areas diverge, the more important 
the social systems become. However, 
Ukraine has yet to establish a public health 
insurance programme. Although Soviet-style, 
free health care still exists theoretically, 
treatment includes little more than 
hospitalization. Those who pay cash up front 
are the ones who generally receive treatment 
and medication. The pension insurance 
system is equally ailing, as the state has to 
regularly prop it up with tax revenues and 
state credit, although the contribution rate 
of 35.2 percent (33.2 percent paid by the 
employer, two percent by the employee) is 
Excess of deaths over births explains 
population loss 
In 1991, the year Ukraine gained independence, 
more Ukrainians died than were born for the first 
time since World War II. Since then, the country has 
been shrinking by almost 300,000 people per year 
as result of its high mortality rate. This trend has only 
abated somewhat in recent years. Emigration also led 
to a sharp decrease in population particularly in the 
1990s. The large surge in immigration in the early 
1990s was due to Ukrainians returning home from 
other Soviet successor states.
Natural population 
balance and migration 
balance in Ukraine in 
1,000, 1990 to 2009
(Source: Derschawni 
Komitet Statistiki 
Ukraini, Online 
Database, Kiev)
Natural population 
balance
Migration balance
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
0
0
20
0
1
20
0
2
20
0
3
20
0
4
20
0
5
20
0
6
20
0
7
20
0
8
20
0
9
extremely high compared to the international 
average. The fact that various professions are 
allowed to pay lower premiums only hurts 
the pension fund financially and reduces 
its public acceptance.500 There is no easy 
solution in sight; as the society ages fast and 
young people leave the country in search of 
work, the number of pensioners will increase 
while those who pay into the system will 
decrease. At least president Yanukovych has 
finally signed a long-awaited bill to gradually 
raise the Soviet-era retirement age of 55 
years for women and 60 years for men as 
well as to add a fully-funded component to 
the pay-as-you-go scheme. 
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ESTONIA
EST Estonia 2 1.64 21.7 73.1 0.0 1 20,327 1.1 77.2 – 3.1
LATVIA
LV Latvia 2 1.40 22.3 72.4 – 0.9 1 17,187 0.6 77.7 – 9.0
LITHUANIA
LT Lithuania 2 1.34 20.3 72.7 – 6.0 2 19,114 0.8 70.7 – 11.1
BELARUS 2 12,282 0.8 71.3 – 10.5
BY1 Brest Oblast 2 1.64 18.4 71.0 – 1.3
BY2 Vitebsk Oblast 3 1.32 20.0 69.8 – 1.0
BY3 Gomel Oblast 3 1.50 18.3 69.6 – 0.6
BY4 Grodno Oblast 2 1.57 19.8 70.5 – 1.9
BY5 Minsk 1 1.24 15.2 73.2 9.4
BY6 Minsk Oblast 3 1.51 19.3 69.0 – 0.2
BY7 Mogilev Oblast 2 1.45 18.1 69.8 – 2.6
UKRAINE
UA1 Autonomous Republic of Crimea 3 1.55 19.6 69.3 1.7 3 4,951 0.5 70.0 – 5.5
UA2 Vinnytsia Oblast 3 1.51 22.6 70.4 – 0.9 3 4,297 0.3 69.8 – 6.3
UA3 Volhyn Oblast 3 1.88 17.7 69.5 – 0.2 3 4,396 0.1 66.5 11.5
UA4 Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 3 1.45 20.8 67.9 – 0.1 2 11,015 0.7 70.4 – 14.5
UA5 Donetsk Oblast 3 1.29 22.1 67.7 – 0.2 3 9,273 0.4 71.5 – 19.4
UA6 Zhytomyr Oblast 3 1.60 21.4 67.8 – 1.5 3 4,113 0.1 69.4 – 15.1
UA7 Zakarpattia Oblast 3 1.83 15.5 69.2 – 1.3 3 3,786 0.2 67.6 – 1.6
UA8 Zaporizhia Oblats 3 1.36 20.9 69.6 – 0.3 2 8,276 1.0 70.0 – 15.4
UA9 Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast 2 1.60 18.4 71.7 – 0.3 4 4,610 0.3 60.9 – 3.4
UA10 Kiev Oblast 3 1.59 20.8 68.2 0.6 3 7,336 0.5 70.7 – 8.0
UA11 Kirovohrad Oblast 3 1.49 22.5 67.7 – 3.7 3 4,815 0.2 70.1 – 24.0
UA12 Luhansk Oblast 3 1.25 21.6 68.4 – 1.6 3 6,533 0.3 68.1 – 23.0
UA13 Lviv Oblast 2 1.51 19.0 71.6 – 0.4 3 4,953 0.8 66.0 – 5.4
UA14 Mykolaiv Oblast 3 1.45 19.6 67.7 – 0.6 2 5,762 1.1 68.8 – 16.1
UA15 Odessa Oblast 3 1.58 19.1 68.1 3.2 3 6,996 0.4 67.3 – 1.7
UA16 Poltava Oblast 3 1.35 22.6 69.3 – 0.1 3 8,007 0.1 70.9 – 18.8
UA17 Rivne Oblast 2 1.92 16.9 69.6 – 1.5 3 4,352 0.1 65.0 – 1.2
UA18 Sumy Oblast 3 1.24 22.1 69.2 – 1.5 3 4,853 0.8 69.8 – 21.3
UA19 Ternopil Oblast 2 1.48 20.5 72.0 – 1.5 4 3,451 0.1 61.2 – 11.7
UA20 Kharkiv Oblast 3 1.25 20.6 70.1 1.3 2 7,586 2.2 69.7 – 8.5
UA21 Kherson Oblast 3 1.50 19.3 67.9 – 2.3 3 4,255 0.3 69.5 – 21.2
UA22 Khmelnytskyi Oblast 3 1.56 21.9 70.1 – 0.9 3 4,228 0.1 70.1 – 11.2
UA23 Cherkasy Oblast 3 1.35 23.1 69.9 – 0.2 3 5,167 0.3 70.2 – 17.3
UA24 Chernivtsi Oblast 2 1.53 18.5 71.8 0.7 3 3,462 0.3 65.3 – 3.8
UA25 Chernihiv Oblast 3 1.34 24.9 67.9 – 0.7 3 4,682 0.3 71.4 – 21.0
UA26 Kiev 1 1.30 16.9 72.7 8.3 2 21,826 1.9 74.1 14.2
UA27 Sevastopol 1 1.45 20.6 69.7 5.4 2 5,880 1.7 73.6 6.7
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
MD Republic of Moldova 4 1.50 14.9 68.4 – 9.4 4 3,004 0.6 50.3 – 11.6
Regional economic data are 
not available for Belarus.
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Data for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine
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GEORGIA
ARMENIA
AZERBAIJAN
KAZAKHSTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
TAJIKISTAN
THE SOUTH
The South Caucasus and Central 
Asia have enjoyed little peace since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Armed conflicts have repeatedly 
blocked the way to economic 
renewal. Tajikistan, for example, 
plunged into a five-year civil war 
in 1992. Azerbaijan and Armenia 
are still fighting over the Nagorno-
Karabakh region and most recently, 
Georgia and Russia waged war over 
South Ossetia.  Ethnic conflict has 
always formed the root of these 
evils. This is the consequence of 
arbitrary border demarcation during 
the Soviet era, which observed 
cultural, linguistic and ethnic 
distinctions only to a limited extent. 
The differences are particularly 
(Source: author’s calculations based on Demoscope Weekly, 
Vsesoyuznaya Perepis Naseleniya 1989 Goda, Moscow; United 
Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision 
Population Database, New York)
1989 (census) until 30 June 2010
1 July 2010 until 1 July 2031
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(Source: United Nations, World Population 
Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population 
Database, New York)
Population change from 2010 to 2030 
in percentages
Substantial growth in Central Asia
People have emigrated in waves from all Central 
Asian countries and the South Caucasus following 
the fall of the Soviet Union. High numbers of children 
have nonetheless ensured steady population growth 
in many places. Tajikistan, with an average of 3.45 
children per woman, can expect the greatest growth 
in the future. The only country to shrink in the near 
future will be Georgia.  
rife with conflict in the Fergana Valley in the 
triangle connecting Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan. 
Once dependent upon Moscow, the majority 
of Central Asian countries have had a very 
difficult time since their independence. 
The reason for this is, on the one hand, 
economies almost devoid of diversification 
– Uzbekistan inherited a cotton monoculture 
from the Soviet Union – and, on the other 
hand, regional conflicts over water and 
natural gas supplies. Young people are 
emigrating in waves to Russia’s construction 
sites to ensure the survival of their families. 
In the face of high numbers of children, the 
population is nonetheless increasing and 
labour supply is exceeding demand in many 
places. Only Kazakhstan has been able to 
halt emigration since its natural resources 
boom has generated jobs and growth. The 
region’s northernmost and, in terms of land 
area, largest country has itself become a 
destination for migrants, particularly from 
Uzbekistan. 
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There are several unresolved territorial 
conflicts on former Soviet territory and 
Georgia is no exception. On the contrary: 
there are numerous trouble spots confined 
to a small geographic area. The most familiar 
to foreigners is probably the conflict in 
South Ossetia, a mountainous region in 
the country’s north. War already broke out 
between Georgians and Ossetians, who 
had declared independence, in 1991. The 
region let an international peace force 
oversee the cease-fire a year later, but this 
peace is fragile. This last became clear in 
August 2008, when the Georgian military 
tried to violently reassert control over 
South Ossetia. The attempt failed because 
Russia responded to the aggression by 
invading Georgian territory within but a few 
hours. After a few days, the war ended and 
Georgia was defeated. The conflict, however, 
remains unresolved. Only Russia, Venezuela, 
Nicaragua and Nauru have recognized South 
Ossetia’s independence. These are the same 
countries which recognize Abkhazia, located 
on the Black Sea coast, as independent. 
Georgia lost control over Abkhazia, which is 
significantly larger and has more inhabitants 
than South Ossetia, at the beginning of the 
1990s following another bloody civil war. 
The ongoing conflicts have by now made 
more than 200,000 Georgians refugees in 
their own country. Following the first war, 
almost half of them lived in mass camps for 
more than 15 years.501 The number of those 
who have left Georgia since independence 
in 1991 is even larger than the number of the 
so-called internally displaced. According to 
estimates by the United Nations, up to 1.3 
million people have left; national sources 
estimate about one million.502 In addition 
to war refugees, primarily ethnic Russians 
returned in droves to their old homeland 
in the 1990s. Since then, labour migration 
northwards and westwards has accounted for 
most losses. 
Radical liberalization following the 
Rose Revolution
During the Soviet era, Georgia was 
considered well-off. It had numerous 
holiday resorts and it exported tropical 
fruits, flowers, wine and tea. But the chaos 
following the demise of the Soviet Union 
brought the country to a standstill. At the end 
of 1998, Georgia’s GDP was only 36 percent 
of what it had been in 1990. Industrial 
production fell to 16 percent of its original 
value. 503 Unemployment and hyper-inflation 
resulted in the impoverishment of over half of 
the population. 504
It was only in 2003 that Georgia experienced 
significantly accelerated economic growth. 
In the same year, the president and 
former Soviet foreign minister, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, had to step down in the wake 
of the so-called Rose Revolution.* Supported 
by the United States, his elected successor, 
Mikheil Saakashvili, quickly implemented 
reforms to liberalize Georgia’s economy and 
fight corruption. He abolished a total of 16 
of the 22 different taxes, introduced a flat-
rate income tax and acquired substantial 
foreign financial aid. While annual foreign 
investment in 2002 was still about 160 
million US dollars, it increased by 2007 to 
about 1.8 billion.505
Fragmented territory
GEORGIA
* Shevardnadze was in office since 1995, after the 
country‘s first president and radical nationalist, 
Sviad Gamskhurdia, had been toppled in a putsch
and subsequently led the country into civil war.
Population in 2010 4.22 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 3.78 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 61
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.58
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 71.6
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 50,000
Median age in 2010 37.6
(Source: see page 139)
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Investors particularly liked the transport, 
telecommunications and industrial sectors. 
The last is concentrated in the region 
surrounding the capital, Tbilisi, where 
primarily fertilizer and metal commodities 
are produced for export to Ukraine, Bulgaria 
and even the USA and Canada. There is also 
a strong vinicultural tradition, although 
it has lost an important market – at least 
temporarily – since Russia put an embargo 
on Georgian and Moldovan wine in 2006. 
Georgia is also one of the world’s major 
producers of hazelnuts, the country’s main 
export commodity to the EU. 
At the same time, however, many people are 
dependent upon subsistence farming and 
long-term unemployment remains a serious 
problem. In addition, only a few people have 
access to the country’s expensive health 
care system. 506 The economic crisis of 
2008 and 2009 exacerbated the situation. 
This is also due to the fact that employment 
opportunities abroad have shrunk and 
remittances by migrants have significantly 
declined. Then there was the war in South 
Ossetia, which cost a great deal of foreign 
investors’ trust. Between 2007 and 2009, 
foreign investment plummeted by 56 percent 
to 769 million US dollars. 507 At least the 
extensive international reconstruction aid of 
about 5.3 billion dollars served as something 
of a counterweight to the recession. 508
Despite Georgia’s westward orientation, 
which has already led to a strategic 
partnership with NATO and withdrawal from 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
it has relations with its unloved neighbour, 
Russia. For example, the countries have an 
agreement on the mutual exchange of energy. 
In autumn and winter, when water levels in 
Georgian dams are too low, Georgia gets its 
energy from Russia. In spring and summer, 
the country returns the amount used in 
winter to the Russian power supply system. 
In the mid-term, Georgia wants to extensively 
supply electricity to other neighbouring 
countries. To do so, it is comprehensively 
overhauling the massive Inguri hydropower 
plant on the border to Abkhazia and it has 
instigated numerous new hydroelectric 
power projects. 
More births than deaths, but not for 
long
At the beginning of 2010, official estimates 
put Georgia’s population at 4.4 million. 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which together 
have about 300,000 inhabitants, are not 
included in these estimates. Compared to 
1991, the population of the former Georgian 
Soviet Socialist Republic has decreased by 
about 700,000 people. This can only be 
explained by emigration, since in Georgia – 
in contrast to Russia or Ukraine, for example 
– slightly more people are born than die 
annually. Since independence, however, the 
average number of children per woman has 
fallen significantly below the level of 2.1 
required for stable population development. 
Current birth surpluses can be accounted 
for by the fact that the 15 to 29-year-old age 
group is the country’s largest. It is only in five 
to ten years, when the smaller generation 
of the 1990s begins to start families, that 
there will be fewer offspring. 509 By 2030, 
the population could decrease to 3.8 
million people. 510 As in other countries in 
the region, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan or 
Ukraine, extensively fluctuating migration 
has nonetheless made it difficult to calculate 
reliable population numbers. 
The comparatively high life expectancy will 
hardly compensate for future shrinkage. 
Men live an average of 69 years, more than 
seven years longer than their counterparts 
in Russia.511 One reason for this difference is 
the Black Sea’s mild climate. Another is the 
moderate consumption of alcohol, which is 
not even half as much in the wine-country of 
Georgia as it is in Russia.512 This more than 
compensates for the higher infant mortality 
and the expensive health system.
Emigration country 
Georgia
According to estimates by 
the United Nations, Georgia 
loses more than one percent 
of its population annually 
due to emigration. In contrast 
to other former Soviet 
countries, emigration rates 
since 1990 have barely 
declined. Due to labour 
migration, which frequently 
remains unregistered, actual 
migration rates in Central 
Asian countries as in the 
South Caucasus and Moldova 
are probably higher than 
official statistics suggest. 
Annual net migration per 1,000 inhabitants in several Soviet successor states, 
1990 to 2010
(Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision 
Population Database, New York)
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Holy Mount Ararat, upon which Noah’s Ark 
is said to have come to rest, adorns the 
Armenian national coat of arms. The national 
symbol can also be found on the Armenian 
50-dram bill. Yet the 5,137 metre volcano 
rising majestically from the East Anatolian 
region is not actually situated in Armenia. It 
is located in Turkey and remains a bone of 
contention between the neighbours. Even 
during the Soviet era, the Turkish government 
protested claims to the Ararat by the 
Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, inspiring 
former foreign secretary Andrey Gromyko, 
with all the arrogance of a world power, to 
point out that the moon in Turkey’s coat of 
arms did not, after all, belong to Turkey.
Relations between Armenia and Turkey 
have been tense for more than a century. 
In “Armenistan”, once a province of 
the Ottoman Empire, Armenians strove 
for independence, for which they were 
mercilessly persecuted. Between 1915 and 
1923, 1.5 million Armenians were killed in 
massacres and death marches, an act of 
genocide which Turkey officially contests to 
this day.513 Since Armenia gained autonomy 
following the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
country has not had diplomatic relations to 
its Turkish neighbour. Borders are closed on 
both sides. It was only in summer 2009 that 
diplomats from both countries hinted that 
they wanted to normalize relations. 
While there have been signs of improvement 
in Armenian-Turkish relations, relations 
to Azerbaijan, Armenia’s neighbour to the 
east, remain sour. This is due to the conflict 
over Nagorno-Karabakh, a frontier area of 
both countries with a primarily Armenian 
population and internationally recognized 
as part of Azerbaijan. Its approximately 
150,000 inhabitants declared the territory 
an independent republic in 1992. In a bloody 
battle with Azerbaijan and with the aid of 
the Armenians, they were able by 1994 
both to secure a large part of the territory 
of the formerly autonomous republic and to 
create an additional buffer zone. Overall, the 
government in Stepanakert occupies about 
16 percent of the Azerbaijani territory.514 
Armenia does not, in fact, lay claim to 
Nagorno-Karabakh, but without the massive 
presence of the Armenian military, the 
republic would have long ceased to exist.
Armenia cannot afford a conflict with 
Georgia, its comparatively large neighbour 
to the north, even though there are a few 
areas in Georgia’s southern regions primarily 
inhabited by Armenians. Georgia is a key 
trade route to the rest of the world since 
all transport to the Russian Federation, 
Armenia’s most important trade partner, 
traverses Georgia due to the conflict with 
Azerbaijan. Moreover, almost all exports 
need to be executed through Georgian Black 
Sea ports due to the closed border to Turkey. 
Conflict with neighbours hampers development
ARMENIA
Population in 2010 3.09 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 3.17 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 104
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 1.74
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 73.7
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 15,000
Median age in 2010 32.0
(Source: see page 139)
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Shaky economic development
Armenia is the smallest republic in the 
South Caucasus. With a surface area 
of just 30,000 square kilometres, it is 
somewhat smaller than Belgium. Almost 
90 percent of the Armenian territory in 
this distinctive mountain region between 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey lies 
more than 1,000 metres above sea-level. 
It reaches its peak at 4,000 metres with 
the Aragaz Volcano. In the middle of the 
country, at 2,000 metres, lies one of the 
world’s largest mountain lakes, Lake Sevan. 
Due to the massive exploitation of water to 
irrigate fields, the lake’s water level sank 
during the Soviet era by about 20 metres. It 
was only in the 1980s that use of the water 
was prohibited to allow replenishment.515 
For Armenia, this was a question of survival, 
since Lake Sevan is considered one of the 
country’s most important sources of drinking 
water. 
Armenia, like all other Soviet successor 
states, suffered its economic demise after 
the Soviet Union crumbled. The country’s 
economic decline, however, began earlier: 
namely, in 1988, when not only 25,000 
people but about 40 percent of industrial 
plants fell victim to a disastrous earthquake. 
The north of Armenia was particularly hard-
hit. The quake completely levelled the city of 
Spitak, home to 20,000 inhabitants. 
Recently, Armenia’s economy has been based 
primarily on construction. Service sectors 
such as telecommunications and tourism 
have also seen rapid growth in the past few 
years. But even if the Armenian economy 
registered two-digit growth rates, GDP only 
managed in 2004 to reach the level of 1990. 
Manufacturing, which once dominated the 
economy, now constitutes but nine percent of 
total economic activity.516
The worldwide financial and economic 
crisis did not spare Armenia. Exports 
sank from 1.2 billion US dollars in 2007 to 
about 700 million US dollars in 2009.517 
It was only in the first quarter of 2010 
that the country enjoyed export growth in 
comparison to the previous year. The natural 
resources industry, in particular, suffered 
from the enormous decline in prices on the 
world market. After prices for copper and 
molybdenum intermittently dropped by two-
thirds, numerous mines had to be closed 
temporarily.
Another consequence of the crisis was the 
sharp decline in remittances by Armenian 
labour migrants, who have constituted a 
significant economic factor since 2000. 
According to the last Russian census in 2002, 
about 1.1 million Armenians lived in Russia 
alone.518 Since then, there are probably 
significantly more due to the large numbers 
of labour migrants in the last few years. 
There was an overall decline in remittances 
of about 32 percent in 2009 following steady 
increases in the previous years.519 This is a 
grave loss for Armenia, where, according to 
the International Labour Organization, up to 
30 percent of the working-age population are 
unemployed or underemployed.520
Even though almost a quarter of all employed 
people in Armenia work in agriculture, the 
country still needs to import food.521 In the 
mountainous terrain, with its cold winters 
and dry summers, only a few stretches of 
land are suitable for cultivation and these 
can only be worked using the most primitive 
of means. In order to modernize agriculture 
and to create better access to world markets 
for Armenian commodities, a North-South 
railway and motorway are supposed to be 
built in the next few years with the financial 
aid of the Asian Development Bank. The 
railway and motorway are supposed to 
connect the country to Iran and to shorten 
the way to the Georgian port of Batumi by 
250 kilometres.
Emigration to escape unemployment
Unemployment in Armenia, at almost 30 percent, is extremely high. Nonetheless, it has sunk since the 
beginning of the decade. This is also true, however, for the number of employed people. This development, 
which seems illogical at first glance, can be explained by the emigration of Armenian workers, who can expect 
wages three times higher in the Russian Federation than in their homeland. 
Unemployment 
rate and number of 
employed people in 
Armenia, 2001 to 
2008
(Source: National 
Statistical Service 
of the Republic of 
Armenia, Online 
Database, Yerevan)
Unemployment rate in percentages 
(including underemployment)
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employed people
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Relatively stable demographics
About 3.2 million people lived in Armenia 
in 2009 according to official statistics. 
Armenia is the only Soviet successor 
republic in which the population, which is 
98 percent Armenian, is almost ethnically 
homogenous.522 But in contrast to the other 
former Soviet republics, which, following 
the fall of the Soviet Union, became more 
ethnically homogenous due to migration, 
ethnic unity is traditional in Armenia. Even 
the last Soviet census in 1989 counted 93 
percent Armenians in the Armenian Soviet 
Socialist Republic.523
Since 1989, Armenia’s population has only 
decreased minimally from the 3.3 million 
people it then had. Since 2002, it has even 
increased slightly.524 While Armenia has 
experienced losses due to emigration since 
independence, these are easily compensated 
for by the country’s birth surplus.525 Armenia 
has long been a typical emigration country; 
two-thirds of all people with Armenian roots 
live in a global diaspora, including countless 
celebrities such as Charles Aznavour, the 
investor and multi-billionaire Kirk Kerkorian 
and Cher.
The average number of children per woman 
is 1.74. This lies below the figure of 2.1 which 
would be necessary to keep the population 
stable long-term, but it is still sufficient 
to prevent demographic shrinkage since 
Armenia’s population is very young and there 
is, accordingly, a substantial pool of parents-
to-be. The population under 20 years old is 
currently twice the size of the over-59s.526 
At 70.2 years for men and 76.6 years for 
women, life expectancy at birth in Armenia 
is significantly higher than in Russia.527 
Armenians drink less alcohol and the 
prevalence of HIV, at 0.1 percent among 
the adult population, is very low.528 The 
high infant mortality rate, which the United 
Nations estimate at 25 deaths per 1,000 
births, nonetheless shows, when compared 
to Russia’s (twelve in every 1,000), that 
Armenia’s health system has a lot of catching 
up to do.529
Population growth in spite of emigration
Comparatively high numbers of children and a 
young population have so far prevented Armenia 
from shrinking. Since 2002, the population has 
even grown, despite the fact that emigration 
continues for economic reasons. Today, almost as 
many people live in Armenia as did at the end of 
the Soviet era. 
Natural population 
growth, net migration 
and population size 
in Armenia
(Source: National 
Statistical Service of the 
Republic of Armenia, 
Statistical Yearbook of 
Armenia, 2005, 2009, 
Yerevan)
Population
Natural population growth 
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Net migration 
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In 1921, Josef Stalin assigned Nagorno-
Karabakh, inhabited primarily by Armenians, 
to what is today Azerbaijan, laying the 
groundwork for one of the many ethnic 
conflicts in the Caucasus. The conflict 
escalated in 1988 when the territory’s 
Armenian population once again demanded 
Nagorno-Karabakh’s annexation to Armenia. 
What began with violent attacks by both 
sides developed over a very short span 
of time into veritable pogroms against 
Armenians in Azerbaijan and ultimately into 
a war between both countries. Up to 50,000 
people lost their lives in the following six 
years and about a million were displaced, 
primarily Azerbaijanis living in Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh.530 The Azerbaijanis lost 
control of over 16 percent of their territory 
following the cease-fire negotiated by Russia 
in 1994. These events, and the masses of 
refugees in Azerbaijan, created a national 
trauma which continues to resonate in 
today’s political and social landscape.
While negotiations over the final territorial 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh continue, arms 
build-up still has top political priority. Since 
1999, Azerbaijan has had the largest military 
budget of all countries in the South Caucasus. 
In 2008, the 1.43 billion US dollar budget 
was three times as high as Armenia’s.531 
In terms of numbers, Azerbaijan’s army, 
with 66,500 active soldiers, is the region’s 
strongest.532 This alleged position of strength 
has repeatedly led the Azerbaijani president, 
Ilcham Aliyev, to speculate publicly about a 
military solution to the conflict.
Dependent upon natural energy resources,
Azerbaijan lies east of Armenia and has an 
800 kilometre coastline to the Caspian Sea, 
over whose international status neighbouring 
countries still argue. This is because its 
status is connected to mining rights for the 
wealth of mineral resources  below the sea’s 
floor. The centre of crude oil production is the 
capital of Baku on the Absheron Peninsula 
stretching 60 kilometres into the sea. The 
industrial exploitation of oil sources began as 
early as 1870, at which time Baku attracted 
soldiers of fortune from all over the world – 
to which the city’s architecture still attests. 
Alfred Nobel’s brothers tried their luck here 
as did the Rothschild family. 
Compared to today, the earlier oil-frenzy was 
vanishingly small. Between 2000 and 2008 
alone, Azerbaijani GDP multiplied eight times 
over before it declined slightly in 2009.533 In 
2008, Azerbaijan exported goods worth 66 
percent of GDP. 93 percent of these exports 
consisted of crude oil and natural gas.534 In 
total, Azerbaijan produced over 50 million 
tonnes of oil, about a tenth of Russia’s, the 
world market leader.535 
Some of the revenues from the oil business 
are administered by Sofaz, the state oil 
fund, which was worth 14.9 billion US 
dollars at the beginning of 2010.536 First and 
foremost, Sofaz supports the state budget 
and finances infrastructure projects and 
social programmes. And yet, many people in 
Azerbaijan still live in poverty. The poverty 
rate did, indeed, sink from 68 percent in 
1995 to eleven percent in 2009, but in 
the same year, 38 percent of all employed 
people worked in the agrarian sector, 
which often means underemployment and 
poverty.537 This also corresponds to the 
fact that in Azerbaijan, particularly in rural 
Oil and arms build-up
AZERBAIJAN
Population in 2010 8.93 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 10.32 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 103
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 2.16
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 70.2
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 10,000
Median age in 2010 28.4
(Source: see page 139)
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areas, significantly more children die before 
their first birthday than in the economically 
weaker neighbouring countries of Armenia 
and Georgia.538 It is precisely the young who 
flee a difficult life by turning to the supposed 
paradise of drug consumption. An estimated 
300,000 people, or about five percent of the 
adult population in Azerbaijan are injecting 
drug users, the world’s highest rate.539
The economic crisis of 2009 further 
exacerbated the situation, since many of 
the approximately three million Azerbaijani 
labour migrants in Russia lost their jobs 
and returned to their home country.540 This 
meant that remittances, which constituted 
the financial backbone of many Azerbaijani 
families, fell from 1.6 to 1.3 billion US 
dollars.541 The country faces more risks with 
its overflowing oil revenues. As a result of 
the enormous foreign trade surplus, the 
value of the national currency, the New 
Azerbaijani Manat, has appreciated by 16 
percent compared to the US dollar since 
it was introduced in January 2006.542 The 
country’s other export commodities have 
become expensive on the world market as a 
result. Inflation has also played a role in this. 
Due to the increase in the world’s food prices 
and high national expenditures – particularly 
for the defence industry – the inflation rate 
was about 20 percent before the economic 
crisis.543
Population growth and selective 
abortion
In 2009, about 8.9 million people lived in 
Azerbaijan, of which about 600,000 lived 
in the breakaway republic of Nagorno-
Karabakh. This was 1.6 million more than 
following independence in 1991. The growth 
was caused by the comparatively high 
number of a few more than two children per 
woman as well as the population’s young 
age structure. About 100,000 people more 
are born than die annually, compensating for 
the labour migration loss of about 10,000 
people per year.544 With a young and quickly-
growing population, the largely Islamic 
Azerbaijan more closely resembles Central 
Asian countries than its neighbours in the 
South Caucasus region. As in Central Asia, 
many young people in Azerbaijan cannot 
find work, meaning that emigration to Russia 
could increase in the future. 
Another problem is common to all three 
Southern Caucasian countries: the selective 
abortion of female foetuses. In Azerbaijan’s 
patriarchal society, male progeny are more 
highly valued than female. Repressed during 
the Soviet era, the preference has since 
become more firmly established. In 2009, 
there were only 87 girls between zero and 
four for every 100th boy; the natural male-
female ratio is 100 to 95.545 In particular, 
women who already have one or two girls 
tend to abort further female foetuses.546 
Selective abortion has been made possible 
by access for ever more people to prenatal 
diagnostics.
Greater education could counter the anti-
pathy towards female children. But societal 
norms cannot be altered from one day to 
the next. In the meantime, more and more 
people have been expressing a desire to 
prohibit pre-natal sex determination, for if 
the current trend continues, 15 percent of all 
young men may be looking for a partner in 
vain in 20 years time, a fact that is anything 
but helpful to the country’s stability.
Increasing dearth of women
Once the Soviet Union fell, the traditional 
preference for male children prevailed in all 
three countries of the South Caucasus. Since it 
became possible for more and more people to 
determine the sex of their child before birth, the 
selective abortion of female foetuses has become 
widespread. Today, 15 percent fewer girls are 
born in Azerbaijan and Armenia than boys. Five 
percent is normal. 
Number of female babies 
per 100 male babies 
in the South Caucasus, 
1991 to 2008
(Source: World Health 
Organization, European 
Health For All Database, 
Geneva)
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Number of girls born per 100 boys
natural sex ratio at birth
On December 16th, 1991, which is now 
a national holiday, the Kazakhs, who had 
been dominated for more than 200 years by 
Russians and Soviets, founded a politically 
sovereign republic. On the very same 
day 14 years later, the Atasu-Alashankou 
pipeline was festively opened. This pipeline 
connects the oil-rich Kazakh region on the 
Caspian Sea to the Chinese Xinjiang and is 
intended to make the country economically 
less dependent upon Russia, its northern 
neighbour. The approximately 2,000 
kilometre oil pipeline is supposed to supply 
China with 20 million tonnes of crude oil 
annually, which would correspond to about 
15 percent of Chinese oil imports.547
Drilling for oil began in Kazakhstan as 
early as 1899, but it has only been since 
independence that the country has developed 
into a significant worldwide exporter of 
fossil fuels. After 1995, the amount of oil 
produced grew within a mere 14 years from 
20 to 78 million tonnes, which accounted 
for two percent of the world’s production 
in 2009. Kazakhstan’s natural gas industry 
multiplied its production six-fold during the 
same period, constituting one percent of the 
world’s production in 2009.548
An estimated 5.3 billion tonnes of oil, or 
about three percent of the world’s reserves, 
can be found in Kazakhstan.549 The Kashagan 
Field in the North Caspian Sea, discovered 
in 2000, is among the world’s last great 
finds. This and the enormous natural gas, 
coal and uranium reserves have made 
the Central Asian country one of the most 
important owners of non-renewable energy. 
Furthermore, the barren Kazakh earth 
contains chromium, vanadium and bismuth 
as well as iron, copper, lead and zinc. 
90 percent of all of Kazakhstan’s exports 
originate in natural resources and products 
generated in the first phase of processing. 
Increasing prices for natural resources 
have blessed the republic with enormous 
economic growth and increasing wealth 
since 2001. Kazakh GDP per capita rose 
from 5,600 international dollars to 11,400 
in 2008.550 Average wages and salaries grew 
two-and-half times between 2004 and 2008 
alone to a monthly 503 US dollars.551 Yet 
Kazakhstan was not spared by the economic 
and financial crisis. Whereas its economy 
had grown on average by nine to ten percent 
in the three years prior to the crisis, it grew 
by only two percent in 2009 due to the crisis 
in the finance and housing sectors.552
Central Asia’s natural resources giant
 KAZAKHSTAN
Population in 2010 15.75 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 17.24 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 6
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 2.31
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 64.9
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 20,000
Median age in 2010 29.4
(Source: see page 139)
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A minority in their own country
Kazakhstan, which is the earth’s ninth-
largest country in terms of surface area, 
stretches over 3,000 kilometres from the 
Caspian Depression in the west to the Altai 
Mountains in the east. From the Kazakh arm 
at the mouth of the Volga to the Caspian Sea, 
the surface of which lies 28 metres below 
sea level, the country stretches hundreds of 
kilometres of primarily plains and steppe, 
rising into mountain ranges only at the 
outermost east and south-east on the borders 
to Mongolia, China and Kyrgyzstan.
From time immemorial, the sparsely-
populated Kazakhstan has been a transit 
region for trade caravans and the goal of 
campaigns of conquest. Constant attacks by 
West Mongolian Oirats in the 18th century 
did not leave the Kazakh hordes, at enmity 
with one another, any other choice but to 
seek Russia’s protection and to declare 
their territory a protectorate of the Czarist 
Empire.553 Following the Russian agrarian 
reforms of 1905, which ensured greater 
freedom of movement to farmers who had 
previously been bound to their village 
communities, Kazakhstan and Siberia, the 
South Caucasus and the Far East became 
migration destinations for the Russian rural 
population. Even before the Bolsheviks 
seized power in 1917, the Slavic population 
constituted 30 percent of the total 
population.554
Countless deaths during the civil war 
between 1917 and 1921 and during forced 
collectivization as well as emigration to 
China and Mongolia due to famines resulted 
in a decline in the number of Kazakhs. In 
addition, the deportations of the 1930s 
brought many other ethnic groups to 
Kazakhstan. The population count of 1959, 
which recorded 30 percent Kazakhs, marked 
the absolute nadir of this development. In the 
following decades, it was the high number of 
children by Kazakh women which contributed 
to the growth of the Kazakh population. In 
1989, Kazakhs constituted 40 percent of the 
country’s total of 16.5 million people. The 
1999 census revealed that, at 53.5 percent, 
they once again constituted the majority 
ethnic group.555 One reason for this was the 
emigration of the Russian population. While 
today’s Kazakhstan enjoyed positive net 
migration within the Soviet Union until 1970, 
it lost a total of approximately 1.2 million 
people to emigration between 1971 and 
1991.556
Emigration from Kazakhstan initially 
intensified following independence. Between 
1990 and 1999, the country had a net loss of 
more than 1.9 million people, about twelve 
One country, two capitals, many names
The opening up of Central Asia by the Russian Empire went hand-in-hand with several 
regional outposts intended to secure the territory. Today’s Almaty quickly developed into 
the capital of the Zhetysu region and was home to 40,000 people on the eve of the First 
World War. Astana, which was founded 30 years earlier, long served, in contrast, as a 
simple fort, becoming a significant traffic hub only after the Turksib railway line was built. 
In 1921, the Bolsheviks moved the capital of the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic to today’s Almaty, at the same time changing its name from Verny to Alma-
Ata, which essentially means “Father of Apples”. Today’s capital, Astana, has also been 
repeatedly renamed. Until 1961, it was called Akmolinsk and under Nikita Khrushchev 
it was called Tselinograd. It became Akmola (White Grave) upon independence in 1991 
while Alma-Ata became Almaty (City of Apples). 
In 1994, the Kazakh government decided to move the capital of Almaty to Akmola and 
to now call it Astana (Capital). Officially, the danger posed to Almaty by earthquakes and 
mud avalanches were given as the reasons for the move. Many, however, believe the 
real reasons have to do with Kazakhstan’s clan structures. President Nazarbayev comes 
from the so-called middle jüz (horde). His conflicts with the influential Almaty clans, who 
belong to the upper jüz, have presumably played a role in the move. At the same time, 
the Kazakh leadership wanted to counter separatist tendencies in Russian-speaking 
areas in the country’s north-east, where the capital is located. But the geo-strategically 
inconvenient position of the old capital, not far from the Chinese border, also played a 
role. 
Since Astana became the capital, people have been pouring into the booming centre 
on the Ishim River. Since 1989, the number of inhabitants has risen from 276,000 to 
640,000. The number of inhabitants in Almaty also grew in comparison to 1989 by 21 
percent to 1.37 million people.557 The Kazakh Central Bank, 36 foreign embassies and 
consulates as well as representatives from UN and Unesco have remained loyal to Almaty 
and the city itself has been able to stake its claim as the country’s centre of science, 
culture and finance.
percent of its entire population, particularly 
Slavs, Germans, Tatars, Greeks and Jews.558 
In turn, many Kazakhs, the so-called Oralman 
(returnees), immigrated from Mongolia, China 
and Iran, attracted by the government’s 
repatriation programme. Most recently, 
Kazakhstan has become a magnet for labour 
migrants from the Central Asian republics 
due to its rapid economic development. 
Since 2003, the emigration country has 
become an immigration country. In that 
same year, the population grew for the first 
time since independence.559 In the mid-term, 
Kazakhstan could even compete with Russia 
for labour migrants. Immigrants head for 
the former and the new capitals, Almaty and 
Astana, as well as the oil and gas-producing 
regions of Atyrau and Mangystau. All other 
regions of the country lose population due to 
migration. 
Differing fertility rates among the various 
ethnic groups can still be observed today. 
While the Central Asian ethnic groups, such 
as the Kazakhs, Uzbeks or Uyghurs, have 
enjoyed remarkable natural population 
growth in the last ten years, the Russian and 
Ukrainian populations have shrunk due to 
mortality surpluses. In the northern regions 
of the country, inhabited primarily by Slavs, 
the number of children per woman in 2008 
was generally just under two. In contrast, 
women in the south, which is primarily 
inhabited by Central Asians, have an average 
of more than three children.560 
There were about 960,000 ethnic Germans 
in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic when 
the last Soviet census was taken in 1989.561 
These concentrated, with a few exceptions, 
in the rural north and were primarily 
comprised of Volga Germans deported by 
Stalin and their offspring. After the fall of 
the Soviet Union, there was a massive wave 
of emigration. The most recent census of 
2009 recorded but 180,000 Germans.562 
Net migration in percent 
from 2003 to 2009 
(coloured fields) and 
number of children per 
woman in 2009 (bars) in 
Kazakhstan’s region
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Immigration poles and lots of children
The northern and eastern areas of Kazakhstan, which 
are still mostly inhabited by a Slavic population, 
have experienced emigration since independence. 
One exception is the new capital of Astana, which 
has gained one-fourth of its population of 2003 due 
solely to immigration. The oil-producing regions in 
the country’s west as well as the former capital of 
Almaty and its surroundings are the clear migration 
winners. It is particularly the rural areas of the south 
which have suffered from internal migration, but the 
number of children per woman is so high in these 
areas that the negative net migration has been more 
than compensated for. 
(Source: Author’s 
calculations on the basis 
of Agenstvo Respubliki 
Kazakhstan po statistike, 
Online Database, Astana)
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A peculiarity of the German minority is its 
natural growth: in 1999, births exceeded 
deaths by 3.5 children per 1,000 inhabitants; 
by 2008, the surplus had grown to 9.9 
children.563 There are presumably two 
reasons for this unusual development: first, 
most Germans in Kazakhstan live in rural 
areas in which higher numbers of children are 
normal. Secondly, entire families, meaning 
many older people, left the country in the 
wave of emigration. 
According to United Nations projections, 
about 17.2 million people will live in 
Kazakhstan in 2030.567 The number of 
Central Asian ethnic groups among the 
entire population will then be significantly 
higher than today. Due to its mineral 
resources as well as to its beneficial age 
structure and its population’s high level of 
education, Kazakhstan is ideally suited to 
become Central Asia’s economic engine. The 
“Strategic Development Plan through 2020” 
is supposed to promote this development. 
It aims to improve the country’s business 
climate, to diversify the economy as quickly 
as possible and to invest more in health 
and education. In addition, the plan aims 
to improve the social situation of the 
population, promote understanding among 
the various ethnic groups and stabilize 
international relations.568 
The Cold War’s dangerous legacy
Within the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan 
already provided natural resources and raw 
materials. Since fulfilling national plans was 
a priority, environmental concerns were 
essentially completely neglected.
In the cities of Almaty, Shymkent, Oskemen, 
Aktobe, Temirtau, Karaganda and Taraz, 
in which more than a fifth of all Kazakh 
inhabitants live, the air is extremely polluted 
Population of Kazakhstan by age in thousands in 2008
(Source: Agenstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po 
statistike, Demograficheski Yezhegodnik Kazakhstana 
2009, Astana)
Young and growing Kazakhstan
After women in Kazakhstan had an average of 3.16 
children in 1987, the total fertility rate sank in the 
1990s to 1.76 children.569 Today’s five to 19-year-
olds have thinned out accordingly. In the meantime, 
Kazakh women have started having significantly 
more children. The reasons for this are the economic 
upswing as well as the return to their homeland of 
Oralman, who have a lot of children, from rural areas 
in Mongolia and China. The age structure also makes 
losses in the Second World War very clear. 
Men Women
Baikonur: window to the cosmos
The first Sputnik, the dog Laika, who was the first animal “cosmonaut”, and Yuri Gagarin, 
the first human being in space: they all launched into the cosmos from the Baikonur space 
station. This was the most important launching pad for Soviet military and civilian space 
exploration. The massive cosmodrome had a surface area almost as large as the Republic 
of Moldova, although it did not appear on maps during the Soviet era.
The once hermetically-sealed city of Leninsk (today’s Baikonur) was home, at the peak 
of the Cold War, to about 100,000 employees and their families. Today, about 40,000 
people still live in Baikonur.564 The military has largely pulled out and released the 
premises for civilian purposes. Currently, it is the most important launching point for 
satellites and the provision of the ISS. In 2009, 27 rockets launched from Baikonur.565
Located in the middle of the semi-desert of Kazakhstan, the grounds are, for all intents 
and purposes, extra-territorial, for Russia has leased the area from Kazakhstan until 
2050 for an annual 115 million US dollars. The Proton and Soyuz rockets are produced 
in Moscow and Samara and need to be transported 1,500 and 2,500 kilometres over 
land respectively before they can transport their freight into space. The future of these 
grounds, extensively covered by rocket debris and partially polluted with fuel waste, 
remains uncertain. From 2011 on, Russia wants to build its own cosmodrome in the far 
eastern Uglegorsk. In 2018, the first cosmonauts should launch there. Among other things, 
Russia wants to address demographic problems in the region using this construction, for 
the new cosmodrome is supposed to ensure the livelihoods of about 120,000 people in 
a region affected by emigration.566
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according to information by the Ministry of 
Environment Protection.570 About two-thirds 
of arable land is contaminated, particularly 
in the industrial centres and the densely 
populated southern agricultural areas.571 
In 2009, the environmental ministry could 
not designate a single river or lake as clean 
and deemed 40 of 56 bodies of water 
polluted or extremely polluted.572 Drinking 
water in Kazakhstan is usually taken from 
surface or groundwater, which is very low 
in the summer and in which, accordingly, 
contaminants collect. For this reason, 
among others, the life expectancy of the 
primarily Muslim population, which is 61.9 
years for men and 72.4 years for women, is 
significantly lower than in western industrial 
countries.573
On 29 August, 1949, the Soviet Union 
tested its first atom bomb, on the atomic 
testing grounds of Semipalatinsk in North 
Kazakhstan. In total, about 460 above and 
Kazakhs gaining ground
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russians and 
other non-Central Asian ethnic groups, particularly 
Ukrainians and Germans, have been leaving 
Kazakhstan. This is one reason why the number of 
Kazakhs has grown. Moreover, Kazakh women have 
more children than non-Asian population groups. In 
1999, Kazakhs accounted for more than half of the 
population in their own country for the first time 
since World War II. 
Kazakhstan’s population by ethnicity between 1939 
and 2009
(Source: Demoscope Weekly, Perepisi Naseleniya 
Rossiyskoy Imperii, SSSR, 15 novykh nesawisimykh 
gosudarstv, Moscow; Agenstvo Respubliki 
Kazakhstan po statistike, Ob itogakh perepisi 
naseleniya 2009 goda, Astana)
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Others
underground atomic tests were conducted 
in the Kazakh steppe up through 1989. 
The nuclear explosions have contaminated 
about 19,000 square kilometres, covering a 
territory almost as large as Slovenia.574
“Rebirth Island”, which was once located 
in the middle of the Aral Sea but is now a 
peninsula due to the drying out of the lake 
and is divided by the Kazakh-Uzbek border, 
has turned into a ticking time-bomb. From 
1954 to 1992, the island was used to test 
biological weapons. Among other things, 
open-air experiments with anthrax, pox 
and plague pathogens were conducted on 
animals. After the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the military left, destroying its plants, and 
promised to decontaminate the island. 
Whether this has been sufficiently executed 
remains unclear. The newly-erected land 
bridge has created new fears that reptiles and 
rodents could carry fatal pathogens inland. 
One indication of this is recurring outbreaks 
of the plague among rodents in the region. 
The last cases of plague among humans 
were registered in 2003, after three Kazakh 
farmers had eaten camel meat. 
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UZBEKISTAN
Geographically, Uzbekistan is a special 
case: with the exception of the Principality 
of Liechtenstein, it is the only country in the 
world which neither borders the ocean nor 
has neighbours with direct access to the sea. 
In Central Asia’s most populated state, water 
is a precious good. 80 percent of the country 
is desert. The country’s two large rivers, the 
Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, are the only 
sources of water during drought and they 
feed the once magnificent Aral Sea at the end 
of their thousand-kilometre journey through 
the desert. 
Today, the Aral Sea, once earth’s fourth 
largest lake, has shrunk to approximately 
a quarter of its original size. Large areas 
have dried up since the 1950s and turned 
into giant salt flats. Soviet planners are 
responsible for the gradual disappearance 
of the lake: they extensively expanded the 
cotton monoculture established during the 
Czarist period and dammed up the rivers in 
the highlands of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
in order to irrigate the fields. In the valley, 
the Uzbeks could use the water to irrigate 
their cotton fields. In the 1980s, but a tenth 
of the original amount of water of the Amu 
Darya and Syr Darya Rivers reached the Aral 
Sea. And what arrived was contaminated 
by pesticides, herbicides and the residua 
of fertilizers. Since then, not much has 
changed.575 
The drying up of the lake, which has since 
split up into a small northern and a larger 
southern fragment, adversely affects public 
health. The wind disperses the desiccated 
former sea bottom, which has been 
infused with salt and chemicals, hundreds 
of kilometres. The region’s inhabitants 
breathe this in as toxic dust, which leads to 
respiratory illness: in the Karakalpakstan 
region, which directly borders the Aral Sea, 
there is a greater rate of pneumonia among 
children than anywhere else in the world.576 
Throughout the country, similar illnesses 
count among the most frequent causes 
of death. Over 60 percent of respiratory 
illnesses can be attributed to environmental 
problems.577
The economy also suffers from the degra-
dation of the environment. The approximately 
60,000 employees of the fishing industry 
surrounding the Aral Sea lost their livelihoods 
as early as the 1980s. And, as so often in 
hot, dry zones, artificial irrigation leads to 
salination of the soils: over 60 percent of the 
irrigated land now contains too much salt.578 
The affected territory can lose more than 
80 percent of its fertility as a consequence. 
Moreover, farmers are using more water 
as they try to wash away salt residues by 
extensively flooding the land.579
State-controlled production
Since 1991, cotton in Uzbekistan has lost 
some of its significance. This is because 
the Uzbek government, following the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, ordered 
the cultivation of grain on part of the cotton 
fields as the country was cut off from food 
supplies from other areas of the former Soviet 
Union. Cotton did not, however, lose its 
dominant economic role: in 2009, Uzbekistan 
was still the world’s sixth largest producer 
and the third largest exporter of this natural 
fibre.580 To irrigate the fields, Uzbek farmers 
take almost as much water from the two 
large rivers as all of the other Central Asian 
countries do together.581
Cotton: an environmental risk
Population in 2010 27.79 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 33.93 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 62
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 2.29
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 67.7
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 80,000
Median age in 2010 24.5
(Source: see page 139)
1987 1992 1997 2002 2009
Current production levels of approximately 
one million tonnes of cotton fibre annually 
would not be possible without strict state 
provisions, for the cultivation of rice would 
be significantly more lucrative for farmers. 
Yet the government requires farmers to 
reserve about 60 percent of their land for 
cotton and to produce an amount specified 
by the local authorities. The farmers then 
sell their produce at a fixed low price to the 
state, which subsequently turns a large profit 
by exporting it to China, India, Bangladesh 
and Pakistan. If a farmer does not fulfil his 
production quota, he may well lose the land 
he leased from the state.582
About 40 percent of all working people in 
Uzbekistan depend on agriculture.583 Due to 
highly volatile seasonal demand for labour, 
many of them are underemployed and 
indigent. Nationwide, more than a quarter 
of the population live in poverty.584 There is 
only sufficient work in the fields at harvest 
time, between September and December. 
But the wages are low because the Uzbek 
government, like the Soviets, relies upon 
“voluntary labour” for the work-intensive 
cotton harvest. In autumn, many schools 
close and send children – and teachers – as 
cheap field labour. Up to one million children, 
some of them barely older than ten, must 
perform hard physical work without proper 
nutrition or remuneration. This can have 
dire consequences for the future, not only 
because the children miss part of the school 
year, but because they also often suffer injury 
or illness. There have even been reports of 
deaths.585
Labour Surplus
According to estimates, approximately 27.79 
million people lived in Uzbekistan in 2010.586 
Measured in terms of inhabitants, this makes 
the country the third largest state, following 
Russia and Ukraine, to emerge from the 
former Soviet Union. Like all other countries 
in Central Asia, Uzbekistan is growing 
due to a very high birth rate. In 2009, the 
population grew by about 1.1 percent.587 
Another feature which the country has in 
common with neighbouring states is the 
emigration of young people who cannot find 
work in the domestic labour market. They 
are not only going to Russia, but increasingly 
to Kazakhstan, where the quickly growing 
economy promises employment. 
The situation in the rural southern and 
western parts of the country is particularly 
desperate. The population in the southern 
oblasts of Qashqadarya and Surkhandarya 
has grown over 60 percent since the last 
Soviet census in 1989 while arable land has 
continued to shrink due to salination.588 Even 
today, some regions of Uzbekistan count 
among the most densely populated in the 
post-Soviet space. These include Tashkent, 
the western area of Khorezm and, above 
all, the three eastern oblasts of Fergana, 
Namangan and Andizhan. These lie in the 
fertile Fergana Valley in the tri-border 
region between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Just about a third of the Uzbek 
population live in an area which constitutes 
less than ten percent of the country’s entire 
surface. In Andizhan, there are about 600 
inhabitants per square kilometre: 20 percent 
more than in the Netherlands.589
Cultivation areas for cotton and wheat in Uzbekistan in hectares
(Source: United States Department of Agriculture, PSDOnline Database, Washington DC)
Cotton plantations converted to wheat fields
In the 1980s, the croplands used for cotton exceeded those for wheat several times. In the Soviet system, 
Uzbekistan was the centre of cotton production and received, in return, food from other areas of the country. 
This mechanism broke down following independence in 1991, which is why the Uzbek government has ordered 
the expansion of wheat cultivation. Although this adversely affects cotton cultivation, cotton remains the 
country‘s second-most important export good following gold. 
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Due to high fertility rates, Uzbekistan’s 
population is markedly young. The median 
age dividing the population into two 
equally-large groups of young and old is 
approximately 25. Only about six percent 
of Uzbeks are 60 or older. Since the 
average number of children per woman 
in the past five decades has continued 
to sink, however – from just under seven 
to 2.2 – the population will rapidly age in 
the upcoming years. According to United 
Nations projections, by 2030 the median 
age will have increased to about 33 and 
the percentage of people over 59 will have 
doubled, rising to 12.5 percent.
The economy could benefit from the fact that 
the working-age population – between 16 
and 60 for men and 16 and 55 for women – 
will increase from 15.7 to 21 million. For 16 to 
25-year-olds, who are currently affected most 
by unemployment and underemployment, 
developments look quite different. This group 
will shrink from 5.7 million to 5.2 million, 
or from 21.8 to 15.3 percent of the entire 
population.590
And yet, for Uzbekistan’s already 
overstrained labour market, the increasing 
workforce is an added burden. It will be of 
crucial importance in the future to create 
new employment opportunities. In the field 
of agriculture, this may be impossible due 
to the country’s environmental problems. 
The development of industry and the 
service sector, on the other hand, depends 
upon the success of attracting foreign 
investors to the country. Here, at least, 
there is a noticeable upward trend. Annual 
investments from abroad increased from 
70 million US dollars in 2003 to 918 million 
dollars in 2008. A large amount of capital 
flowed into Uzbekistan’s energy sector, 
Population density of Uzbekistan’s 
regions in 2009
(Source: Gosudarstweny Komitet 
Respubliki Uzbekistan po Statistike, 
Demograficheskie Dannye 1991 – 2009 
gg., Tashkent, author’s calculations)
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Fergana Valley: a melting pot
Uzbekistan’s settlement density varies extensively among the regions. While western parts of the country 
around the Kyzyl Kum Desert are only sparsely populated, up to 600 people per square kilometre live in the 
fertile Fergana Valley. In total, about eight million people live in the three Uzbek valley regions; beyond the 
border in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the valley has another seven million inhabitants. Due to the enormous 
population density, there is a dearth of job opportunities for the population, which repeatedly leads to unrest. 
This is why many Uzbeks are leaving the country for Kyrgyzstan, where, however, they face similar problems. 
Inhabitants per square kilometre
which has natural gas reserves of 2.8 trillion 
cubic metres.591 Internationally, however, 
Uzbekistan lags behind with regard to 
foreign direct investments: its significantly 
smaller neighbour, Turkmenistan, received 
820 million dollars in 2008. With almost 
15 billion dollars, due to its enormous oil 
reserves, Kazakhstan is in another league 
entirely.592
That Uzbekistan was for a long time only 
moderately interesting to investors is due 
to its comparatively slow transition from 
a planned to a market economy. Unlike in 
many of the Soviet Union’s successor states, 
president Islam Karimov only privatized the 
economy step by step; consequently, the 
state still exercises extensive control over 
the country’s three key sectors: energy, gold 
and cotton. The gold industry, in particular, 
has enormous potential: Uzbekistan numbers 
among the world’s ten leading gold producers 
and has numerous untapped deposits. The 
state Navoi Mining and Metallurgy Combine is 
responsible for 60 of the annually produced 
80 tonnes. It is active in the world’s largest 
open-pit gold mine in Muruntau in the 
Kyzl Kum Desert.593 The only foreign – and 
publicly-listed – enterprise in Uzbekistan’s 
gold sector is Oxus Gold, which is controlled 
by a Chinese consortium and holds a 50 
percent stake in the Amantaytau Goldfields 
joint venture directly near the Muruntau 
mine. 
Many investors are discouraged by the 
limited convertibility of the local currency, 
the sum. It has officially been open to 
trade since 2003 but in fact often cannot 
be exchanged without restrictions. 
Other impediments to doing business in 
Uzbekistan include inadequate infrastructure 
and ubiquitous corruption. According to 
the “International Corruption Index” by 
Transparency International, the Uzbek 
government is among the world’s ten most 
corrupt regimes.594
Uzbekistan does not fare much better in the 
World Bank’s annual “Doing Business Index”, 
in which it ranked 150 among 183 countries 
in 2010. At 178, it ranked especially poorly 
in the “Taxes” category, for which the 
complicated tax system and the overall 
burden, which constitutes an average 95 
percent of profits, were responsible. Things 
did not look much better in the category 
“Transnational Trade”, in which Uzbekistan 
ranked 174th. Settling an export transaction 
took, on average, 71 days and an import 
transaction as many as 92.595 This deficit 
is particularly grave given the country’s 
geographically convenient trade location on 
the former Silk Road. 
Birth control by decree
President Karimov, who has governed the 
country since its independence in 1991, is 
aware of the population pressures. At the 
beginning of his term of office, he tried to 
decrease the number of children per woman, 
which was about four at the end of the Soviet 
period.596 It is the state-controlled media, 
above all, which provide information about 
contraception and family planning. Locally, 
so-called mahallas – something like non-
governmental citizens’ assemblies – provide 
information about birth control. According 
to the results of a survey among employees 
in the health sector, the government did 
not, however, stop at awareness-raising; 
it also urged physicians to implant IUD’s 
into a specified number of patients. 
This was common practice even before 
independence.597 Moreover, international 
organizations repeatedly denounce the fact 
that women in Uzbekistan are sterilized 
without their knowledge.598
By human rights standards, these measures 
are unacceptable. The Uzbek government 
has nonetheless reached a few of its goals 
by implementing them. Contraception, for 
example, has outstripped abortion as the 
main instrument of birth control and the 
total fertility rate has dropped to 2.3 children 
per woman.599 On the whole, however, 
reproductive health has deteriorated: the 
number of sexually transmitted diseases, 
including Aids, has risen drastically since 
the mid-1990s. Drug consumption plays a 
large role in the spread of HIV infections, as 
it does throughout the post-Soviet space. 
The number of approximately 16,000 
infected people in 2007, which was about 
0.1 percent of the population, may be low by 
international standards. But in light of the 
fact that physicians only started registering 
the first cases in the mid-1990s, the virus 
is spreading rapidly.600 The government is 
not entirely blameless in this, as it ignores 
the topic of reproductive health in its family 
planning campaigns, instead propagating 
the IUD and sterilization as contraceptive 
methods.601 Condoms, which also protect 
people from sexually transmitted diseases, 
are still comparatively unpopular. Many feel 
that they do not fit Uzbek culture in which 
contraception is a woman’s responsibility. 
The decline in fertility rates in the last 
two decades cannot be attributed to 
governmental policies alone, however. 
Even before the fall of the Soviet Union, 
there was a noticeable downward trend in 
the number of children, characteristic of 
social development and modernization. 
It can also be assumed that the economic 
crisis accompanying the transition period 
adversely affected the number of children in 
Uzbekistan.
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Strong decline in births among young 
women
Since 1995, the number of children per woman 
in Uzbekistan has decreased from 3.1 to 2.3. The 
decline in fertility was greatest among young 
women between 15 and 24 years old. This trend 
has corresponded to an increase in women’s 
average age of marriage since the mid-1990s. 
It cannot yet be determined whether or not 
this is a long-term development, since Uzbek 
women had married younger and younger in the 
previous decade. One reason for this could have 
been that they wanted to marry earlier after 
the Iron Curtain fell in response to economic 
uncertainty.602
Age-specific fertility rates in Uzbekistan from 1995 to 
2000 and 2005 to 2010 and the decrease during this 
period in percent
(Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: 
The 2008 Revision Population Database, New York)
Decrease 
in percent
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s stronghold is the densely 
populated Fergana Valley region. Again 
and again, there are conflicts between the 
populace and the state in this traditionally 
Islamic area. In 2005, this led to a 
tragedy when the military opened fire on 
demonstrators, killing several hundreds.607 
The government later claimed that military 
interference was necessary since militant 
Islamists were among the demonstrators.  
Other sources report, however, that tens of 
thousands of demonstrators had gathered 
in the central square of Andizhan to protest 
the arrest of 23 businessmen who had been 
detained as religious extremists.608
Although unique in scale, the unrest in 
Andizhan illustrates Uzbekistan’s dilemma. 
Due to a lack of economic prospects, the 
population is discontent. Yet due to political 
oppression, it cannot openly demonstrate 
its frustration, becoming receptive to radical 
ideas. In the meantime, the situation in 
Fergana has escalated to such a point that 
Hizb ut-Tahrir would win a democratic 
election by a landslide. Karimov’s regime 
is at a dead-end: nothing but a sustainable 
economic upturn creating jobs could put an 
end to the discontent and prevent further 
violence. Yet an unfinished reform agenda, 
political despotism and corruption stand in 
the way of recovery. 
Repression and Extremism
Despite all internal difficulties, president 
Karimov’s regime is considered stable in 
regional comparisons. This is also due to the 
fact that the opposition is, to a great extent, 
suppressed. Usually, the government justifies 
the detainment of members of the opposition 
on the pretext that they are potential radical 
Islamists. Many experts, however, believe 
that Karimov is forging a political enemy from 
unquestionably existing extremist currents 
in order to legitimize his repressive style of 
leadership.603
Islam has indeed experienced a renaissance 
in Central Asia since the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Migration has not made societies 
more heterogeneous, as it has in Europe, 
but more homogenous and long-suppressed 
religions have become more significant to 
identity building. Between 1990 and 1997 
alone, approximately a half million Slavs 
left the country.604 Today, 80 percent of the 
population is of Uzbek descent. Russians and 
Tajiks each comprise five percent according 
to official estimates. Almost 90 percent of 
the inhabitants are Muslims.605
Shortly after independence, state-mandated 
Islam as propagated by president Karimov 
encountered opposition by radical Islamic 
organizations such as the “Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan” (IMU). Three bombings in 
the centre of Tashkent in spring 1999 just 
missed the president. Although the IMU 
has essentially been broken up, the globally 
operating organization Hizb ut-Tahrir is 
enjoying enormous influx in Central Asia. 
This organization also aims to overthrow 
the government and install a caliphate. 
Officially, Hizb ut-Tahrir supports overthrow 
by peaceful means but it does not exclude 
military force to reach its goal of state 
expansion.606
Number of children per 1,000 
women in an age group
TURKMENISTAN
In the centre of the Turkmen capital 
Ashgabat, the Ruhnama or “The Book of the 
Soul”, a stone monument weighing several 
tonnes, revolves. Its author, Saparmurat 
Niyazov, was president of the Central Asian 
country from 1990 until his death in 2006 
and one of the modern world’s most bizarre 
dictators. The book was obligatory reading in 
all schools, universities and mosques – even 
at driving schools. Today, the pamphlet has 
been translated into 22 languages as it is the 
entrance ticket for businesses the world over 
to the Turkmen market. DaimlerChrysler and 
the Zeppelin construction machine company 
paid for the German translation.
Niyazov, who called himself “Turkmenbashi”, 
Leader of all Turkmens, was an absolute 
despot. He abolished pensions for a large 
portion of the population and closed opera 
houses, libraries and all hospitals outside 
the capital. In return, he gave every woman 
38 US dollars on International Women’s Day. 
Following Niyazov’s death in 2006, the new 
president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, 
tried to abolish the worst manifestations of 
the Niyazov cult. He edited out all mention 
of Turkmenbashi from the constitution and 
decreed that farmers and housewives get 
their pensions back.609 Turkmenistan’s new 
ruler is not, however, entirely free of his own 
autocratic pretensions. For his 50th birthday, 
he awarded himself a 55 kilogram gold medal 
encrusted with 55 carat diamonds.
In contrast to his predecessor, 
Berdimuhamedow also plans to reduce 
Turkmenistan’s dependence on natural 
resources and to promote diversification of 
the economy. Accordingly, he has converted 
the city of Turkmenbashi on the Caspian Sea 
into a spa town. Three hotels in the “Avaza” 
project, intended to attract international 
tourists to the country, have already been 
festively opened. The leisure complex 
is supposed to be connected to a seven-
kilometre artificial river by the time it is 
completed in 2020.
A desert El Dorado
The country’s landscape, the surface area 
of which is larger than Germany’s by about 
half, is quite uniform. One of the world’s 
largest deserts, the Karakum, covers almost 
95 percent of the territory. But the desert 
sand hides the resource that has made its 
dictators’ obscure construction projects and 
cult-status possible: natural gas. Following 
the most recent exploration of the Yolotan 
Gas Field, Turkmenistan’s gas reserves now 
contain more than eight trillion cubic metres 
or 4.3 percent of the world’s natural gas 
resources. Only Russia, Iran and Qatar have 
larger reserves.610
At current production levels, Turkmen natural 
gas reserves would last over 100 years. But 
production will probably increase soon since 
the country has experienced a veritable 
pipeline building boom in the last three 
years. In December 2009, the so-called Silk 
Road Pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to 
China was opened. In the near future, the 
Pre-Caspian Pipeline, which will measure 
Dictatorship without data
Population in 2010 5.18 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 6.28 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 11
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 2.50
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 64.7
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 5,000
Median age in 2010 24.7
(Source: see page 139)
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1,700 kilometres, will also be built to 
connect the city of Turkmenbashi with 
Russia’s Alexandrov Gay. The pipelines will 
each transport 30 billions of cubic metres of 
natural gas annually. As of 2015, the Nabucco 
Pipeline will also pump this much Turkmen 
and Azerbaijani gas to Europe.611 And Iran 
also wants to increase its imports from 
Turkmenistan from eight to 20 billion cubic 
metres annually using a second pipeline 
which has already been completed.612
The population does not benefit
There are little reliable data or figures on 
Turkmenistan and its population. These are 
not recorded in this sealed-off country or, 
at least, not published. Only estimates by 
international organizations are able to supply 
a fragmentary portrait of the situation.
What is certain is that GDP per capita has 
significantly grown since 2000 due to the 
natural gas boom, from about 1,900 to over 
5,900 international dollars in 2009. This 
was double that of neighbouring Uzbekistan 
and has made Turkmenistan, following 
Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s second-richest 
country.614 The economic boom, which is 
controlled to a great extent by the state, 
has not benefited the population, however. 
According to estimates, up to 70 percent of 
the working-age population are unemployed 
or underemployed and a large share of these 
people live in abject poverty.615
The price boom on international natural 
resource markets has meant that 
Turkmenistan’s agriculture – dominated by 
a cotton sector constituting 24 percent of all 
economic activity in 2000 – only contributed 
ten percent to GDP in 2009, even though a 
major portion of the employed work in this 
industry.616 Another indication of the poor 
quality of life is the extremely high infant 
mortality rate, with over 50 deaths per 1,000 
live births.617 The high rate also contributes 
to the fact that the life expectancy of the 
primarily Muslim population in Turkmenistan, 
at 64.7 years, is still lower than in Russia.
A lot of Turkmen, few Russians
Turkmenistan’s population is very young. 
In 2009, about 69 percent of its 5.1 million 
inhabitants were younger than 35 years 
old and only about five percent were 65 or 
older. In the 1960s and 1970s, the average 
number of children per woman was six and 
only began to sink gradually in the following 
years. Today, women in Turkmenistan have 
an average of 2.5 children so that the current 
population growth of an annual 1.3 percent 
will slow down to 0.2 percent by 2030. 
Nonetheless, Turkmenistan’s population 
size of 6.3 million in 2030 will be higher 
than in 2009 by 23.5 percent. Among the 
Soviet successor states, only Tajikistan is 
growing more rapidly. The surplus in births 
even offsets annual migration losses of 
approximately one person for every 1,000 
inhabitants.618
Since 1990, primarily Russians, Uzbeks and 
Kazakhs have emigrated despite officially 
closed borders.619 While most of the urban 
Russian population has left the country 
due to nationalistic tendencies in Turkmen 
society, the Kazakhs, who live primarily 
in the country’s north, have left due to 
environmental problems which have resulted 
in the drying out of the Aral Sea. Additionally, 
the Kazakh government’s repatriation 
policies have attracted many compatriots. 
As a result of the emigration of other ethnic 
groups, Turkmenistan is steadily becoming 
more homogenous. While the share of 
Turkmen constituted 72 percent of the entire 
population in 1989, it was 85 percent when 
the last census was taken in 2003. Alongside 
the Turkmen population, only the number of 
Uzbeks rose, from about two to five percent, 
due to high birth rates.620
Crisis facing the health care system
At the beginning of the century in the oil and gas 
exporting countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, expenditures for health care could not 
keep up with economic growth rates. In 2007, health 
care expenditure in Turkmenistan constituted only 
2.6 percent of GDP; worldwide, this value was lower 
in only seven other countries. In contrast to this, 
developed countries invest about ten percent of their 
income in health. Turkmenistan’s low investment 
is, in addition to the general downfall of the health 
sector under Niyazov’s rule, due to corruption, 
for frequently only those receive treatment who 
significantly augment regular physicians’ fees under 
the table.613
Percentage of health care expenditure in GDP, 
2000 and 2007
(Source: World Health Organization, World Health 
Statistics, Geneva)
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Following independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan 
was seen as an island of democracy in 
Central Asia. President Askar Akayev seemed 
open to reform at the beginning of his rule 
and the country’s three largest population 
groups – the Kyrgyz, the Russians and the 
Uzbeks – lived in relative harmony. The 
bloody unrest in the southern Kyrgyz city 
of Osh in which the Uzbek and the Kyrgyz 
populations had fought over land rights in 
1990 seemed to have been forgotten.
Barely two decades later, the picture has 
changed. The island of democracy has long 
disappeared and daily life in Kyrgyzstan 
is characterized by insufficient food, 
inflationary energy prices and massive 
corruption. In April 2010, this led to the 
downfall of president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, 
who had violently ousted the increasingly 
authoritarian Askayev in 2005. Following 
this revolution, the situation escalated in the 
southern part of the country. Kyrgyz gangs 
attacked members of the Uzbek minority 
for days. It is possible that the attacks were 
incited by Bakiyev’s family, which tried to 
destabilize the transitional government 
quickly.621 Hundreds lost their lives in the 
conflicts and tens of thousands fled to 
neighbouring Uzbekistan.622
North-south divide
According to national estimates, the Kyrgyz 
were the largest ethnic population group 
in 2009, constituting 69.6 percent of 
the total population of 5.28 million; the 
United Nations put the population for the 
same period at 5.48 million. The Uzbek 
and Russians followed the Kyrgyz as the 
next-largest ethnic groups at 14.5 and 8.4 
percent respectively, followed in turn by 80 
smaller minorities.623 The largest part of the 
Russian minority lives in the northern Chui 
Valley surrounding Bishkek. The Uzbek live 
primarily in the south, in the oblasts of Osh 
and Jalalabad in the Fergana Valley. The two 
valleys, which are home to 75 percent of the 
total population, are separated by the Tian 
Shan Mountains and thus quite isolated.624 
They have only been connected since 2003 
by a paved street passable year-round.
For historical reasons, living circumstances 
vary greatly in the north and south: the north, 
which borders the steppe of Kazakhstan, 
is the country’s economic centre. Soviet 
planners settled the textile, food and 
electricity industries here, which is why 
a relatively large number of people live 
in cities. In the more rural south, many 
people live as farmers and poverty is a great 
problem. In 2007, GDP per capita in Bishkek 
was, at about 4,500 international dollars, 
three times greater than in Osh, the country’s 
second-largest city. The economic strength of 
the other northern oblasts of Chui, Issyk-Kul 
and Talas is also significantly greater than 
that of all southern areas.625 
Russian settlement in the region began at 
the end of the 19th century, shortly after 
Czar Alexander II conquered the Khanate of 
Kokand, which contained today’s Kyrgyzstan. 
The fertile Chui Valley quickly became a 
popular destination among Russian farmers, 
who drove away many of the Kyrgyz nomads 
living in traditional yurts towards China. 
Later, the Soviets continued to pursue these 
policies.626 The share of ethnic Russians in 
the total population rose as a consequence, 
from 5.9 percent in 1926 to 30.2 percent in 
1959. It was primarily during World War II 
that their numbers increased dramatically, 
since the Soviet rulers evacuated their 
KYRGYZSTAN
Ethnic upheavals 
Population in 2010 5.55 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 6.54 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 28
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 2.56
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 67.8
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 15,000
Median age in 2010 25.1
(Source: see page 139)
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industries from western regions to today’s 
Kyrgyzstan, among other places. Since the 
1960s, the ethnic Kyrgyz population, which 
constituted but 40.5 percent of the total 
population at the end of the 1950s, has 
gained in significance compared to Russians 
due primarily to high numbers of children.627
The trend towards a more homogenous 
population has continued since 
independence in 1991. Between the last 
Soviet census in 1989 and 2009, the number 
of ethnic Russians sank from 917,000 to 
440,000; in the same period, the entire 
population grew by a fourth from 4.33 to 
5.48 million people.628 This means the 
Russians have lost their status as the largest 
minority to the Uzbeks. There were about 
767,000 of the latter living in Kyrgyzstan in 
2009. In 1989, there had been but 550,000 
Uzbeks. The Kyrgyz increased in this period 
from 2.23 million to 3.67 million.629
Due primarily to emigration, the Russian 
minority in Kyrgyzstan has shrunk in the two 
decades since independence.  As in other 
Central Asian countries, many Russians 
fled from the major economic crisis of the 
1990s, as a result of which real GDP per 
capita decreased by about 40 percent while 
the annual inflation rate increased to over 
one thousand percent.630 For the economies 
of all Central Asian countries, particularly in 
the industrial sector, the mass emigration of 
Russians was a major loss, as Russians were, 
on average, better educated than the “titular” 
peoples for whom the country was named. 
Prior to 1991, Russians had accounted for 
about half of all of Central Asia’s engineers.631
Those Russians who did remain in Kyrgyzstan 
also have significantly fewer numbers of 
children than the rest of the population, as 
the last Demographic and Health Survey in 
1997 showed. Kyrgyz women had an average 
of 3.6 children while Russian women in 
Kyrgyzstan bore an average of 1.5 children. 
And the growing Uzbek population also has 
high fertility rates: Uzbek women had the 
most children among the three largest ethnic 
groups, with an average of 4.2 children.632
In 2008, the average number of children 
per woman in Kyrgyzstan, according to 
information by the United Nations, was 
2.56; according to the National Statistical 
Committee, it was 2.81. It is remarkable that 
the figure has significantly increased since 
the beginning of this century; in 2001, it 
had merely been 2.38. This increase, which 
distinguishes Kyrgyzstan from its neighbours 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, is almost entirely 
traceable to an increase of children in the 
cities, where rates rose throughout the entire 
period from 1.7 to 2.57 children per woman. 
In rural areas, there was only an increase 
from 2.93 to 2.99.633 Both the improved 
economic situation and the emigration 
of ethnic Russians play a role in this 
development. The Russians lived primarily 
in the cities and contributed to lower fertility 
rates.
Since rural areas still have markedly higher 
birth rates than cities, the most significant 
population growth of 20 percent by 2030 
will take place here.634 This will mostly 
benefit the southern part of country, where 
57 percent of the population already live.635 
However, the rapid population growth of 
the Uzbek minority, in particular, contains 
continuing potential for tension. The Uzbeks 
have long dominated the markets in the south 
although their demands for greater political 
participation and a greater role for the Uzbek 
language have so far been largely ineffective. 
On the contrary, since 1996, Russian has 
been the second official national language. 
The poorhouse of the former Soviet 
Union
Among the Soviet successor states, only Tajikistan 
had a lower GDP per capita than Kyrgyzstan in 
2009. Both countries had been highly dependent 
upon food and financial transfers from Moscow 
during the Soviet era and they have still not 
managed to liberate themselves entirely from 
this dependence. This is also because they have 
relatively few valuable resources.
GDP per capita in the Soviet successor states in international dollars in 2009
(Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, Washington DC; the data for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan are estimates)
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Problems with neighbours
As in the neighbouring states, the high 
birth rates in Kyrgyzstan have also led to 
a labour surplus, which is why especially 
people from the poorer southern regions 
have left the country. As a result, it is no 
longer only Russians but increasingly Kyrgyz 
who have been migrating north. In 2008, 
they constituted 37 percent of emigrants, 
essentially equalling the Russians.636 
According to estimates, there were between 
300,000 and 500,000 Kyrgyz working in 
Russia and Kazakhstan as early as 2005.637 In 
2008, remittances by migrants constituted 
27.9 percent of GDP and were the most 
important means of alleviating poverty.638 
Another problem which Kyrgyzstan shares 
with its neighbours is drug smuggling, which 
is the only way many people can earn their 
money. About 20 tonnes of narcotics cross 
Kyrgyz territory every year.639 On top of 
this, there are repeated conflicts with the 
neighbouring countries in the valley over 
access to water.
Kyrgyzstan has better relations with its 
eastern neighbour, China, which despite 
corruption and uncertain legal norms has 
invested extensively in new goldmines and 
Kyrgyzstan’s infrastructure. Today, gold is 
Kyrgyzstan’s most important export good and 
it is precisely for the mining of this precious 
metal that the country is dependent upon 
foreign investors, generally as partners in 
joint ventures with the state corporation 
Kyrgyzaltyn. Majority owners of the largest 
mine, the Kumtor Gold Mine, located at 
4,000 metres in the country’s northeast, is 
the Canadian Centerra Gold. The company 
produces 90 percent of the country’s gold.640 
Its main buyer is Switzerland, which has 
become the world’s largest importer of 
Kyrgyz products.641
But trade between China and Kyrgyzstan, 
the only two WTO members in the region, 
is also flourishing: between 2006 and 
2008 alone, the trade volume tripled, due 
almost exclusively to Kyrgyzstan’s increasing 
imports. Following Russia, China was 
Kyrgyzstan’s second-most important trade 
partner in 2008.643 Many Kyrgyz feel China’s 
influence, however, is going too far. They 
fear competition from the 100,000 Chinese 
labourers living in Kyrgyzstan as well as the 
traders selling their commodities on the 
Central Asian market. Ethnic violence against 
the Chinese is no longer a rarity.644
Due to its economic structure, Kyrgyzstan 
is extremely dependent upon world market 
prices for energy and food, as the country 
imports both. This means that in times of 
increasing prices, the country quickly faces 
crisis, as it last did in 2008 when Bishkek 
city districts were cut off from the power 
supply system on a rotating basis. In order 
to make Kyrgyzstan a more attractive 
production site in the future, it will require, 
above all, a better-educated population. 
After 1991, teachers emigrated extensively 
due to low pay, forcing some schools to 
offer morning and afternoon shifts. And the 
teaching materials are insufficient. There 
are similar problems in higher education: 
although there were 48.3 students per 
1,000 inhabitants in 2007, constituting the 
highest student quota in Central Asia, there 
is a dearth of qualified teaching staff.645 
Furthermore, the ones who actually complete 
a degree are those paying up front.646
Kyrgyz men live longer than Russian men
Despite the economic crisis, life expectancy in Kyrgyzstan in the early 1990s decreased only minimally, in 
contrast to Russia, where chances of survival decreased dramatically – especially for men. Men in Kyrgyzstan 
live about four years longer than their Russian counterparts despite the lower level of development. Women 
in Russia can still expect to live longer than women in Kyrgyzstan, but they have also lost a lot of ground. 
Interestingly, the life expectancy of Russian men and women within Kyrgyzstan, despite their higher socio-
economic status, sank more markedly than that of the titular population. Apparently, the two population 
groups have responded differently to financial uncertainty: Russian men and women tended to adopt unhealthy 
lifestyles.642
Life expectancy at birth by sex in Kyrgyzstan and Russia, 1970 to 2010
(Source: United Nations, Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database, New York)
Kyrgyzstan – men
Russia – men
Kyrgyzstan – women
Russia – women
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In Tajikistan, whoever does not have a 
share in the Rogun Dam, a huge national 
construction project, or cannot prove 
that he or she has donated to it, must fear 
consequences: students, for example, risk 
losing their placements. And in one region 
of the country, several teachers have lost a 
day’s wages. The money flowed into the dam. 
Since the Russian aluminium company Rusal 
has pulled out as an investor, the leviathan 
endeavor urgently needs capital.647
The dam, the planning of which hails back 
to the Soviet era, would be a milestone in 
Tajikistan’s history: the dam’s wall on the 
Vakhsh River in the centre of the country 
is supposed to reach 335 metres in height, 
which would be a world record. With a total 
capacity of 3,600 megawatts, the plant 
could supply as much electricity as three 
modern nuclear power plants together. 
The country’s electricity production would 
increase by more than 75 percent at a single 
stroke.648 For the first time, Tajikistan would 
be self-sufficient with regard to energy. 
Furthermore, it would be able to supply 
electricity to Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
China, thereby importing much-needed 
foreign currency. Currently, the aluminium 
industry devours a vast amount of electricity, 
while the population depends on firewood to 
survive the ice-cold winters in a country with 
93 percent mountain coverage. The state 
aluminium corporation Talco alone produces 
over 400,000 tonnes of raw aluminium 
annually, using 40 percent of Tajikistan’s 
total energy resources.649
For the impoverished Tajikistan, however, 
building the dam is an almost impossible 
financial challenge. In order to build just two 
of the six generators, the state needs about 
a billion US dollars, which it aims to collect 
by selling shares to the entire population.650 
Whether this can succeed without applying 
more pressure is questionable, for few 
people voluntarily purchase shares whose 
price greatly exceeds the average monthly 
income. 
Finances are not the only impediment on 
Tajikistan’s path to energy self-sufficiency. 
Its neighbour, Uzbekistan, has vehemently 
tried to stop the dam because the water of 
the Amu Darya, which flows towards the Aral 
Sea, itself created from the confluence of 
the Vakhsh and the Panj Rivers, is urgently 
needed in the summer to irrigate the Uzbek 
and Turkmen cotton fields in the valley. At 
this time of year, however, the Tajiks want to 
dam up the water from the mountain regions 
in order to produce electricity throughout 
the winter. The Uzbek government has also 
pointed to the region’s earthquake risk. 
Meanwhile, experts suspect that Uzbekistan 
wants to prevent the building of the dam 
primarily to ensure Tajikistan’s dependence 
upon Uzbekistan’s natural gas supplies.651
When growth becomes a problem
 TAJIKISTAN
Population in 2010 7.08 million
Population in 2030 (projection) 9.62 million
Population/km2 of land in 2010 49
Total fertility rate in 2005-2010 3.45
Life expectancy at birth in 2005-2010 66.7
Annual net migration 2005-2010 – 40,000
Median age in 2010 20.7
(Source: see page 139)
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Civil war and economic crisis
The roots of today’s feud between both 
countries lay in the Soviet era, when the state 
ruled that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan should 
supply their western neighbours with water, 
receiving natural gas in return. In various 
treaties, the Central Asian states agreed 
after 1991 to maintain the old agreement, 
but they rarely fulfilled their obligations. 
Additionally, Uzbekistan sold its fuel to 
neighbours at internationally competitive 
prices, while Tajikistan was unable to make 
comparable profits with its water. At the end 
of October 2009, Uzbekistan temporarily 
cut off its energy supply to Tajikistan, 
thereby encouraging its eastern neighbour to 
continue with the dam project. 
Now the Tajiks are Persian and the Uzbeks 
Turkish, but in the Czarist era, ethnic 
background played a subordinate role in the 
groups’ relationship. The Islamic religion 
binding both peoples was more important. 
Even less educated people generally spoke 
both Tajik and Uzbek. It was only when Stalin 
separated the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic 
from the Uzbek SSR in the wake of “national 
demarcation” in 1928, promising Uzbekistan 
the significant Tajik centres of Samarkand 
and Bukhara, that the region developed 
something akin to a national awareness. 
Oppressed in the Soviet era, this led in the 
1990s to increasingly frequent, if smaller, 
conflicts. 
In 1992, a year after the country was founded 
and Tajikistan’s first democratic elections 
were held – from which the former Soviet 
cadres emerged victorious – the country was 
plunged into a bloody civil war. By the war’s 
official end in 1997, at least 50,000 had lost 
their lives and many more people had been 
displaced.652 The insurgents, comprised of 
both liberals and Islamists and who recruited 
their supporters primarily from the central 
Tajik city of Gharm and the eastern region 
of Gorno-Badakhshan, faced massacres 
by governmental troops following their 
decisive defeat in 1993 and fled by the tens 
of thousands to neighbouring Afghanistan.653 
A large number of ethnic Russians living in 
Tajikistan had already fled to Russia during 
the war. Estimates put their number at about 
400,000.654
The economic consequences of the civil 
war were also devastating: the country’s 
real GDP was halved between 1992 and 
1996, which meant that three-fourths of 
the population had to survive on incomes 
below poverty level.655 The yield from cotton 
production, which was extremely important 
as an export and to which Tajikistan devoted 
a large portion of its paltry arable land, 
decreased to 312,000 tonnes by 1996. Prior 
to independence, cotton production had 
yielded an average of 800,000 tonnes.656 
Due to crop shortfalls and sinking prices 
on the world market, export revenues were 
no longer sufficient to import urgently 
needed food for the growing population – for 
Tajikistan is not in a position to supply its 
own food due to the cotton monoculture 
introduced by the Soviets.
Today, farmers are still suffering from 
the crisis of the 1990s: when the Tajik 
government converted the kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes in 1996 into so-called dehkan 
farms, these had huge debts. The farmers, 
who have since had to lease their land from 
the state, are legally bound to take over the 
debts of the collective farms. Nor do they 
have much possibility of restructuring their 
farms, as Tajikistan, like Uzbekistan, dictates 
production. Farmers must set aside between 
60 and 75 percent of their croplands for 
cotton production. They can only export 
their yield, however, through the state, which 
claims a major portion of profits.657
Labour migrants: Tajikistan’s life 
insurance
In order to flee the hopelessness of post-
war Tajikistan, many young Tajiks migrated 
to Russia, though few of them had legal 
residency permits. Until today, at least a 
million Tajik nationals in search of work 
have left the country either temporarily or 
permanently. While Tajikistan has lost about 
20 percent of its working-age population 
to migration, the country would be much 
worse off without its emigrants. These 
transfer a significant amount of their wages, 
Tajikistan’s most important economic 
pillar
After the Tajik government abolished several 
hurdles for migrant workers at the beginning 
of this century, the volume of remittances 
jumped significantly. Up through 2008, it grew 
even faster than the Tajik economy, which 
was recuperating from the crisis of the 1990s. 
Remittances reached a peak in 2008, when 
they constituted about 2.5 billion US dollars or 
more than 50 percent of Tajik GDP. In 2009, 
remittances plummeted as a result of the 
economic crisis. 
GDP in and remittances to Tajikistan in million US 
dollars between 2003 and 2008
(Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Database, Washington DC)
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Net migration per 1,000 inhabitants, 2008
Great population growth despite massive 
emigration
Almost all successor states of the Soviet Union which 
will experience population growth through 2030 are 
now losing people to emigration. Only Kazakhstan 
has positive net migration. The countries with 
growing populations are all located outside of Europe 
and are economically less developed (Kazakhstan 
is an exception). Traditional lifestyles ensure birth 
surpluses over deaths, which exceed losses due to 
migration. This trend is strongest is Tajikistan: in 
the poorest country of the former Soviet Union, the 
population will increase the most through 2030, by 
over 35 percent. The opposite is true in the European 
Soviet successor states, where low birth rates are 
leading to shrinking populations.
Georgia
Moldova
Lithuania
Armenia
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Estonia
LatviaUkraine
Kyrgyzstan
Belarus Russian
Federation
Net migration in 2008, population change until 2030 and GDP per capita in the former Soviet states. The size 
of the circles indicates GDP per capita in international dollars.
(Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, Washington DC, author’s calculations; United Nations, World 
Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database; National statistical offices)
which significantly exceed average earnings 
in Tajikistan, to their families back home. In 
2008, the official total volume of remittances 
was about 2.5 billion US dollars. This was 
about half of Tajik GDP; worldwide, a uniquely 
high value. This means that migrant workers 
have contributed significantly to the drop in 
poverty to 44.4 percent – high though this 
still is. 
Despite the remittances, the Tajik govern ment 
long remained sceptical of labour migration 
and even condemned it as traitorous. Until 
2001, the state placed a 30 percent tax on 
international money transfers. Emigrants 
were virtually forced to bring the money 
back personally and then often fell victim 
to robbery or the capriciousness of border 
controls and the police. Following the 
abolishment of the tax, bank transfers became 
the preferred method of sending money. 
More relief came in 2002: the government 
abolished the emigration visa for which 
migrants previously had to apply. In 2004, 
Russia and Tajikistan signed an agreement 
which formally recognized the rights of 
migrant workers and which was intended to 
fight illegal migration.661 But many Tajiks still 
reside illegally in Russia.662
The extensive wave of labour migration has 
also made Tajikistan extremely dependent 
upon Russia’s economy. When it faced crisis 
in 2009, transfers fell by 30 percent.663 
And it is especially the construction 
industry in which many Tajiks earn their 
wages, which is sensitive to economic 
fluctuations. Tajikistan’s long-term economic 
development also profits little from the 
transfers, which flow to a great extent into 
private consumption. Only about 15 percent 
of this income is invested, and then more 
often in private property rather than in new 
businesses or capital goods.664
Population pressure meets a weak 
labour market
Despite emigration, Tajikistan’s population 
is the fastest-growing of all former Soviet 
republics. While only five million people lived 
in the mountain republic in 1989, more than 
seven million lived there in 2010, an increase 
of more than a third.665 This can be explained 
by the fact that women in Tajikistan still have 
more than three children on average. This is 
about two fewer children than in the 1980s, 
but significantly more than necessary for 
stable population numbers. Annually, births 
exceed deaths by about 150,000. Due to the 
number of children, Tajikistan’s population is 
also very young: about half the Tajiks are not 
even 20 years old. In the near future, more 
and more women will reach childbearing 
age between 15 and 44, leading to further 
population growth. The United Nations 
estimates that in 2030, there will be about 
Population change from 2009 to 2030 in percent
9.6 million people living in Tajikistan, which 
would be more than 35 percent more than 
today.666
Because the Tajik labour market is not in a 
position to absorb the steady increase of 
young people, such strong population growth 
carries risks. In the first half of 2009 alone, 
about 150,000 more people were burdening 
the domestic labour market, because 
demand for migrant labour in Russia had 
diminished considerably in the wake of the 
economic crisis.667 There are no reliable data, 
however, on unemployment. Nonetheless, 
the official estimate of 2.2 percent bears 
little relationship to reality.668 The low 
employment estimate of 50.5 percent makes 
it clear that many people keep their heads 
above water on subsistence farming or 
depend upon family members.669
period, as well as extensive corruption, 
created fertile soil in the mid-1990s for the 
drug trade, which has been booming ever 
since. In 1996, Tajik police forces seized the 
first six kilograms of smuggled heroin. Barely 
a decade later, over 5,000 kilograms were 
seized annually, before a recent decrease 
to about 2,000 kilograms.672 According to 
estimates, a total of 40 to 80 tonnes of pure 
heroin pass through Tajikistan every year on 
their way north or west. This is about a fourth 
of total Afghan production.673 The rapid 
spread of HIV in Russia and other former 
Soviet states, in which about 50 to 95 tonnes 
of heroin are consumed per year, would not 
have been possible without this transit route.
Opium trade route
Since it is difficult to earn money legally 
in Tajikistan, many young men end up in 
the drug trade. Turnover in this business 
is estimated at about 30 percent of Tajik 
GDP.670 Thanks to a border extending over 
1,300 kilometres to Afghanistan, which 
produces over 90 percent of the world’s 
opiates, Tajikistan is ideally located to serve 
the steadily increasing demand for opium 
and heroin in Russia.671 The civil war and the 
difficult economic situation of the transition 
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GEORGIA
GE Georgia 2 1.58 18.1 71.6 – 11.5 4 4,907 0.2 56.5 – 11.0
ARMENIA
ARM Armenia 2 1.74 14.4 73.7 – 4.9 4 5,809 0.2 57.3 2.5
AZERBAIJAN
AZ Azerbaijan 5 2.16 8.9 70.2 – 1.2 3 8,728 0.2 74.4 15.9
KAZAKHSTAN 9.7
KZ1 Akmola Oblast 4 2.19 12.2 66.2 – 6.5 3 7,004 0.1 81.8
KZ2 Aktobe Oblast 5 2.70 8.8 68.2 – 0.9 3 13,443 0.1 78.5
KZ3 Almaty Oblast 5 2.65 9.3 68.6 1.5 3 4,468 0.1 73.3
KZ4 Atyrau Oblast 5 3.29 7.2 68.2 2.8 1 39,593 0.1 76.3
KZ5 West Kazakhstan Oblast 5 2.29 10.9 68.6 – 1.4 3 14,625 0.1 74.9
KZ6 Zhambyl Oblast 5 3.20 8.4 68.7 – 6.6 3 3,460 0.4 81.9
KZ7 Karagandy Oblast 4 2.04 12.5 66.9 – 0.6 3 11,884 0.1 77.5
KZ8 Kostanai Oblast 4 1.70 13.9 67.8 – 5.3 3 8,623 0.0 85.7
KZ9 Qysylorda Oblast 5 3.42 6.7 67.5 – 5.7 3 11,748 0.0 72.2
KZ10 Mangystau Oblast 3.80 5.5 68.3 19.6 1 28,728 0.3 71.6
KZ11 South Kazakhstan Oblast 5 3.71 6.4 69.5 – 2.1 3 3,389 0.1 73.8
KZ12 Pavlodar Oblast 4 1.98 12.1 68.0 – 1.9 3 12,596 0.0 78.7
KZ13 North Kazakhstan Oblast 4 1.72 13.7 67.3 – 7.4 3 6,759 0.0 83.0
KZ14 East Kazakhstan Oblast 4 2.07 13.3 67.2 – 5.4 3 6,856 0.5 74.8
KZ15 Astana 2.44 8.1 75.7 38.1 1 22,714 0.4 74.6
KZ16 Almaty 2.65 11.5 72.2 14.5 1 23,948 0.5 71.3
UZBEKISTAN
UZ Uzbekistan 5 2.29 6.2 67.7 – 3.0 2,607 66.9 22.8
TURKMENISTAN
TM Turkmenistan 5 2.50 6.1 64.7 – 1.0 5,764 21.9
KYRGYZSTAN
KS Kyrgyzstan 5 2.56 7.3 67.8 – 2.8 3 2,204 0.3 68.1 18.4
TAJIKISTAN
TJ Tajikistan 5 3.45 5.1 66.7 – 5.9 4 1,793 0.1 59.7 37.3
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What are the regional demographics of the 
former Soviet Union? To what extent are a 
region’s demographics related to its wealth 
and economic structure? How do current 
developments affect the regions’ future?
In order to answer these questions, the Berlin 
Institute for Population and Development has 
selected seven demographic and economic 
indicators and submitted these to two 
separate cluster analyses. The classification 
illustrates the complex developments 
in the post-Soviet space by identifying 
and distinguishing regions facing similar 
challenges.
The analyses focused on all Soviet successor 
states. As a rule, the first sub-national 
administrative level was considered; in most 
countries, these regions are called oblasts. 
In Russia, the 80 oblasts, krais, republics 
and autonomous cities have constituted 
the second-highest administrative level 
since Vladimir Putin created eight federal 
districts. Nonetheless, they formed the basis 
of analysis since their size and population 
numbers compare most closely to regions in 
other countries. A few states were considered 
on the national rather than regional level. 
This was the case when further sub-divisions 
would have led to very small units, both in 
terms of space and population, or when no 
In the field of economics, GDP per capita 
was chosen as a general welfare indicator. 
In order to ensure cross-regional and 
cross-country comparability, GDP has 
been expressed in international dollars, 
a hypothetical currency which eliminates 
differences in price levels. Conversion 
was made in two steps. First, differences 
in purchasing power within Russia were 
eliminated using a regional consumer 
price index calculated by Rosstat; then all 
regional and national values were converted 
to international dollars. The International 
Monetary Fund provides conversion factors 
for all countries. 
In addition to GDP, an employment indicator 
was also selected. This illustrates to what 
extent a region’s economic strength actually 
benefits people and to what extent the 
regular labour market is developed. When 
unemployment takes root and the shadow 
economy expands, an economy cannot 
make effective use of its human capital and 
public coffers lose tax revenues for future 
investments. In order guarantee the highest 
possible degree of comparability, the number 
of all employed persons was put in relation 
to the number of people between 15 and 59 
years old. 
reliable regional data were available. The 
countries considered on the national level 
included the three Baltic states, Moldova, 
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The 
analysis encompassed a total of 141 regions 
and countries.
The selection of indicators was made 
on the basis of theoretical knowledge in 
demography and economics: in the field 
of demography, the total fertility rate, life 
expectancy at birth, net migration per 
1,000 inhabitants (in order to eliminate 
short-term economic fluctuations the mean 
for the years 2006 to 2009 was calculated) 
as well as the share of the over-59s in the 
total population. The first three indicators 
are the most important parameters in the 
field of demography and the basis for all 
population projections. The age structure 
of the population, in this case the share of 
elderly people, provides important additional 
information about age group ratios within a 
single region. Among other things, it allows 
assertions about the future size of the labour 
force and the burdens facing social security 
systems. 
INDICATORS AND METHODS
In order to make assertions about future 
economic sustainability, the analysis also 
included expenditures on research and 
development in percentages of GDP. This 
made it possible to measure a region’s 
potential for securing long-term welfare 
based on innovation. We would also have 
liked to consider foreign direct investments 
in order to make a statement about how far 
regions can modernize their economies by 
means of technology transfer and outside 
aid. Unfortunately, however, no comparative 
data were available. 
In preparation for the cluster analysis, all 
indicators were standardized using z-scores. 
This made it possible to avoid unequal 
weights arising from different scales of 
measurement. To determine the number of 
clusters and to identify outliers, a hierarchical 
cluster analysis was made based on Ward’s 
Method, using the appropriate squared 
Euclidean distance metric. All indicators were 
given the same weight. Mangystau Oblast 
and the cities of Astana and Almaty were 
excluded from the demographic analysis 
The information tables
At the beginning of each regional 
chapter, there are information tables 
with basic demographic indicators. The 
data come from two sources: for the 
chapters on Russia, we used data from 
Rosstat; for all other chapters, we used 
information from the United Nations. 
Since the latter only provide most of 
the information as five-year-averages, 
the information on population density, 
life expectancy and net migration are 
based on the period from 2005 to 2010, 
thereby deviating from national data, 
which are frequently cited in the texts. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the chapters 
on Russia, the median age rather than 
the mean age was used for reasons of 
data availability.
as outliers while the Republic of Ingushetia 
and the Chechen Republic were excluded 
from the economic analysis for the same 
reason. The standardization was adjusted 
accordingly. Following the visual inspection 
(dendrogram) and evaluation of the results 
with regard to their interpretability, the 
number of clusters was set at five for the 
demographic analysis and four for the 
economic analysis. Finally, the cluster centres 
found with Ward’s Method were used as 
starting points for a k-medians algorithm 
to refine the results and to determine the 
ultimate clusters. The results of Kruskal-
Wallis tests for all indicators confirm that the 
clusters significantly differ from one another.
The final clusters provide orientation in 
classifying demographic and economic 
developments in the post-Soviet space and 
relating them to one another. They are by no 
means definitive, however: other indicators, 
as well as methodological deviations, 
could have resulted in a slightly divergent 
outcome. A few regions are located at the 
“edge” of a particular group and, under other 
circumstances, could have been assigned to 
a different group. These borderline cases, 
however, do not distort the overall picture. 
Considering the restrictions mentioned 
above, the selected model is as precise as 
possible while also ensuring interpretability 
of the results. 
139Indicators und Methods
140  The Waning World Power
Indicator Unit of Measurement Mean Maximum Minimum
Demography
No. of children Total fertility rate
(TFR), 2009
1.68 children 3.71 children 
(South Kazakhstan 
Oblast, Kazakhstan)
1.19 children
(Leningrad Oblast, 
Russia)
Life expectancy Average life expectancy
at birth in years, 2009
68.6 years 78.3 years 
(Republic of 
Ingushetia, Russia)
58.2 years 
(Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug, Russia)
Migration Net migration (immigration 
minus emigration) per 1,000 
inhabitants; mean for the years 
2006 to 2009
– 0.14 people + 40.35 people 
(City of Astana, 
Kazakhstan)
– 15.37 people 
(Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug, Russia)
Ageing Proportion of over 59-year-
olds in the total population in 
percentages, 2009
16.3 percent 24.9 percent 
(Chernihiv Oblast, 
Ukraine)
5.1 percent 
(Tajikistan)
Economy
GDP GDP per capita in purchasing 
power parities in international 
dollars, 2008
10,290 international 
dollars
46,628 international 
dollars 
(Tyumen Oblast, 
Russia)
1,793 international 
dollars 
(Tajikistan)
Employment Share of employed persons (all 
ages) in the total population 
aged 15 to 59 in percentages, 
2008
69.5 percent 101.3 percent 
(Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug, Russia)
20.2 percent 
(Republic of 
Ingushetia, Russia)
Research and 
development
Public and private 
expenditures on research and 
development in percentages of 
GDP, 2008 
0.58 percent 3.42 percent 
(Nizhny Novgorod 
Oblast, Russia)
0.01 percent 
(Qyzylorda Oblast, 
Kazakhstan)
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Special Information Source
Mangystau Oblast and the cities of Astana and Almaty have been 
excluded from the analysis as outliers
Data for Belarus and Ukraine from 2008
Data for the North Caucasus – for example for the Republic of 
Ingushetia – are only partly credible: the slightly higher life 
expectancy is accurate, the difference between it and Russia’s is 
doubtful; data for Ukraine from 2008
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan: National statistical 
committees; other countries: United Nations, World Population 
Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan: National statistical 
committees; other countries: United Nations, World Population 
Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan: National Offices of Statistics; 
other countries: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 
2008 Revision Population Database
Analysis excluding Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, since data were 
not entirely available; Belarus considered on national level for 
reasons of data availability; Chechnya and Ingushetia excluded as 
outliers
Regional price level differences in Ukraine and Kazakhstan not 
considered for reasons of data availability; wealthier regions in 
these countries appear slightly better-off than they might have 
otherwise – accordingly, poorer appear worse-off; for Russia gross 
regional product (GRP) was used. Since it does not take into account 
added value on the supra-regional level, such as federal defence 
expenditures, the sum of all GRPs is about twelve percent lower 
than national GDP. The difference was equally added to all GRPs.
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan: National statistical committees; other 
countries: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
Database
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan: National statistical committees; other 
countries: International Labour Organization
Data for Ukraine were only available as current expenditures for 
research and development, which exclude capital investments. As 
a rule, these differ from total expenditures only minimally, meaning 
there should be no large distortions; values for Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and 
Tajikistan are based on 2007, data for Georgia on 2005
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan: National statistical committees; other 
countries: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database
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